The april 1998 NPT prepcom

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 121-131

  Rauf, Tariq ^a  

^a MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010618895     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709808436713     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of Foreign Affairs (Canada), A Non-Paper on Strengthening Review Conferences (Ottawa: March 1995), unpublished.
2. Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I: Organization and Work of the Conference, New York, 1995, Document No. NPT/CONF. 1995/32 (Part I), “Decision 1: Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty,” Annex, p. 8.
3. Personal communication dated January 6, 1997.
4. See also, Ambassador Taylhardat’s comments in “Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference,” The Nonproliferation Review 2 (Spring-Summer 1995), p. 9.
5. Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I: Organization and Work of the Conference, New York, 1995, Document No. NPT/CONF. 1995/32 (Part I), “Decision 1: Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty,” paragraph 4.
6. Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I: Organization and Work of the Conference, New York, 1995, Document No. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), “Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” Annex, pp. 9-12.
7. Tariq Rauf and Rebecca Johnson, “After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Norm,” The Nonproliferation Review 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 34.
8. The Hon. John D. Holum (Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), “Remarks to the International Conference on Nuclear Nonproliferation, Sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment,” Washington, D.C., February 12, 1996.
9. Perhaps, a better way of structuring a full and balanced review of the treaty might have been an article by article assessment, which could have allowed more time for the consideration of certain articles deserving of special treatment, such as safeguards, peaceful cooperation, nuelcar-wcapon-free zones, and nuclear disarmament, with additional time being set aside for the consideration of universality, security assurances, and the Middle East resolution.
10. Ambassador Mark Moher (Representative and Ambassador of Canada to the United Nations for Disarmament), “Statement to the Preparatory Committee of the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” New York, April 8, 1997, p. 2.
11. Ambassador K. J. Jele (Permanent Representative of South Africa), “Statement to the First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the Year 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” New York, April 8, 1997, p. 1.
12. The Hon. Lawrence Scheinman, presentation at the Workshop on Preparing for the April 1997 NPT PrepCom, organized by the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, February 27, 1997.
13. The Hon. Lawrence Scheinman (Representative of the United States), “Statement” to the Preparatory Committee of the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, April 8, 1997, p. 3.
14. Canada, for example, reiterated its refrain from the NPTREC of “permanence with accountability,” and accountability by all states parties. In light of Decision 1 of the NPT (on a “strengthened review process”) the 1997 session of the PrepCom was initiating a qualitatively different process than any previous NPT review. States parties were no longer focused only on a “review of implementation” but also on addressing “specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.”
15. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPTREC, the Depositaries circulated “Draft Rules of Procedure” (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.I/CRP.l, 7 May 1993), to facilitate the consideration and adoption by NPT states. The 1995 NPTREC adopted the “Rules of Proccdure” at its 17th meeting on 11 May 1995 (NPT/CONF. 1995/28, 9 May 1995), which contained adjustments to Rules 12, 13,27,28,30, and 44 of the Rules of Procedure for the 1990 NPT Review Conference, in order to provide a legal basis for an extension decision. After the conclusion of the 1995 NPTREC, the Rules can revert back to their traditional format, except for retaining the revised formulations for Rule 12. Rule 12 on “Costs” was adjusted in accordance with a detailed schedule of costs for the Conference as well as the PrepCom, with the proviso that the financial arrangements did not constitute a precedent. However, there is no compelling reason to revise the cost-sharing schedule of 1995, other than to re-apportion the proportional costs among NPT states in light of the expansion in treaty membership from 178 to 186 parties (to date), while preserving the traditional formula whereby the NWS between them pay 55 percent of the total costs for the NPT Conference (and the PrepCom). Rule 44 was updated to reflect the fact that there were no longer any states that had signed but not yet ratified the NPT, and this situation continues as states now can only join the NPT after depositing their instrument of ratification with one of the three depositaries.
16. These seven thematic points correspond to the principles and objectives outlined in Decision 2, for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and comprise inter alia, universality, nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament (CTBT, fissile material cut-off, and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons), nuelcar-wecapon-free zones, security assurances, safeguards, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is interesting to note, in this context, that these thematic points only deal with relevant developments that have taken place since the end of the 1995 NPTREC regarding principles and objectives.
17. It is interesting to note, in this context, that these thematic points only deal with relevant developments that have taken place since the end of the 1995 NPTREC regarding principles and objectives Algeria, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela.
18. Algeria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, Netherlands, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. Australia walked into the consultations uninvited and was privately cautioned by the chairman to only observe but not participate in the discussion taking place within the framework of the chairman’s consultations.
19. I am grateful to Ambassador (ret’d.) George Bunn, currently at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University, for sharing this proposal.
20. See, for example, Jeff Erlich, “New U.S. Nuclear Policy Maintains Ambiguity: Directive Clears Way for Arsenal Cuts, Broaches Bio-Chem Attack Retaliation, Defense News, January 6-11, 1998, p. 4.
21. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear Arms,” The Washington Post, December 7, 1997, p. 1.
22. Walter Pincus, “Russia Considering Increased Nuclear Dependence,” The Washington Post, December 7, 1997, p. 11.
23. IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (September 1997).