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73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735-1828, at
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Richard Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735-1828 (1985), at 1740.
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(1985)
Causation in Tort Law
, pp. 1740
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Wright, R.1
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3
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Lawful Sufficiency and Causal Sufficiency, 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 83-105, at
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Richard Fumerton & Ken Kress, Causation and the Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency and Causal Sufficiency, 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 83-105 (2001), at 102.
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(2001)
Causation and the Law: Preemption
, pp. 102
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Fumerton, R.1
Kress, K.2
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4
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0347125347
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70 J. Phil. 556-567 (1973) David Lewis, 2 Philosophical Papers, see, e.g., id., Postscript E to “Causation.”
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David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. Phil. 556-567 (1973) David Lewis, 2 Philosophical Papers (1986), see, e.g., id., Postscript E to “Causation.”
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(1986)
Causation
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Lewis, D.1
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5
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85022363934
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Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 402; Barnett v. Kensington & Chelsea Hosp., [] 1 Q.B. 428. Many other authorities could be cited.
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Cork v. Kirby Maclean, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 402; Barnett v. Kensington & Chelsea Hosp., [1969] 1 Q.B. 428. Many other authorities could be cited.
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(1969)
Cork v. Kirby Maclean
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6
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33846487285
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in Causation and Counterfactuals 75-106 (J. Collins, N. Hall & L. A. Paul eds., ).
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David Lewis, Causation as Influence, in Causation and Counterfactuals 75-106 (J. Collins, N. Hall & L. A. Paul eds., 2004).
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(2004)
Causation as Influence
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Lewis, D.1
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in Causation and Counterfactuals 107-117 (J. Collins, N. Hall & L. A. Paul eds., 2004); Jonathan Schaffer, Trumping Preemption, in Causation and Counterfactuals 59-73 (J. Collins, N. Hall & L. A. Paul eds., ).
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John Collins, Preemptive Prevention, in Causation and Counterfactuals 107-117 (J. Collins, N. Hall & L. A. Paul eds., 2004); Jonathan Schaffer, Trumping Preemption, in Causation and Counterfactuals 59-73 (J. Collins, N. Hall & L. A. Paul eds., 2004).
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(2004)
Preemptive Prevention
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Collins, J.1
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8
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60949522641
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15 Int'l J. Phil. Stud. 169-189, at 177 see also the Smart Rock example in Ned Hall, Two Concepts of Causation, in Causation and Counterfactuals 225-276 (J. Collins, N. Hall & L. A. Paul eds., 2004), at
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Alex Broadbent, Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation, 15 Int'l J. Phil. Stud. 169-189 (2007), at 177 see also the Smart Rock example in Ned Hall, Two Concepts of Causation, in Causation and Counterfactuals 225-276 (J. Collins, N. Hall & L. A. Paul eds., 2004), at 237.
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(2007)
Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation
, pp. 237
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Broadbent, A.1
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12
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[1988] 1 All E.R. 871; and McGhee v. Nat'l Coal Bd. [] 1 W.L.R. 1 (HL); subsequently resolved by Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs., Ltd., & Others, [2003] 1 A.C. 32.
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Again, this is well illustrated by the tension between Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1988] 1 All E.R. 871; and McGhee v. Nat'l Coal Bd. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1 (HL); subsequently resolved by Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs., Ltd., & Others, [2003] 1 A.C. 32.
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(1973)
Again, this is well illustrated by the tension between Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Auth
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14
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Ratiocinative and Inductive 237 (8th ed. 1887). The Mill-Lewis line is also discussed in Jonathan Schaffer, Contrastive Causation, 114 Phil. Rev. 297-328, at
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John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive 237 (8th ed. 1887). The Mill-Lewis line is also discussed in Jonathan Schaffer, Contrastive Causation, 114 Phil. Rev. 297-328 (2005), at 342-343.
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(2005)
A System of Logic
, pp. 342-343
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Stuart Mill, J.1
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15
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0346032466
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in Jurisprudence: Cambridge Essays 127-148 (H. Gross & T.R. Harrison eds., ).
