Rethinking the joint project: Australia's bid for nuclear weapons, 1945–1960

The Historical Journal

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 853-873

  Reynolds, Wayne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE   (Australia)

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EID: 85010175123     PISSN: 0018246X     EISSN: 14695103     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0018246X98007870     Document Type: Article

References (136)

1. In 1985 the McClelland royal commission into British nuclear tests in Australia concluded that Menzies virtually alone gave the go-ahead for the tests out of a ‘great willingness to help the motherland’. Report of the royal commission into British nuclear tests in Australia (Canberra, 1985), p. 15.
2. Lorna Arnold argues that Britain could join with Australia, a ‘non-nuclear power’ because of a ‘special relationship’. There is no suggestion that Australia entertained the prospects of obtaining nuclear weapons. A very special relationship: British atomic tests in Australia (London, 1987), p. xv.
3. See, for example, P. Edwards, Crises and commitments: the politics and diplomacy of Australia's involvement in Southeast Asia conflicts, 1948–1965 (Sydney, 1992)
4. P. Dennis and J. Grey, Emergency and confrontation: Australia's military operations in Malaya and Borneo, 1950–1966 (Canberra, 1996).
5. David Day, The great betrayal: Britain, Australia and the onset of the Pacific war, 1939–42 (London, 1988).
6. There is a great wealth of literature on this. The classic work is Margaret Gowing's Independence and deterrence: Britain and atomic energy, 1945–1952 (London, 1974).
7. Roger Louis and HedleyBull have compiled a collection of essays by some of the most significant authors in The ‘special relationship’: Anglo-American relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986).
8. See also Ian Clark and Nicholas Wheeler, The British origins of nuclear strategy, 1945–1955 (Oxford, 1989).
9. Brian Cathcart, Test of greatness: Britain's struggle for the atom bomb (London, 1994), p. 8.
10. G. Herken, The winning weapon: the atomic bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950 (Princeton, 1981).
11. Bertrand Goldschmidt, Atomic rivals (New Brunswick, 1990), p. 191.
12. Vincent C.Jones, Manhattan: the army and the atomic bomb (Washington, 1985), p. 247.
13. Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: the history of atomic energy of Canada Limited (Toronto, 1988), p. 22.
14. Robert Bothwell, Eldorado: Canada's national Uranium company (Toronto, 1994).
15. Bothwell, Nucleus, pp. 34–8, 68.
16. Mackenzie papers, Ottawa, MG30, B122, diary 21, 15 Nov. 1945.
17. N. Hillmer and J. Granatstein, Empire to umpire: Canada and the world to the 1990s (Toronto, 1994), ch. 5.
18. Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: the making of a national insecurity state, 1945–1957 (Toronto, 1994), p. 61.
19. The final decision to build a bomb was taken in 1947. Well before, however, planning was started on a range of associated steps. Plutonium was a major hurdle for British researchers, as Cathcart has recently reminded us, and steps were taken to build a group under Sir John Cockcroft at Harwell. Cathcart, Test of greatness, p. 50.
20. The operational requirement for the delivery system was issued in 1945 and received the support of the air staff in August 1946. Humphrey Wynn, RAF nuclear deterrent forces (London, 1994), p. 18.
21. Never again: Britain 1945–1951 (London, 1993).
22. The fear of atomic attack predated the war itself, see Kirk Willis, ‘The origins of British nuclear culture, 1895–1939’, Journal of British Studies, 345 (1995).
23. Public Record Office (PRO), London, CAB129/7, CP(46)65, 15 Feb. 1946.
24. Peter Morton, Fire across the desert: Woomera and the Anglo-Australian joint project, 1946–1980 (Canberra, 1989).
25. Australian Archives (AA), A2700, 27, Submission 1186, 3 July 1946.
26. AA, A5954/1, 1662/4.
