Geographically targeted spending: Exploring the electoral strategies of incumbent governments

European Political Science Review

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 103-123

  Tavits, Margit ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

clientelism; local government; pork barrel politics; re election strategy; Scandinavia

Indexed keywords

EID: 85011444714     PISSN: 17557739     EISSN: 17557747     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1755773909000034     Document Type: Article

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