The constitutional foundations of judicial review: Conceptual conundrum or interpretative inquiry?

Cambridge Law Journal

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 87-125

  Allan, T R S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85011453530     PISSN: 00081973     EISSN: 14692139     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S000819730200154X     Document Type: Article

References (156)

1. H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 8th edn. (2000), pp. 35–37.
2. Administrative Law.
3. See Christopher Forsyth, “Heat and Light: A Plea for Reconciliation”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution (2000), pp. 408–409.
4. The connections between the ultra vires debate, as currently conducted, and the various schools or styles of public law thought more generally will be examined below. For a helpful account of the main styles of thought, see Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (1992).
5. See also Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration, 2nd edn. (1997), chs. 2 & 3.
6. The nature of parliamentary sovereignty is, however, examined by Mark Elliott in the context of his defence of ultra vires: see Elliott, “The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty? The Implications for Justifying Judicial Review” (1999)
7. 115 L.Q.R. 119
8. The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (2001), ch. 3.
9. Although Elliott is willing to contemplate the existence of (modest) limits to the scope of parliamentary sovereignty, he fails to see their implications for administrative power: see Allan, “The Rule of Law as the Foundation of Judicial Review”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution, pp. 413–414.
10. Paul Craig, “Public Law, Political Theory and Legal Theory” [2000] PL. 211, at pp. 236–237.
11. See H.W.R. Wade, “The Basis of Legal Sovereignty” [1955] C.L.J. 172.
12. The weaknesses of Wade's theory of sovereignty as a basis for the ultra vires doctrine are perceptively explored by Nicholas Bamforth, “Ultra Vires and Institutional Interdependence”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution.
13. See e.g., Forsyth, “Heat and Light”, above, p. 394.
14. Paul Craig, “Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review” [1998] C.L.J. 63, at pp. 81–85, 88.
15. See Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (2001), pp. 204–207.
16. Christopher Forsyth, “Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review” [1996] C.L.J. 122, at p. 134.
17. Sir John Laws, “Illegality: The Problem of Jurisdiction”, in M. Supperstone and J. Goudie (eds.), Judicial Review (1997), pp. 4.12–4.13.
18. Craig, “Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review”, above, p. 79.
19. Sir Stephen Sedley, “Human Rights: a Twenty-First Century Agenda” [1995] P.L. 386, at p. 389
20. “The Common Law and the Constitution”, in Lord Nolan of Brasted and Sir Stephen Sedley, The Making and Remaking of the British Constitution (1997), p. 26.
21. J.A.G. Griffith, “The Common Law and the Political Constitution” (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 42.
22. “The Common Law and the Political Constitution”, pp. 48–50.
23. “The Common Law and the Political Constitution”, p. 49.
24. See also Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, 5th edn. (1997).
25. 18 Jeffrey Jowell, “Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review” [1999] P.L. 448.
26. P.L., p. 452.
27. P.L., p. 458.
28. P.L., p. 460.
29. P.L., p. 458.
30. P.L., pp. 458–459.
31. Jowell, “Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review” [2000] P.L. 671, at pp. 671–672.
32. P.L., p. 675.
33. Sir John Laws, “Law and Democracy” [1995] P.L. 72, at p. 92.
34. P.L., p. 87.
35. Jowell, “Of Vires and Vacuums”, above, p. 454.
36. See Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice (1993), ch. 8
37. Constitutional Justice, ch. 5.
38. J.D.B. Mitchell, “The State of Public Law in the United Kingdom” (1966) 15 I.C.L.Q. 133, at p. 142.
39. Loughlin, “Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administrative Law Theory” (1978) 28 U. of Toronto L.J. 215.
40. R. v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex p. Begbie [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1115 at p. 1130.
41. W.L.R.
42. See generally Harlow and Rawlings, Law and Administration, 2nd edn., ch. 15.
43. Jowell, “Beyond the Rule of Law”, above, p. 673.
44. Jowell, “Of Vires and Vacuums”, above, p. 449.
45. The interdependence of courts and Parliament, as regards ultimate constitutional authority, is a principal theme of Bamforth's essay, “Ultra Vires and Institutional Interdepence”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution.
46. Christopher Forsyth, “Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales”, above, at p. 136.
47. Sir John Laws, “Law and Democracy” [1995] P.L. 72, at p. 79.
