Competing conceptions of modern desert: Vengeful, deontological, and empirical

Cambridge Law Journal

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 145-175

  Robinson, Paul H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 85011492189     PISSN: 00081973     EISSN: 14692139     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S000819730800010X     Document Type: Article

References (132)

1. A. von Hirsch, Doing Justice (New York 1976).
2. A. Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 4th ed., (Cambridge 2005), pp.98–101
3. see, e.g., Cunningham (1993) 14 Cr. App. R. (S) 444 at 447.
4. Sentencing Guideline Council, Overarching Principles: Seriousness (2004).
5. E.g., 204 Pa. Code 1 303.11 (2005)
6. see M. Tonry, “U.S. Sentencing Systems Fragmenting”, in M. Tonry (ed.) Penal Reform in Overcrowded Times (Oxford 2004), pp.21–28, Table 1.1.
7. E.g., Cal. Penal Code 1 1170(a)(1) (West 1985) (“The legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”).
8. E.g., Model Penal Code 1 1.02(2) (Official Draft 1962).
9. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code 1 1.02(2) (adopted May 16, 2007) [hereinafter MPC Amendment].
10. See, for example, the US cases Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984)
11. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183–84 (1976)
12. M. Cotton, “Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment” (2000) 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1313, 1326–1327, 1357.
13. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 461.
14. Exodus 21:24–25.
15. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (New York 1966), p.825.
16. I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge 1991) p.169.
17. See J. Waldron, “Lex Talionis” (1992) 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 25, 25–27.
18. J. Dressler, “The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day Criminal Sentencing” (2005) 38 Akron L. Rev. 853, 860.
19. For a modern defence of this “reciprocity principle,” as it is sometimes called, see L. Crocker, “The Upper Limit of Just Punishment” (1992) 41 Emory L.J. 1059, 1065.
20. See, for example, J.C. Oleson, “Comment: The Punitive Coma” (2002) 90 Calif. L. Rev. 829, n. 59
21. R.L. Christopher, “The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments” (2003) 72 Fordham L. Rev. 93, 127.
22. See N. Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (London 1994), p.17
23. C. L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment (Oxford 1987), p.152.
24. G. P. Fletcher, “The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution” (1999) 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev 51, 58.
25. J. Feinberg and H. Gross (eds.), Philosophy of Law, 2nd ed. (Belmont 1980), p.541.
26. J. Feinberg and J. Coleman (eds.), Philosophy of Law, 6th ed. (Belmont 2000), p.793.
27. The most prominent English advocates of desert, von Hirsch and Duff, conceive of desert in this form, as focusing upon an offender's moral blameworthiness, although they offer different accounts of why this should be so. von Hirsch does so for instrumental reasons, avoiding crime, and Duff for deontological reasons, doing justice. See A. Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford 2001)
28. von Hirsch and Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford 2005).
29. J. Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules” (1955) 64 Philosophical. Review 3, 5. Central here are the writings of Immanuel Kant.
30. See “The Metaphysics of Morals” in H. Reiss, ed., and H. B. Nisbet trans., Immanuel Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge 1991), p.156.
31. S. Pillsbury, “Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment” (1989) 74 Cornell L. Rev. 655, 663.
32. H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., (London 1907), pp.420–21.
33. See P. H. Robinson and J. M. Darley, “Utility of Desert” (1997) 91 Nw. U.L. Rev. 453, 456–58.
34. See, for example, P. H. Robinson and J. M. Darley, Justice, Liability and Blame (Boulder 1995), pp.203–208.
35. P. H. Robinson and R. Kurzban, “Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice” (2007) 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1829.
36. Robinson and Darley, “Utility of Desert,” above note 27, at 457–58.
37. J. E. Kennedy, “Making the Crime Fit the Punishment” (2002) 51 Emory L.J. 753, 838–39 (footnotes omitted).
38. A. von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals (New Brunswick 1985), pp.39–46.
39. See, e.g., J. Vorenberg, Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd ed. (New York 1981), p.40.
40. See, for example, M. S. Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribution, in Responsibility, Character and Emotions” in F. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge 1988), p.180.
41. See, e.g., Robinson and Darley, Justice, Liability and Blame, above note 28, at 14–28, 181–96