27. The section on the formation of the joint intelligence bureau (JIB) has been removed from archives but it is clear that a mission from Britain to Australia prior to the 1946 Commonwealth conference had launched significant initiatives here. Intelligence links were to be strengthened and defence science machinery was developed on British lines. AA, A5954/1, 1662/1.
28. AA, A5954/1, 1634/6.
29. PRO, PREM8, 753, Attlee to Tizard, 3 May 1946.
30. Tizard chaired the scientific committee that recommended in July 1945 that Britain should undertake large-scale development of atomic energy and delivery systems. His report set out the parameters of British strategic defence strategy. Wynn, RAF nuclear deterrent forces, pp. 1–2. 1957 was the planning date accepted by the British chiefs of staff for the point at which the Soviet Union would be able to wage nuclear war.
31. PRO, DO35/1759, ICCDS, 1st meeting, 3 June 1946.
32. The cabinet defence committee later concluded that ‘the limiting factor’ was the lack of sufficiently qualified scientific staff. The United Kingdom, however, ‘could offer more facilities for post-graduate training than can any of the other countries of the Commonwealth’. PRO, PREM8, 753, DO(48)4, 6 Jan. 1948.
33. By 1955 the committee estimated that the British universities could only produce some 55,000 to 60,000 scientists, when at least 70,000 were needed. PRO, CAB129/9, CP(46) 185, 3 May 1946.
34. Cockcroft papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, CKFT25/19, ‘Correspondence about Chalk River and Harwell’.
35. PRO, ICCDS, 1st and 3rd meetings, 3 June 1946, DO 35/1759.
36. Chifley had been advised by Attlee on 17 Oct. 1945 that the production of plutonium for power could not be separated from the simultaneous production of bomb-grade material, a factor ignored by Alice Cawte, Atomic Australia, 1944–1990 (Sydney, 1992).
37. The letter described the British predicament in the Second World War when they had to move industry to less exposed parts of the island. AA, A5954/1, 1662/1, Attlee to Chifley, 17 Oct. 1945.
38. PRO, DO35/1759, ICCDS/17 (final), 4 July 1946.
39. AA, A2700/XM 1,28, submission 1197, 15 June 1946. Chief of Air Staff Lord Portal stressed that Harwell would be the site of a substantial Commonwealth effort by July 1947.
40. PRO, CAB133/86, PMM(46) 11 th meeting, 3 May 1946.
41. S. Foster and M. Varghese, The making of the Australian National University (Canberra, 1996), p. 16.
42. AA, A2700, 31, submission 1291, 31 Jan. 1947.
43. Gowing, Independence and deterrence, pp. 160–161.
44. Wayne Reynolds, ‘Atomic war, empire strategic dispersal and the origins of the Snowy Mountains scheme’, War and Society, 14 (1996).
45. AA, A2618/1, ‘Snowy Mountain diversion’, memorandum for minister for supply and development from Jensen, 9 Feb. 1949.
46. Commonwealth parliamentary debates (CPD), 202 (1949), p. 247.
47. Cockcroft papers, CKFT 5/13, ‘Applications of atomic energy’.
48. AA, A5954/1, 1385/3, report 9/1948. The extent of British involvement at this point can only be assumed. The US had an embargo in place on intelligence to Australia that would have allowed the atomic programme to proceed. See Ken Buckley, Barbara Dale, and Wayne Reynolds, Doc Evatt: patriot, internationalist, fighter and scholar (Sydney, 1994), p. 292.
49. The idea of a TVA project in the Commonwealth was first floated by Leo Amery after the Quebec conference of 1943. In Amery's opinion the empire would allow Britain to disperse its population and industries so that in future the defence potential would not be destroyed in the event of an air attack on the British Isles. Lilienthal papers, Princeton, box 106; PRO EG1/119.
50. Arnold, A very special relationship, pp. 19–20.
51. PRO, CAB 131/9, DO(50)58, 21 July 1950
52. CAB 131/11, DO(51 )72 (revise), 18 June 1951.
53. AA, A5799/15, 3/1950.
54. PRO, DEFE 11/15, CWS/P(53)6, CWS/P(53) 12.
55. PRO, DEFE 11/15, DRP(50) 121, 2 Oct. 1950.
56. Cockcroft papers, CKFT 25/8, ‘Atomic energy history’.
57. Cockcroft papers, CHAD1 boxes 9/2 and 9/3.
58. Cathcart, Test of greatness, p. 68.