48. Paul Craig, “Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review”, above, at p. 90.
49. Christopher Forsyth, “Of Fig Leaves and Fairly Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review” [1996] C.L.J. 122, at p. 133.
50. C.L.J.
51. See e.g., Paul Craig, “Competing Models of Judicial Review” [1999] PL. 428, at p. 439.
52. Mark Elliott, “The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Principle of Administrative Law” [1999] C.L.J. 129, at p. 131.
53. C.L.J., p. 143.
54. C.L.J.
55. Forsyth, “Of Fig Leave and Fairy Tales”, p. 135.
56. Craig, “Competing Models of Judicial Review”, above, at p. 431.
57. See further Paul Craig and Nicholas Bamforth, “Constitutional Analysis, Constitutional Principle and Judicial Review” [2001] PL. 763, at pp. 771–772.
58. Craig, “Competing Models of Judicial Review”, at p. 431.
59. Craig, “Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Review”, at p. 67.
60. Elliott, “Legislative Intention Versus Judicial Creativity? Administrative Law as a Cooperative Endeavour”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution, pp. 350–351.
61. Judicial Review and the Constitution, p. 369.
62. Judicial Review and the Constitution, pp. 364–368.
63. See also Forsyth, “The Metaphysic of Nullity’: Invalidity, Conceptual Reasoning and the Rule of Law”, in Christopher Forsyth and Ivan Hare (eds.), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord (1998).
64. Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147.
65. Black-Clawson International v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg [1975] A.C. 591, at p. 638.
66. See further Allan, Constitutional Justice, ch. 7.
67. See Laws, “Law and Democracy”, mentioned above, and “Illegality: The Problem of Jurisdiction”, Supperstone and Goudie (eds.), Judicial Review, pp. 4.12–4.13.
68. Sir John Laws, “Illegality”, above, p. 4.17.
69. “Illegality”, pp. 4.18–4.19.
70. “Illegality”.
71. [1993] A.C. 593.
72. Cf. Nolan and Sedley, The Making and Remaking of the British Constitution, pp. 58–60.
73. For a perceptive account of constructive interpretation, see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986), ch. 9.
74. For pertinent criticism of Pepper v. Hart on constitutional grounds, see Johan Steyn, “Pepper v. Hart; A Re-examination” (2001) 21 O.J.L.S. 59.
75. Laws, “Illegality”, p. 4.19.
76. Elliott, “The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a Constitutional Setting”, at p. 143.
77. See Allan, Constitutional Justice, pp. 210–213.
78. Laws, “Illegality”, pp. 4.23–4.26.
79. Elliott, “Legislative Intention Versus Judicial Creativity”, p. 361.
80. “Legislative Intention Versus Judicial Creativity”, p. 363.
81. Cf. Lord Woolf of Barnes, “Droit Public---English Style” [1995] P.L. 57 at p. 69.
82. Elliott, “The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty?”, above, at p. 132.
83. Elliott, “Legislative Intention Versus Judicial Creativity”, pp. 355–356.
84. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374, at p. 410.
85. Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Renew, p. 141.
86. The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Renew, pp. 141–144. (As regards non-existent intentions, see discussion below.)
87. The South African experience provides a pertinent example: see Forsyth, “Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales”, above, pp. 129–131
88. David Dyzenhaus, “Reuniting the Brain: The Democratic Basis of Judicial Review” (1998) 9 P.L.R. 98, at p. 101.
89. Laws, “Illegality”, pp. 4.17–4.18.
90. Andrew Halpin, “The Theoretical Controversy Concerning Judicial Review” (2001) 64 M.L.R. 500, at p. 504.
91. (Cf. Craig and Bamforth, “Constitutional Analysis, Constitutional Principle and Judicial Review”, above, at p. 771.)
92. “Constitutional Analysis, Constitutional Principle and Judicial Review”, p. 507.
93. Contrary, moreover, to Barber's complaint, Elliott's argument is no more undermined---in purely conceptual terms---by his “personification” of Parliament than any other argument that invokes the notion of legislative intent: see N.W. Barber, “The Academic Mythologians” (2001) 21 O.J.L.S. 369, at pp. 375–376.
94. Dyzenhaus, “Reuniting the Brain”, above, at p. 107.
95. Halpin, “Reuniting the Brain”, p. 508.
96. “Reuniting the Brain”, p. 510.
97. For pertinent discussion, see Paul Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: an Analytical Framework” [1997] P.L. 467
98. David Dyzenhaus, “Form and Substance in the Rule of Law: A Democratic Justification for Judicial Review?”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution
99. Allan, Constitutional Justice, esp. chs. 1–3.
100. For the contrast between “normativist” and “functionalist” styles of thought in public law, see Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory.
101. J.A.G. Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42 M.L.R. 1, at p. 15.