42. J. H. Mansfield et al., “Comment, Causation in the Law” (1964) 17 Vand. L. Rev. 487, 494–95.
43. For community views on a wide variety of criminal law issues, see P. H. Robinson, “The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between Philosophical and Empirical, Desert” (2007) 48 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 1831–1843.
44. For a fuller account see Robinson and Darley, “Utility of Desert”, note 27 above
45. P.H. Robinson and J. Darley, “Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy” (2007) 81 So. Calif. L. Rev. 1.
46. E. Rubin, “Just Say No To Retribution” (2003) 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 17, 58
47. C. Haney, “Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain” (1997) 3 Psych. Pub. Pol. and L. 499, 525, 528
48. G. C. Thomas III and D. Edelman, “An Evaluation of Conservation Crime Control Theology” (1988) 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 123, 125
49. M. Tonry, “Theories and Policies Underlying Guidelines Systems” (2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1233, 1264.
50. B. Hudson, Justice through Punishment: A Critique of the “Justice” Model of Corrections (London 1987), ch. 6.
51. D. Dolinko, “Three Mistakes of Retributivism” (1992) 39 U.C.L.A. Law Review 1624, 1657.
52. Rubin, note 40 above, at 33.
53. Dolinko, “Three Mistakes”, above note 42, at 1651.
54. “Three Mistakes”, at 1652.
55. D. Dolinko, “Some Thoughts About Retributivism” (1991) 101 Ethics 537, 559.
56. Feinberg and Coleman, Philosophy of Law, note 22 above, at 794–795
57. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
58. See, e.g., “Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration” (1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1967, 1971
59. D. McCord, “Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital Punishment” 50 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 82 (1998).
60. Rubin, above note 40, at 69 (2003).
61. Rubin, above note 40, at 17.
62. See, e.g., R. E. Harlow, J. M. Darley and P. H. Robinson, “The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining Community Perceptions” (1995) 11 J. Quantitative Criminology 71, 85
63. P. H. Robinson et al., “Codifying Shari'a: International Norms, Legality and the Freedom to Invent New Forms” (2007) 2 J. Comp. Law 1, 47–50.
64. A. Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 4th ed. (London 2000), p.86.
65. See also B. Bosanquet, Some Suggestions in Ethics (London 1918), pp.188, 203
66. J. Braithwaite and P. Petit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (New York 1990), p.180
67. R.A. Duff, “Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment” (1996) 20 Crime and Just. 1, 7.
68. L. Katz, “Criminal Law”, in Dennis Patterson (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (London 1996), pp.80–81.
69. A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History (London 1993), p.218.
70. N. Morris, The Future of Imprisonment (Chicago 1974), pp.75–76.
71. Morris, note 58 above, at 74. Other writers have expressed similar views in different terms.
72. See, e.g., P.H. Rossi and R.A. Berk, Just Punishments: Federal Guidelines and Public Views Compared (New York 1997) pp.2–3
73. H.A. Bedau, “Retributivism and the Theory of Punishment” (1978) 75 J. Phil. 601, 613.
74. See J. Kleinig, Punishment and Desert (Amsterdam 1973), p.114
75. von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes, note 32 above.
76. P. H. Robinson, “The A.L.I.'s Proposed Distributive Principle of'Limiting Retributivism’: Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other than Pure Desert?” (2003) 17 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 3.
77. One of the traditional hudud punishments for a married person who commits adultery (zina)is stoning to death. I. Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist's Primer (Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee trans., Reading 1994), p.523
78. M. Iqbal Siddiqi, The Penal Law of Islam (Lahore 1979), p.51 (1979)
79. US Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, at 1372 (1994).
80. For example, the average offender in the Netherlands was released after 5 months: United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, at 308.
81. R. L. Christopher, “Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of ‘Just’ Punishment” (2002) 96 Nw. U.L. Rev. 843, 893 (footnotes omitted).
82. See A. von Hirsch, “Proportionate Sentences: A Desert Perspective in Principled Sentencing” in A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth (eds.) Readings on Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. (London 1998) 173–74.
83. For a general discussion of these matters, see Robinson and Kurzban, “Concordance and Conflict”, note 29 above, at Parts I-III.
84. A.M. Durham III, “Public Opinion Regarding Sentences for Crime: Does it Exist?” (1993) 21 J. Crim. Justice 1, 2.
