Sense and Quasisense of Schmitt's Großraum Theory in International Law – A Rejoinder to Carty's “Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberal International Legal Order”

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 53-68

  Gattini, Andrea ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF URBINO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Carty; Gro raum; Nazi ideology; neoliberalism; Schmitt

Indexed keywords

EID: 85011465092     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S092215650200002X     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. Cf. M. Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 Harv. Int'l L. J. 397 (1991); N. Mac Cormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MLR 1 (1993); C. Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State, 4 EJIL 447 (1993); O. Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications for International Law, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 7 (1997); A. Hurrell & N. Woods, Globalization and Inequality, 24 Millennium 447 (1995); B. Kinsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EJIL 599 (1998).
2. Cf. P.-M. Dupuy, International Law: Torn Between Coexistence, Cooperation and Globalization, 9 EJIL 278 (1998).
3. Cf. M. Reisman, Designing and Managing the Future of the State, 8 EJIL 409 (1997).
4. For an excellent survey of current debate on globalization from political, sociological and legal perspectives see A. Paulus, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht 97 et seq. (Munich, 2001).
5. Cf. S. Latouche, L'occidentalisation du monde (Paris, 1989); S. Sur, The State between Fragmentation and Globalization, 8 EJIL 421 (1997).
6. G. Simpson, Two Liberalisms, 12 EJIL 537 (2001).
7. Cf. A.-M. Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EJIL 503 (1995).
8. Actually Slaughter still owes us an explanation on how she sees the relations between the world of liberal states and the non-liberal ones. She acknowledges that the division between liberal and non-liberal states “is likely to recall the 19th century distinctions between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ States,” but limits herself to observe that “exclusionary norms are unlikely to be effective” in regulating the relationships between the two worlds (Slaughter, id., at 506). Anyway, given the demonization of the non-liberal states, it is quite obvious that the relations between liberal and non-liberal states would be reduced to a minimum and would be hostile. This outcome is implied in the author's thoughts on the “liberal peace” that would characterize the relations between liberal states, unlike their relations to non-liberal states (id., at 509), and in the further reflection that the new liberal concept of sovereignty “would exist side by side with more traditional conceptions, which are still accurate and important in relations between liberal and non-liberal States.” In clear text, the sovereignty of non-liberal states is “subject to violation primarily by coercive intervention” by other states or by international institutions (id., at 536, n. 68). Simpson, International Law in a World of Liberal States note 6, at 562 counts Slaughter among the “mild antipluralists,” in contrast to F.R. Teson and M. Reisman whom he considers “strong antipluralists,” because he finds that “the question of outlawry is not exercised much by Slaughter.” I am rather inclined to think that Slaughter's vagueness on this central point was intended.
9. Cf. P. Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 8 EJIL 435, at 441 (1997). For more criticisms on Slaughter's premises and thesis see S. Marks, “The End of History”. Reflections on Some International Legal Thesis, 8 EJIL 449, at 470-472 (1997); M. Koskenniemi, Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in International Relations, in M. Byers (Ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics 17 (Oxford, 2000); J.E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 EJIL 183 (2001); Paulus, Actually Slaughter still owes us an explanation on how she sees the relations between the world of liberal states and the non-liberal ones. note 4, at 205 et seq.
10. A. Carty, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberal International Legal Order Between 1933 and 1945, 14 LJIL 25 (2001) (hereinafter ‘Carl Schmitt's Critique'). Actually, this does not come as a surprise. In his well known critique of theories on international law, Carty had proposed an “ethnical” view, based on the priority of nations in their historical reality over every possible system of international law, A. Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law, 2 EJIL 66, at 93 (1991) (hereinafter ‘Critical International Law'). International law norms are seen as islands in an ocean of lacunae, as concretions formed by the accidental correspondence of the “cultural presuppositions” of different ethnics. It follows that an international discourse could only ever be possible between culturally homogeneous ethnics. Undoubtedly one feels reminded here of concepts similar to the “Artverwandheit” cherished by the Nazis.
11. Carty, Carl Schmitt's Critique, id., at 28.
12. Id., at 29. The outburst of sympathy is even more disturbing, if one recalls that some years ago it was Carty, who meticulously and critically hunted out every slightest trace of Verdross's association with National Socialism in the thirties, see A. Carty, Alfred Verdross and Othmar Spann: German Romantic Nationalism, National Socialism and International Law, 6 EJIL 78 (1995). Carty's attempt to establish a nexus between Verdross's international law theory and Nazi Weltanschauung, starting from Verdross's early sympathy for pangerman nationalistic political parties, is beside the point. “Verdross's catholic universalism and National Socialism are simply irreconcilable,” as is concisely and perfectly rightly put by Paulus, Carl Schmitt's Critique note 4, at 175.