102. H.W. Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall
103. L.J. 1.
104. L.J., p. 42.
105. Cf. Griffith, “The Common Law and the Political Constitution”, above, p. 58.
106. 90 Arthurs, “The Common Law and the Political Constitution”, p. 41.
107. “The Common Law and the Political Constitution”, pp. 17–18.
108. “The Common Law and the Political Constitution”, p. 20.
109. “The Common Law and the Political Constitution”, p. 19.
110. “The Common Law and the Political Constitution”, p. 18.
111. “The Common Law and the Political Constitution”. p. 22.
112. These dangers are duly emphasised by Paul Craig in his text, Administrative Law, 4th edn. (1999): see esp. chs. 1 & 13.
113. The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Sedley, Freedom, Law and Justice (Hamlyn Lectures, London, 1999), p. 33.
114. Dawn Oliver, “Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of Judicial Review?” [1987] P.L. 543, at p. 568.
115. Griffith, “The Common Law and the Political Constitution”, above, p. 66.
116. See Dawn Oliver, “Common Values in Public and Private Law and the Public/Private Divide” [1997] P.L. 630
117. “Review of (Non-Statutory) Discretions”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution.
118. Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] A.C. 112.
119. A.C., p. 192.
120. A.C., p. 194.
121. Review of the decisions of the University Visitor provides a further example. No challenge can he made on grounds of error of law (as regards interpretation of the statutes) or unreasonableness: see R. v. Hull University Visitor, ex p. Page [1993] A.C. 682.
122. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374.
123. A.C., p. 411.
124. R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p. Datafin p.l.c. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564.
125. All E.R., p. 578.
126. Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law”, above, p. 33.
127. Doctrinal indeterminacy is an important theme in Hutchinson's radical critique of judicial review: see Allan C. Hutchinson, “The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law and Scholarship” (1985) 48 M.L.R. 293.
128. See Loughlin, “Procedural Fairness”, above.
129. For the elastic and indeterminate nature of jurisdictional control, as regards “error of law”, see Craig, Administrative Law, 4th edn., ch. 15.
130. See R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p. Coughlan [2001] Q.B. 213, at pp. 241–242.
131. See Allan, Constitutional Justice, pp. 132–133.
132. R. v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex p. Begbie [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1115, at p. 1130.
133. R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex p. Smith [1996] 1 All E.R. 257, at p. 263.
134. The discretionary nature of judicial review in New Zealand, highly sensitive to context, is a major theme in Philip Joseph's essay, “The Demise of Utra Vires---Judicial Review in the New Zealand Courts” [2001] P.L. 354 (esp. pp. 371–375).
135. See Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 493.
136. See Allan, Constitutional Justice, pp. 177–179.
137. See generally Allan, Constitutional Justice.
138. Halpin, “The Theoretical Controversy Concerning Judicial Review”, above, p. 509.
139. See esp. Laws, “Judicial Review and the Meaning of Law”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution.
140. Elliott, “Fundamental Rights as Interpretative Constructs: The Constitutional Logic of the Human Rights Act 1998”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution.
141. Judicial Review and the Constitution, pp. 277–278.
142. Judicial Review and the Constitution, p. 277.
143. Judicial Review and the Constitution, pp. 281–287.
144. David Feldman, “Convention Rights and Substantive Ultra Vires”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution, p. 262.
145. Judicial Review and the Constitution, p. 263.
146. Judicial Review and the Constitution, p. 258.
147. Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42 M.L.R. 1, at p. 14.
148. Feldman, M.L.R., p. 267.
149. M.L.R., pp. 266–268.
150. Laws, “Illegality”, above, at pp. 4.30–4.35.
151. See also Laws, “The Constitution: Morals and Rights” [1996] P.L. 622.
152. The complexities of the dubious distinction between “illegality” and “irrationality”, whichmirror those of the ultra vires debate over legislative intention, provide a good example: see Laws, “Wednesbury”, in Forsyth and Hare (eds.), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord, pp. 193–194.
153. Dyzenhaus, “Reuniting the Brain”, above, at pp. 106–108.
154. See also Dyzenhaus, “Form and Substance in the Rule of Law: A Democratic Justification for Judicial Review?”, in Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution.
155. Judicial Review and the Constitution., p. 107.
156. Elliott, “Legislative Intention Versus Judicial Creativity?”, above, p. 366.