85. Ashworth, note 55 above, at 86.
86. M. Tunick, Punishment: Theory and Practice (Berkeley 1992) p.107.
87. J. Monahan, “The Case for Prediction in the Modified Desert Model of Criminal Sentencing” (1982) 5 Int'l J. L. and Psychiatry 103, 105
88. M. Tonry, “Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy” (2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1233, 1263
89. Dolinko, “Three Mistakes”, note 42 above, at 1638–1639
90. E. van den Haag, “Punishment: Desert and Crime Control” (1987) 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1250, 1254.
91. Robinson and Kurzban, “Concordance and Conflict”, note 29 above, at Part II.A. and B.
92. See Robinson and Darley, Justice, Liability and Blame, note 28 above.
93. L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, “Fairness Versus Welfare” (2000) 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 1007
94. E. Luna, “Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice” 2003 Utah Law Review 205.
95. J. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 4th ed., (New York 2006) p.22.
96. A. Sanders, “What Principles Underlie Criminal Justice Policies in the 1990's?” (1998) 18 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 533, 538.
97. See, e.g, Model Penal Code 1 1.02(1) (1962).
98. See, for example, Luna, “Punishment Theory”, note 78 above
99. J. G. Murphy, “Symposium on Kantian Legal Theory: Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?” (1987) 87 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 517
100. Dolinko, Three Mistakes, note 42 above, at 1635.
101. Christopher, “Injustice of Just Punishment”, note 66 above. As one writer expresses in a related concern, “Just deserts tends to mean fair distribution within an existing penalty system, regardless of whether that system is itself just.”
102. D. J. Galligan, “Guidelines and Just Deserts: A Critique of Recent Trends in Sentencing Reform” 1981 Crim. L.R. 297, 305.
103. M. S. Moore, Placing Blame, a General Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford 1997), pp.207–208.
104. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge 1971), p.48.
105. A Theory of Justice
106. L. Katz, “Incommensurable Choices and the Problem of Moral Ignorance” (1998) 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1465, 1482–1483.
107. Robinson, “Moral Philosophers”, note 38 above.
108. I.H. Nagel, “Supreme Court Review: Foreword: Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines New Federal (1990) 80 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 883, 920.
109. S. Breyer, “The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest” (1988) 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 15–17 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
110. Breyer, note 95 above, at 15–16.
111. See, for example, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1 13–601 (2006)
112. Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 18–1–104 (1999)
113. Kan. Stat. Ann. 1 21–4704 et seq. (1995)
114. Neb. Rev. Stat. 28–105, 106 (1995).
115. The United States Sentencing Guidelines represent the far end of this spectrum, with 43 offense levels. US Sentencing Guidelines Manual 1 5A (Nov. 2004) available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/gl2004.pdf.
116. See Robinson and Kurzban, “Concordance and Conflict” note 29 above.
117. Robinson and Darley, Justice, Liability and Blame, note 28 above
118. See Robinson and Kurzban, “Concordance and Conflict”, note 29 above, at Part IV.
119. See, e.g., P. H. Robinson and M. T. Cahill, Law Without Justice (New York 2006) pp.90, 137, 186.
120. See, for example, J. S. Hall, “Note: Guided to Injustice?: The Effect of Sentencing Guidelines on Indigent Defendants and Public Defense” (1999) 36 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1331 1364–1365.
121. Tonry, “Obsolescence and Immanence”, note 74 above, at 1264. Andrew von Hirsch offers a different response to this kind of objection. He argues that, under deontological desert, the onerousness of punishment should reflect the degree to which the penalty intrudes on punished persons' rights, not their subjective preferences. The subjective-preference view holds only for deterrence theories.
122. A. von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford 1993), pp. 33–35.
123. See for example A. J. Hosmanek, “Cutting the Cord: Ho'oponopono and Hawaiian Restorative Justice in the Criminal Law Context” (2005) 5 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 359, 370
124. C. Slobogin, “The Civilization of the Criminal Law” (2005) 58 Vand. L. Rev. 121, 147
125. R. Shafer-Landau, “The Failure of Retributivism” (1996) 82 Phil. Studies 289, 299
126. Tonry, note 40 above
127. Rubin, note 40 above
128. Dolinko, note 42 above
129. Lacey, note 19 above
130. Dressler, note 78 above
131. Luna, note 78 above
132. Murphy, note 83 above.