13. Cf. Carty, Carl Schmitt's Critique, The outburst of sympathy is even more disturbing, if one recalls that some years ago it was Carty, who meticulously and critically hunted out every slightest trace of Verdross's association with National Socialism in the thirties note 10, at 60: Schmitt does offer a reasoned, in the sense of limited, critique of Anglo-American international law ideology that continues to have considerable credibility.
14. A typical exponent of this mystification is H. Quaritsch, Positionen und Begriffe Carl Schmitts, 2nd Edn., at 121 (Berlin, 1991), who speaks of “Abschied vom Kampf.”
15. B. Rüthers, Entartetes Recht, at 142 et seq. (Munich, 1988). M. Schmoeckel, Die Grossraumtheorie, at 151 (1994), notices a substantial continuity in Schmitt's post war writings on the Groβraum, which for the author should suffice to discharge Schmitt from the reproach of a slavish opportunism. The fact that after the war Schmitt sometimes used the Groβraum concept in a polemic mode to explain the political influence of the US in the western hemisphere (see the examples given by Schmoeckel, Positionen und Begriffe Carl Schmitts, at 80) does not change the truth that it was originally developed in order to provide a theoretical cloak to the Nazis’ expansionistic and aggressive goals.
16. Cf. C. Schmitt, Der Führer schützt das Recht, Deutsche Juristenzeitung, column 945 (1934).
17. On the course and intrigue of this infamous congress strongly wanted by Schmitt see Rüthers, Der Führer schützt das Recht note 15, at 135 et seq. The conclusive speech held by Schmitt is published in Deutsche Juristenzeitung, column 1193 (1936). That Schmitt's anti-Semitism was far from being a transient weakness is proved by his post war writings. In his post war diary one can read entries like the following: “Gerade der assimilierte Jude ist der wahre Feind”; “Denn Juden bleiben immer Juden. Während der Kommunist sich bessern und ändern kann”, cf. E. Freiherr von Medem (Ed.), Glossarium. Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951, at 18, 255 (Berlin, 1991). For an appraisal of the Glossarium see R. Mehring, Zu Carl Schmitts Dämonologie, 32 Rechtstheorie 258 (1992). Therefore the affirmations by J.W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt at Nuremberg, 72 Telos 91, at 95 (1987): “He never succumbed to racism,” and by Schmoeckel, Der Führer schützt das Recht note 15, at 144: “Das Rassendenken hat Schmitt grundsätzlich nicht rezipiert” are totally untenable.
18. The circumstances of Schmitt's imprisonment and release are exhaustively depicted in an apologetical mode by Benderski, id.
19. Schmitt himself provided a mystifying version of this episode of his life, cast as a piece of literature, see C. Schmitt, Ex captivitate salus (Köln, 1950).
20. C. Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde (Berlin, 1950). According to Quaritsch, Schmitt himself provided a mystifying version of this episode of his life note 14, at 121 the book was already finished by 1945.
21. C. Schmitt, Der Völkerbund und Europa, in Quaritsch, Schmitt himself provided a mystifying version of this episode of his life note 14, at 88 et seq. It was the text of a conference held on 29 October 1927 for the ‘Gesellschaft der Freunde und Förderer der Universität Bonn’ and originally published in Hochland, January 1928, at 345.
22. C. Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Formen des modernen Imperialismus, in Quaritsch, Der Völkerbund und Europa note 14, at 162 et seq., and originally published in 8 Könisberger Auslandsstudien 117-142 (1933).
23. Id., at 169. In the original “Die merkwürdige Elastizität und Dehnbarkeit, diese Offenhaltung vor allen Dingen auch der Alternative Recht oder Politik.”
24. The concept of Hegung, as the act of founding and spatially circumscribing, and at the same time legitimizing and restraining, plays a fundamental role in Schmitt's reconstruction of the jus publicum europeum, see Schmitt, the original “Die merkwürdige Elastizität und Dehnbarkeit, diese Offenhaltung vor allen Dingen auch der Alternative Recht oder Politik.” note 21, at 44: Diese Erkenntnis, dass Recht und Frieden ursprünglich auf Hegungen im räumlichen Sinne beruhen, wird uns im weiteren Verlauf unserer Betrachtung noch öfters begegnen und fruchtbar werden. (Emphasis in original.)
