Turkey’s quest for peaceful nuclear power

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 33-44

  Kibaroglu, Mustafa ^a  

^a BILKENT UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

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EID: 85010495353     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709708436677     Document Type: Article

References (81)

1. This study is based in part on views expressed to the author, in personal interviews or via correspondence, by individuals from the Turkish state bureaucracy and academia (some of whom wish to remain anonymous).
2. The author would like to express his deep gratitude to Professor Yalcin Sanalan, Head of the Nuclear Engineering Department, Hacettepe University, Ankara (former Director of Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency) for his invaluable contributions at every stage of this study.
3. The guiding principle of Turkish foreign and security policy as laid down by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder and the first President of the Republic of Turkey, is “peace at home and peace in the world.”
4. For a comprehensive discussion on these matters, see Mustafa Kibaroglu, ‘Turkey,” in Harald Muller, ed., Europe and Nuclear Disarmament (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt -PRIF, 1997), forthcoming.
5. Growth rate of population in Turkey is 2.1 percent per annum.
6. The overall installed capacity reached 21 gigawatts electric (GWe) by 1996, of which 10 GWe came from hydroelectric, and 11 GWe from thermal plants fueled with both domestic and imported coal, natural gas, and oil. In terms of electricity production, the total capacity reached 104 trillion watts hour (TWh) (hydro 36 TWh; thermal 68 TWh) with a net production of 84.5 TWh (hydro 32 TWh; thermal 52.5 Twh). Average productivity of hydroelectric plants is 88 percent, while productivity of plants fueled with coal, oil and natural gas is 78 percent in the average. Gross electricity production was 8.6 TWh in 1970; 25 TWh in 1980; and 57 TWh in 1990.
7. There is an almost steady 15 percent loss in the electricity network due to a variety of reasons which rendered the net production figure available for consumption to 66 TWh in 1996. The net per capita electricity consumption is recorded to be 1050 kilowatts hour (kWh) in that year. Source: Lecture notes of Ozden Bilen, former Director of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) of Turkey, Hydropolitics and Strategical Research and Development Centre, Hacettepe University, Ankara, spring 1996.
8. Taking into consideration the seven percent in-crease/jer annum in electricity consumption along with a high population growth, demand for electricity is predicted to be 310 TWh in the year 2010. Turkey’s main domestic energy sources, namely fresh water and coal have potentials of 125 TWh/year and 105 TWh/y, respectively. Source: Lee-ture notes of Ozden Bilen.
9. For an expert view on these matters, see Dogan Oner (Vice-Chairman of Turkish Atomic Energy Authority-TAEA), “Nukleer Guc Reaktorlerinde Teknoloji Transferi ve Uretimi” (Technology Transfer and Production in Nuclear Power Reactors), Uluslararasi Nukleer Teknoloji Kurultayi (International Nuclear Technology Forum), October 12-15, 1993, Ankara Makine Muhcndisleri Odasi (Chamber of Mechanical Engineers), Ankara, Publication No: 168 (March 1994), pp. 269-273.
10. The negative effect of the fear of especially the U.S. administrations of a Pakistani connection is confirmed by authorities from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority. Moreover, Professor Steven Cohen, an expert on India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear programs at the University of Illinois, also confirmed the concerns of the U.S. administrations in that regard, and the possibility of a negative effect on Turkey’s quest for nuclear power plants. Author’s conversations with Professor Cohen during his visit to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California. March 24, 1997.
11. CNRTC was founded on a 3,200 acres beside the Kucuk Cekmece lake in the outskirts of Istanbul. Nuclear research and training are being conducted in its 10 departments. See the website of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEA) (http://www.nukleer.gov.tr).
12. The number of staff in ANRTC currently is 161, including 75 scientists, 36 technicians, and 50 administrative personnel. ANRTC began with 12 staff persons. See the website of TAEA (http://www.nukleer.gov.tr).
13. The intervention of the military in domestic politics, on March 12, 1971, with the so-called “Generals’ Memorandum” resulted in drastic changes in the government. Turkey was then administered for a couple of years by a series of short-lived ministerial cabinets.
14. See Kenan Unlu, “Turks Take Steps to Revive Their Nuclear Programme,” Nuclear Engineering, International (January 1995), pp. 16-17.
