The 1999 NPT prepcom

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 118-133

  Rauf, Tariq ^a   Simpson, John ^b  

^a MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85011476699     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709908436755     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. While these dates were provisionally agreed at the 1997 PrepCom and subsequently confirmed at the 1998 PrepCom, a proposal is under consideration to shift the PrepCom to May 3-14 (or April 26-May 7 in the event the UN Disarmament Commission is cut back to two weeks). While the dates were still subject to finalization at the time of writing in late January, this issue does not have any material bearing on the issues and questions discussed here.
2. PrepCom and subsequently confirmed See, “Worthwhile NPT Review outcomes in the lead-up to the 2000 NPT Review Conference,” Peace and Disarmament News (August 1998), p. 90.
3. Ben Sanders is probably the first analyst to make this observation. See Ben Sanders, “NPT Review Conferences and the 1995 Extension Conference: Working Towards Consensus,” in Tariq Rauf, ed., Extending the NPT: Perpetuating the Global Norm, Aurora Papers 27 (Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1995), pp.43-44.
4. Ben Sanders “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Treaty Series, Vol. 729 (United Nations, New York).1995.
5. Ben Sanders Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons, Final Document: Parti-Organization and Work of the Conference, Decision 1, “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty,” (United Nations, New York: 1995), Annex, p. 8.
6. Ben Sanders., Parti-Organization and Work of the Conference Decision 2, “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” Annex, pp. 9-12.
7. Ben Sanders Parti-Organization and Work of the Conference., Decision 3, “Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Annex, pp. 12-13.
8. Ben Sanders “Resolution on the Middle East,” Annex, pp. 13-14.
9. Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of Foreign Affairs (Canada), A Non-Paper on Strengthening Review Conferences (Ottawa, March 1995).
10. See, Jayantha Dhanapala (Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations), “The NPT Regime: External and Internal Challenges,” statement at The Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, January 11, 1999, .
11. Jayantha Dhanapala NPT/CONF. 1995/32 (Part 1), Decision 1, paragraph 4.
12. See, for example, Jayantha Dhanapala NPT/CONF NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.2, the statements by the Netherlands (on behalf of the European Union), China, Canada, South Africa, and Japan at the 1997 session, pp. 2-16.
13. Jayantha Dhanapala NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/SR.1 (April 30,1998), the statement by South Africa.
14. Jayantha Dhanapala NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/SR.3 (May 4, 1998), statement by Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Egypt.
15. Jayantha Dhanapala NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32 (18 April 1997), p. 3.
16. Jayantha Dhanapala NPT/CONF. 1995/1 (February 1, 1995).
17. Jayantha Dhanapala Final Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Annex V: “Proposed Allocation of Items to the Main Committees of the Conference.”
18. Jayantha Dhanapala NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/34 (May 8, 1998), “Proposals for inclusion in the Report of the Preparatory Committee at its second session-Submitted by Canada.”
19. Jayantha Dhanapala NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/CRP.2 (May 7, 1998), “III. Substantive Issues” (paragraph 21), p. 9.
20. Jayantha Dhanapala NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/36 (9 June 1998), Report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session, .
21. Jayantha Dhanapala Refer to the Indicative Timetable of the second session of the PrepCom, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/INF.2 (April 28, 1998).
22. Jayantha Dhanapala NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/35 (9 June 1998), Chairman’s Working Paper, .
23. Summary of Statement by The Hon.orable Lawrence Scheinman (Assistant Director for Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting, New York, April 8, 1998, p. 9 (paragraph 41).
24. Lawrence Scheinman Summary of Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang (China), Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, Summary Record of the 2nd Meeting, April 8, 1998, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.2, p. 8 (para-graphs 34-35).
25. Lawrence Scheinman., NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.2 p. 10 (paragraph 44).
26. Lawrence Scheinman., NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.2 p. 24 (paragraph 123).
27. Dhanapala, “The NPT Regime.”
28. Dhanapala NPT/CONF. 1995/32/DEC.l, paragraph 7, May 11, 1995.
29. Dhanapala NPT/CONF.2000/PC.1/32, p. 12.
30. Dhanapala NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/35, p. 1.
31. Dhanapala Article 1X:3 of the Treaty states that “For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.”
32. See, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Address at The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, November 12, 1998, “US Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report,” . In his talk, Talbott refers to the “irreversibility” in the foreseeable future of the nuclear weapon programs of India and Pakistan.
33. Strobe Talbott Under this article non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty commit themselves “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices.” In this context, however, it might be appropriate to point out that the difficulty of effectively monitoring or verifying the destruction of weapons programs under non-negotiated and non-cooperative circumstances, as in the case of Iraq, and where in addition the inspecting agency might have compromised its neutrality, does not say much about the usefulness of verification and monitoring conducted as part of negotiated arms control agreements that facilitate cooperative monitoring, as in the case of the NPT.
34. International Court of Justice, “Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations),” Communique No. 96/23 (July 8, 1996).
35. Harald Muller and Makarim Wibisono, Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament: Two Views, PPNN Issue Review No. 12, April 1998.
36. Harald Muller and Makarim Wibisono NPTREC.1995, Document 2, paragraph 4. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Article XIV. 1.
37. Harald Muller and Makarim Wibisono Conference on Disarmament, CD/1299. Text available on-line at .The eight are Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden.
38. Harald Muller and Makarim Wibisono NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/2, Statement by the delegations of France, China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament at the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference; and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/8, Letter dated April 29,1998, from the Head of the Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, transmitting a statement by the delegations of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.
39. Special Defense Department Briefing with Defense Secretary William Cohen, A Iso Participating: Joint Chiefs ofStaffChairman Gen: Hugh Shelton and BMDO Director Gen. Lester Lyles, US Department of Defense, January 20, 1999.
40. Harald Muller and Makarim Wibisono National Security Staff Briefing on Defense and Arms Control by Robert Bell (Special Assistant to the President for National Defense and Arms Control), The White House, January 21,1999.
41. Steven Lee Myers, “US Asking Russia to ease the pact on missile defense-threatens to end Treaty…,” The New York Times, January 21, 1999, p. A1.
42. See, Bill Gertz, “Russia, China denounce US plans for missile defense,” The Washington Times, January 22, 1999, p. 5.
43. David Hoffman, “Russia says START II is Imperilled: US Missile System Plan Could End Hopes for Ratification,” The Washington Post, January 22, 1999, p. 5.
44. David Hoffman, A/RES/53/77D, adopted by consensus, on “Mongolia’s International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status.”
45. David Hoffman A/RES/53/77A, adopted by consensus, on “Establishment of a Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.”
46. David Hoffman A/RES/53/74, adopted by consensus, on “Establishment of a Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East.”
47. David Hoffman A/RES/53/77Q, adopted by 154:3:10, on “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas.”
48. David Hoffman The nine states are Belgium, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. See IAEA, Communication Received From Certain Member States Concerning Their Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549 (March 16, 1998).