25. C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 2nd Ed., at 32 (Berlin, 1932): Solange ein Volk in der Sphäre des Politischen existiert, muβ es, wenn auch nur für den extremsten Fall-über dessen Vorliegen es aber selbst entscheidet-die Unterscheidung von Freund und Feind Selber durch eigene Entscheidung und auf eigene Gefahr bestimmen. Darin liegt das Wesen seiner politischen Existenz.
26. Cf. C. Schmitt, Die letzte globale Linie, in E. Zechlin (Ed.), Völker und Meere 342 (Leipzig, 1944).
27. In considering Hitler as a model for Schmitt, and comparing Hitler's absolute and fanatic radicality with Schmitt's outlook, Carty plays down Schmitt's enterprise as a “mixture of extreme naiveté and irresponsibility”, Carty, Carl Schmitt's Critique, Die letzte globale Linie note 10, at 71, but he knowingly abuses himself when he reduces Schmitt's main purpose of re-establishing Germany “as a regional power, with rights equal to other regional powers”, id., at 69.
28. Cf. E. Bristler (pseudonym for J. Herz), Die Völkerrechtslehre des Nationalsozialismus (Zürich, 1938). See also Gruchmann, considering Hitler as a model for Schmitt, and comparing Hitler's absolute and fanatic radicality with Schmitt's outlook, Carty plays down Schmitt's enterprise as a “mixture of extreme naiveté and irresponsibility” note 20, at 138; Schmoeckel, considering Hitler as a model for Schmitt, and comparing Hitler's absolute and fanatic radicality with Schmitt's outlook, Carty plays down Schmitt's enterprise as a “mixture of extreme naiveté and irresponsibility” note 15, at 112.
29. At any rate this attitude was shared by most German international lawyers, beyond their personal adherence to the Nazi movement, see V. Bruns, Deutschland Gleichberechtigung (Berlin, 1934).
30. I do not agree with Carty, Carl Schmitt's Critique, The ostracism of which Schmitt was purportedly the victim from 1936 on, especially from the SS and specifically because of his nationalistic clerical political and philosophical origin, is emphasized by Schmitt's followers note 10, at 42, that Schmitt's concept of the Political Idea unconditionally reflected the Nazi racial ideology; it rather seems to me that Schmitt's main thrust was to establish a totalitarian system through the assertion of the Führer principle and the reordering of societies along ethnical divides. It is telling that Schmitt's Grossraum does not coincide with the more orthodox Nazi views on Lebensraum, represented by R. Höhn, Grossraumordnung und völkisches Rechtsdenken, 1 Reich-Volksordnung-Lebensraum 256 (1941); and W. Best, Völkische Grossraumordnung, 10 Deutsches Recht 1006 (1940); cf. Schmoeckel, The ostracism of which Schmitt was purportedly the victim from 1936 on, especially from the SS and specifically because of his nationalistic clerical political and philosophical origin, is emphasized by Schmitt's followers note 15, at 139 et seq. and 188 et seq.
31. The point was already made clear by the contemporary German doctrine, cf. F. Klein, Die staats-und völkerrechtliche Stellung des Protektorats Böhmen und Mähren, 31 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 262 (1940). Although Art. 3 of the Decree vaguely spoke of “sovereign rights” to be exercised by officials of the Protectorate, all government members had to be nominated and could at any time be removed by the Reichsprotektor (Art. 5(3)), the German Government could enact statutes for the Protectorate whenever it judged suitable and could assume directly the administration of some sectors (Art. 11).
32. For an irony on history, a very similar thesis was brought forward by German authors after the war in order to explain the peculiar power of Poland over the former Eastern German territories, cf. A. Verdross, B. Simma & R. Geiger, The Oder-Neiβe Frage (Bonn, 1972).
33. Cf. F. Klein, Zur Stellung des Generalgouvernements in der Verfassung des Grossdeutschen Reichs, 32 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 227 (1941).
34. On the Generalplan Ost envisaged by the Reichssichereitshauptamt and the German occupation regime in Poland see M. Rössler, Generalplan Ost (Berlin, 1993); B. Wasser, Himmlers Raumplanung im Osten. Der Generalplan Ost in Polen 1940-1944 (Basel, 1993); and the classical, still valuable works by M. Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939-1945 (Stuttgart, 1961); C. Madajczyk, Die deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Polen 1939-1945 (Wiesbaden, 1967).