15. Also see Ahmet Kutukcuoglu (former Director of Nuclear Power Plants Division of TEK), “Turkiye’nin Gecmisteki Nukleer Enerji Deneyimleri” (Past Experiences of Turkey in the Nuclear Field), Uluslararasi Nukleer Teknoloji
16. Kurultayi (International Nuclear Technology Forum), October 12-15, 1993, Ankara Makine Muhendisleri Odasi (Chamber of Mechanical Engineers), Ankara, Publication No: 168 (March 1994), pp. 40-44.
17. The third of the so-called once-every-ten-year intermissions in Turkish democracy took place on September 12, 1980 (previously on May 27, 1960 and March 12, 1971) as a result of the military coup of the then-Joint Chiefs of Staff. The democratic regime was re-established with the country-wide elections held in November 1983.
18. Author’s telephone conversation with Omer Ersun, Turkish ambassador to Ottawa, March 24, 1997.
19. A very common belief in the public domain in Turkey can be translated as “there are no friends of Turks but the Turks” which is quickly followed up with “except the Pakistanis.”
20. The same applies to Pakistani leaders such as Mohammed Ali Cinnah and Zulfikar Ali Butto whose names have been given to institutes, libraries, and districts in Ankara and Istanbul. In March 1997, Humayun Han Banghash, the Pakistani ambassador to Ankara, confirmed this friendship during the reception of celebration of the 50th anniversary of the foundation of Pakistan. In his speech, Ambassador Banghash said “the Pakistani people have once more demonstrated how much they admire Ataturk [by hanging everywhere posters of Ataturk and Cinnah.” Hurriyet (Istanbul), March 21, 1997, p. 1.
21. The RCD remained in existence until 1979. In 1985, the RCD, by then dormant, was resuscitated as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkey attempted to enlarge the ECO to include Azerbaijan, the Central Asian Republics, and Afghanistan. See the website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.tr).
22. See “Turkey’s Role in Pakistan’s Nuclear Program,” Worldwide Report, March 20, 1987, pp. 1-4. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
23. The basic undertakings of TAEA are “to determine and progress the basis of the national policy and the related plans and programs and to submit them to be approved by the Prime Minister; to execute and to support scientific, technical and administrative studies; to give approval, permission and license to the nuclear installations; to enlighten the public in nuclear matters; to establish research and educate the personnel in the nuclear field.”
24. See Yalcin Sanalan, “Turkiye Atom Encrjisi Kurumu’nun Nukleer Enerji Uretimindeki Yeri” (The Role of TAEA in the Development Nuclear Energy), Uluslararasi Nukleer Teknoloji Kurultayi (International Nuclear Technology Forum), October 12-15, 1993, Ankara Makina Muhendisleri Odasi (Chamber of Mechanical Engineers), Ankara, Publication No: 168 (March 1994), pp. 128-134.
25. See “The Chosen Three,” Nuclear Engineering International (December 1983), p. 4.
26. For a precise account on this matter, see Ahmet Kutukcuoglu, “Turkey’s Joint Venture Scheme,” Nuclear Engineering International (March 1986), p. 29.
27. “Turkey: AECL Close, KWU Still Running, W-MHI Out,” Nuclear News (February 1985), p. 102.
28. Diane Francis, “Bank Risk Share Asked in Turkish Reactor Deal,” The Toronto Star (Toronto), November 13, 1985, p. Gl. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
29. “Candu Sales Hit Problems,” Nuclear Engineering International (October 1986), p. 14.
30. Kenan Unlu, ‘Turks Take Steps to Revive their Nuclear Programme,” p. 16.
31. AECL’s statement was made in response to a Reuter’s report on October 15, 1986, in which the Turkish Minister reportedly said that the deal was suspended. See “AECL Says That it is Still Negotiating With Turkey,” Nuclear News (November 1986), p. 21.
32. Ray Silver, “Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.(AECL) is not Conceding Either Turkish or Argentinian Prospects for CANDU Sales,” Nucleonics Week, January 22, 1987, pp. 8-9.
33. “Still Negotiating,” Nuclear Engineering International (June 1987), p. 38.
34. “Canadian Firm Drops Bid to Build Nuclear Plant,” Nuclear Developments, February 25, 1988, p. 39. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
35. “Spokesman Denies Nuclear Sales to Pakistan,” Nuclear Developments, January 28, 1988, p. 95. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
36. “MP Notes Turkish Nuclear Equipment to Pakistan,” Nuclear Developments, April 1, 1988, p. 5. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
37. “U.S. Expert Interviewed in South Asian Nuclear Arming,” Nuclear Developments, September 2, 1988, pp. 17-19. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
38. ENACE is 75 percent owned by Argentine Comision Nacional De Encrgia Atomica (CNEA) and 25 percent owned by KWU of Germany. See Richard Kessler, “Argentina Says Nuclear Accord With Turkey Sets Stage for Exports,” Nucleonics Week, May 12, 1988, pp. 8-9.