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Peter Lipton, Causation Outside the Law, in Jurisprudence: Cambridge Essays 127-148 (H. Gross & T.R. Harrison eds., 1992).
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(1992)
Causation Outside the Law
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Lipton, P.1
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17
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
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Jonathan Schaffer, The Metaphysics of Causation, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
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(2007)
The Metaphysics of Causation
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Schaffer, J.1
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On the Nature and the Observability of the Causal Relation, 23 J. Phil. 57-68 Lipton, The Metaphysics of Causation note 17 Peter Menzies, Causation in Context, in Russell's Republic Revisited: Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality 191-223 (Huw Price & Richard Corry eds., 2007); Alex Broadbent, The Difference between Cause and Condition, Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y (2008)
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Other philosophical defenses of selective notions of causation include C. J. Ducasse, On the Nature and the Observability of the Causal Relation, 23 J. Phil. 57-68 (1926); Lipton, The Metaphysics of Causation note 17 Peter Menzies, Causation in Context, in Russell's Republic Revisited: Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality 191-223 (Huw Price & Richard Corry eds., 2007); Alex Broadbent, The Difference between Cause and Condition, Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y (2008) 355-364.
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(1926)
Other philosophical defenses of selective notions of causation include C. J. Ducasse
, pp. 355-364
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[1773] 2 Bl. R. 892. Legal scholars may be uneasy about the fact that this case concerns trespass, not negligence; indeed it considerably predates the tort of negligence as we now know it. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how that can excuse theorists of the modern tort of negligence from answering Blackstone's challenge, especially since the case remains an authority in negligence (albeit a venerable one).
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Scott v. Shepherd, [1773] 2 Bl. R. 892. Legal scholars may be uneasy about the fact that this case concerns trespass, not negligence; indeed it considerably predates the tort of negligence as we now know it. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how that can excuse theorists of the modern tort of negligence from answering Blackstone's challenge, especially since the case remains an authority in negligence (albeit a venerable one).
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Scott v. Shepherd
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(2d ed. 2004), ch. 3; Peter Lipton, Contrastive Explanation, in Explanation and Its Limits 246-266 (D. Knowles ed., 1990); see also David Lewis, Causal Explanation, in 2 Philosophical Papers 214-241 (1986); Adam Garfinkle, Forms of Explanation 28-41 (1981); Bas Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image
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Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (2d ed. 2004), ch. 3; Peter Lipton, Contrastive Explanation, in Explanation and Its Limits 246-266 (D. Knowles ed., 1990); see also David Lewis, Causal Explanation, in 2 Philosophical Papers 214-241 (1986); Adam Garfinkle, Forms of Explanation 28-41 (1981); Bas Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image 126-129 (1980).
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(1980)
Inference to the Best Explanation
, pp. 126-129
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Lipton, P.1
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at 345. Schaffer's theory differs from Lipton's, proposing “c rather that C * causes e rather than E *” as the underlying form of causal claims. Lipton's contrastive theory specifies a contrast for the effect only, however, which is then supposed to determine (or narrow down) the selection of the cause.
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Schaffer, I am grateful to Jonathan Schaffer for this counterexample note note 15, at 345. Schaffer's theory differs from Lipton's, proposing “c rather that C * causes e rather than E *” as the underlying form of causal claims. Lipton's contrastive theory specifies a contrast for the effect only, however, which is then supposed to determine (or narrow down) the selection of the cause.
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I am grateful to Jonathan Schaffer for this counterexample note note 15
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Schaffer1
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Contrastive explanations are answers to contrastive why questions, and explaining why we ask the questions we do is “not part of providing a model of explanation, as that task has traditionally been construed”; Lipton, I am grateful to Jonathan Schaffer for this counterexample note note 15 note 28, Inference to the Best Explanation, at
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Contrastive accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science do not provide inspiration here either. Contrastive explanations are answers to contrastive why questions, and explaining why we ask the questions we do is “not part of providing a model of explanation, as that task has traditionally been construed”; Lipton, I am grateful to Jonathan Schaffer for this counterexample note note 15 note 28, Inference to the Best Explanation, at 46.
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Contrastive accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science do not provide inspiration here either
, pp. 46
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