35. Cf. Carty, Carl Schmitt's Critique, On the Generalplan Ost envisaged by the Reichssichereitshauptamt and the German occupation regime in Poland note 10, at 43.
36. Author's translation (emphasis added). The manifesto was published in the Giornale d'Italia, the official fascist press organ on 14 July 1938.
37. Carty, Carl Schmitt's Critique, Author's translation (emphasis added). note 10, at 27.
38. On this point see Simpson, Author's translation (emphasis added). note 6, who speaks of “Charter liberalism” in opposition to “liberal antipluralism.”
39. Also the title of the leading German textbook of international law, A. Verdross & B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht (Berlin, 1976); G. Abi-Saab, International Law and the International Community: the Long Road to Universality, in R. Macdonald (Ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya 31 (London, 1994).
40. What was established with the International Monetary Fund, the World bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ('GATT') was rather, to use the expression of Picone, the “inner universalization of the capitalistic system,” see P. Picone, Diritto internazionale dell'economia e costituzione economica dell'ordinamento internazionale, XVI Comunicazioni e Studi 137 (1980).
41. On this issue see B. Badie, L'Etat importé, l'occidentalisation de l'ordre politique (Paris, 1992); O.C. Okafor, After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa, 41 Harv. Int'l L. J. 503 (2000).
42. Cf. P. Gerbet, La construction de l'Europe, 2nd Edn., at 44 (Paris, 1994); M. Dumoulin, Plans des temps de guerre pour l'Europe d'après-guerre 1940-1947 (Brussels, 1993).
43. For a pleading of the recovery of the normative dimension of liberal international political theory see C. Reus-Smit, The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory, 12 EJIL 573 (2001).
44. The phenomenon of economic regionalism has reached such proportions that it could no longer be excluded as a possible alternative system to the World Trade Organization, see H.G. Preusse, Regional Integration in the Nineties, 28 JWT 147 (1994); J.H. Jackson, Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 873 (1996); H.A. Grigera Naón, Sovereignty and Regionalism, in id., at 1073. Contra S. Hobe, Völkerrecht im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, 37 Archiv des Völkerrechts 253 (1999), according to whom the proliferation of regional groups would characterize a transitional era pointing at a better and in time full integration in the world economic system. This theory views the phenomenon of trade regionalism as “building blocks” instead of “stumbling blocks,” for a recent view on this see S. Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 Harv. Int'l L. J. 419 (2001).
45. Of course, the more macroscopic debate is the one on the so called “human rights relativity.” On this issue see among others A.A. An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World, 3 Harvard Human Rights Journal 13 (1990); Y. Ghai, Human Rights and Governance, The Asia Debate, 15 Australian Yearbook of International Law 1 (1994); T.M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?, 91 AJIL 593 (1997).
46. Cf. J.A. Frowein, Die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts, in K. Dicke (Ed.), Berichte der deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 427 (Heidelberg, 1999). See also the Symposium held at the Heidelberg Max-Planck-Institut on the occasion of Frowein's 65th birthday, Grenzüberschreitende Konstitutionalisierungsprozesse, 59 ZaöRV 901 (1999).
47. Another matter is Schmitt's possible influence on the debate on the development of Europe. Some of those who hold him in high esteem try to actualize his thesis in the framework of that current of thought known as the “conservative revolution,” which aims at the reestablishment of a “Christian Europe,” on this subject see Carty, Carl Schmitt's Critique, Die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts note 10, at 74.
48. Carty, id., at 56.
49. Cf. A.-M. Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AJIL 205 (1993); A.-M. Slaughter, A.S. Tulumello & S. Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AJIL 367 (1998); A.-M. Slaughter, International Law and International Relations, 285 Recueil des cours 9 (2000).
50. The expression is used by Koskenniemi, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda note 9, at 33.
51. Cf. Reus-Smit, The expression is used by Koskenniemi note 51, at 586.
52. Cf. S. Marks, The expression is used by Koskenniemi note 9, at 467. See also S. Marks, Big Brother is Bleeping Us-With the Message that Ideology Doesn't Matter, 12 EJIL 109 (2001).
53. Koskenniemi, The expression is used by Koskenniemi note 9, at 34.