39. “Argentina and U.S. in Co-operation Talks,” Nuclear Engineering International (November 1988), p. 3.
40. “More Argentine Sales?” Nuclear Engineering International (July 1989), p. 5.
41. Richard Kessler, “Argentina Says Nuclear Accord With Turkey …,” pp. 8-9.
42. “Agreement Signed to Build Carem,” Nuclear Engineering International (December 1990), p. 8.
43. Also see Richard Kessler, “Argentina and Turkey to Form Nuclear A/E to Build a Small PWRs,” Nucleonics Week, October 25, 1990, pp. 12-13.
44. For more on this issue sec “Nuclear Pact With Argentina ‘Secretly Signed’,” Nuclear Developments, November 15, 1990, pp. 29-30. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
45. “Reactor Venture Entered With Turkey,” Nuclear News (December 1990), p. 46.
46. It was reported that Saracho made a significant contribution to the signing on May 3, 1988 of a nuclear technology cooperation agreement. Saracho was quoted as saying that “Argentina’s objective [was] to help Turkey develop its nuclear technology without depending on any country or bloc, and hopefd] to help Turkey build reactors and nuclear power plants in the future.” Sec “Argentina to Help Acquire ‘Nuclear Technology’,” Nuclear Developments, June 21, 1988, p. 39. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
47. “Nuclear Pact With Argentina ‘Secretly Signed’," Nuclear Developments, November 15, 1990, pp. 29-30. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
48. “Secret Talks’ With Argentina on Nuclear Plant,” Nuclear Developments, October 6, 1989, pp. 31-32. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
49. Author’s e-mail correspondences with Professor Yalcin Sanalan, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Hacettepe University, Ankara, February/March 1997.
50. For details, see Dogan Oner (former Deputy Director of Turkish Atomic Energy Authority), “Turkiye’nin Nukleer Enerji Santralleri Konusunda Ileriye Donuk Politikalari Ne Olmalidir” (What Should be Turkey’s Forward Looking Policies About Nuclear Power Plants?), Karayollari Vakfi Dergisi (Journal of Highway Foundation) (April 1991), p. 19.
51. John Glenn, “This Country Encouraged the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” The Washington Post, June 24, 1992, p. A19.
52. “Turkey: Reports of Nuclear Transfer to Pakistan Denied,” Proliferation Issues, July 10,1992, p. 29. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
53. Unlike many other Greek-origin publications, Dr. Thanos Dokos was kind enough to use the words “alleged” and “unconfirmed” regarding a Turkish-Pakistani connection. But still, the fear of such a connection apparently is keenly felt in Athens. Dr. Dokos expressed his views not in his official capacity but in a recent scholarly work. See, Thanos Dokos, “Greece,” in Harald Muller, ed., Nuclear Export Controls in Europe (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1995), p. 208.
54. See I Kathimerini (Athens), December, 29, 1991, p. 1.
55. Cited in “Turkey Reportedly Seeking Soviet Nuclear Warheads,” Proliferation Issues, January 31, 1992, p. 61. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
56. “Ministry Denies Trying to Get Nuclear Technology,” Proliferation Issues, January 31, 1992, p. 67. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.
57. It is interesting but not surprising to note that, behind the allegations about a Turkish-Pakistani connection are, in most cases, sources from Greece and India, both of which arc adversaries of one of the parties accused for being in illicit collaboration.
58. “Turkish Plant: Bids in 1995,” Nuclear Engineering International (January 1995), pp. 6-7.
59. TEAS said KAERI’s bid was the most comprehensive and, at $350,000, the lowest it received. “Korea Prepares for Turkish Bid,” Nuclear Engineering International (March 1995), p. 5.
60. Mark Hibbs, “Turkey Expected to Request Bids for PWR Project in Coming Weeks,” Nucleonics Week, March 21, 1996, pp. 1-2.
61. “Turkey Extends Nuclear Bid Enquiry Period,” Anatolia News Agency (Ankara), January 21, 1997.
62. Suna Erdem, ‘Turkey Signs $13.5 Billion Deal With Gazprom,” Reuter, April 28, 1997.
63. Importing expertise in these areas which are less controversial than nuclear technology can be a feasible short-term measure.
64. Turkey has other fresh water resources in the Black Sea region. However, the mountainous topography of the region hardly allows construction of hydroelectric plants.
65. Whereas Turkey suggests “allocation” of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, total of 1,000 cubic meters per second (m3/sec) originating mainly (approximately 95 percent) from its territory, Syria and Iraq insist on a “sharing” agreement for at least a “guaranteed” 500 m3/sec amount per country. For a scholarly assessment of the stance of the parties to the water dispute, as well as prospects for peaceful solutions that are rarely mentioned in international, political sphere, see Aysegul Kibaroglu, “Prospects for Co-operation in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin,” in Peter Howsam and Richard C. Carter, eds., Water Policy: Allocation and Management in Practice (London: E & FN Spon, 1996), pp. 31-38.
66. For more comprehensive studies on this topic see John F. Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project, Water: The Middle East Imperative (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991);
67. Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East (London: Routledge Press, 1994); Thomas Naff and Ruth C. Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation? (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984);
68. Natasha Beschomer, “Water and Instability in the Middle East,” Adelphi Paper, No. 273 (1993);
69. Pritt J. Vesilind, “Water: the Middle East’s Critical Resource,” National Geographic (May 1993). ’
70. The two downstream riparians followed a similar strategy against the 672 MW Birecik dam project near Gaziantep on the Euphrates which will generate 2.5 TWh electricity. Moreover, the Iraqi embassy in Ankara gave a note to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on March 17, 1993, and Syria also gave a note to this effect to the Turkish embassy in Damascus on July 18, 1993.
71. See, the website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.tr). Despite all contentious efforts, a consortium of firms from Turkey, Austria, Belgium, and France that undertook the construction of the dam has reportedly secured a $1.3 billion syndicated loan from 44 banks of 10 countries signed in November 1995, after a decade of deliberations.
72. See “Turkish BOT Projects Emerge Despite Political Uncertainties,” International Trade Finance, January 19, 1996, via NewsNet (http://www.newsnet.com).
73. For an account on this issue, see Robert Olson, “The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkey versus Russia Since the Gulf War,” Middle East Policy 4 (March 1996), pp. 106-118.
74. Finally, on April 28,1997, Turkey signed a landmark agreement with Russia’s gas giant Gazprom for $13.5 billion worth of natural gas over 25 years, starting in 1997. Minister of Energy Recai Kutan told attendees at the signing ceremony that Turkey’s gas need would shoot up to 27 billion cubic meters (bem) annually by the year 2000, and to 60 bem by 2010. See Suna Erdem, “Turkey Signs $13.5 Billion Deal With Gazprom,” Reuter, April 28, 1997.
75. See Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Impact of the North-em Tier on the Middle East: A Rejoinder,” Security Dialogue 27 (September 1996), pp. 319-324.
76. In May 1993, the Clinton administration adopted the policy of “dual containment” to isolate Iran together with Iraq from the world, as it did towards the latter for five years, in order to curb their ambitions to develop weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, the United States uses its political weight to persuade Russia, China, and its Western allies to refrain from getting into relationships with these “rogue” states that would help them acquire the weap-ons-related know-how and economic power to enable them finance weapons programs. The U.S.-Iran confrontation has its roots in the “hostage crisis” in the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979. Iran’s support of international terrorism and its efforts to revitalize the Bushehr nuclear reactors site with Russian assistance further exacerbated tensions.
77. See the website of TAEA (http://www.nukleer.gov.tr).
78. See Dogan Oner, “Turkiye’nin Nukleer Eneiji Santralleri Konusunda Ileriye Donuk Politikalari Ne Olmalidir,” pp. 18-24.
79. Presumably KAERI is hired by TEAS to conduct such a study, at least in part. Turkish scientists, scholars, engineers, and technicians as well as politicians should become much more heavily involved in sqch studies.
80. Membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) requires a unanimous “yes” vote of its existing members, including Greece. Ironically, Greece may warmly welcome Turkey’s application to NSG, unlike its robust opposition to Turkey’s European Union membership.
81. Export control laws cover a long list of dualuse materials which are used in civilian goods manufacturing. Restrictions (or at least delays caused by intrusive inspections) on the import or export of these materials may have uneconomic effects on the manufacturing process.