59. Titterton wanted nuclear weapons for Australian forces and advocated the development of British-supplied reactors on the Snowy in his book Facing the atomic future (Sydney, 1956), pp. 112–13, 212.
60. John Dickie, ‘Special’ no more: Anglo-American relations: rhetoric and reality (London, 1994), p. 80.
61. John Simpson, The independent nuclear state (London, 1986), p. 114.
62. Clark and Wheeler, British origins of nuclear strategy, pp. 140–159.
63. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic shield, 1947–1952 (University Park, 1969), ch. 15.
64. John Charmley, Churchill's grand alliance: the Anglo-American special relationship, 1940–57 (London, 1995), p. 245.
65. Arnold, A very special relationship, p. 97.
66. Bothwell, Nucleus, p. 198
67. PRO, EG1/54, ‘The UKAEA: statutory direction concerning the production of electricity’.
68. PRO, EG1/64, overseas trade memorandum 9/56, 10 Feb. 1956.
69. PRO, EG 1/64, ‘advisory council on overseas construction’, 1 July 1955.
70. AA, A4906/XM1, submission 117, 20 Sept. 1954.
71. AA, A1838/1, 720/3, Memorandum of discussion with Oliphant, 27 June 1955.
72. J. Symonds, A history of British atomic tests in Australia (Canberra, 1985), p. 280.
73. AA, A1838/1, 720/3, ‘Atomic energy-developments in Australia’.
74. Symonds, History of British atomic tests, pp. 199, 313.
75. Morton, Fire across the desert, pp. 213, 222.
76. K. W. Condit, History of the joint chiefs of staff, vi (Washington, 1992), p. 11
77. S.J. Ball, ‘Military nuclear relations between the United States and Great Britain under the terms of the McMahon Act, 1946–1958’, Historical Journal, 38 (1995), pp. 439–454.
78. T. Botti, The long wait: the forging of the Anglo-American nuclear alliance, 1945–1958 (New York, 1987), p. 232.
79. Memorandum of discussion at the 236th NSC meeting, 10 Feb. 1955, Foreign relations of the US (FRUS), xx (1955–7), pp. 25, 27
80. R. Divine, The Sputnik challenge: Eisenhower's response to the Soviet satellite (Oxford, 1993), p. 46.
81. PRO, CAB 131/23, D(60)2, 24 Feb. 1960.
82. Bothwell, Eldorado, p. 398
83. PRO, EG1/117, ‘Briefs for Bermuda conference’.
84. PRO CAB 128, 31, part 2, CC(57) 46th conclusions, 24 June 1957; C(57)143, 146, and 151.
85. Thermonuclear weapons used beryllium tampers, a standard feature of most modern nuclear weapons, to provide a fission trigger. R. Rhodes, Dark sun: the making of the hydrogen bomb (New York, 1995), pp. 119, 194, 253.
86. Cawte, Atomic Australia, p. 109.
87. Australian atomic energy symposium, 1958 (Sydney, 1958).
88. CPD, 26 (1960), pp. 815, 844–8.
89. AA, A1209/79, 61/20, report by technical committee on the use of Blue Streak, 2 Sept. 1960.
90. AA, A5819/2, submission 190, ‘AAEC research program’.
91. D. Ball, ‘Australia and nuclear non-proliferation’, Current Affairs Bulletin, 55 (1979).
92. Bill Hayden, Bill Hayden: an autobiography (Sydney, 1996), p. 422.
93. Avener Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 13 (1990).
94. Alan Stephens, Going solo: the Royal Australian Air Force, 1946–71 (Canberra, 1996), ch. 3
95. Ritchie Ovendale, The English-speaking alliance: Britain, the United States, the dominions and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London, 1985), p. 120.
96. G. Wyn Rees, Anglo-American approaches to alliance strategy, 1955–60 (London, 1996), p. 50.
97. Cawte, Atomic Australia, p. 109.
98. John Simpson, The independent nuclear state: the United States, Britain and the military atom (London, 1983), p. 114.
99. AA, A5462/1, 138/2/10, memo 1030/54, L. J. Lawrey, first secretary, Australian embassy, Washington, 22 Sept. 1954.
100. NATO provided the model for the strategic co-operation, but this was not offered in 1951 in the ANZUS treaty. W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS pact: policy-making, strategy and diplomacy, 1945–55 (Canterbury, 1995).
101. PRO DO35/7015, cable 2126, Menzies to Casey and Spender, 15 Oct. 1954. As it turned out the British assessment was that the US were not interested in actual measures to disarm and therefore a ‘partial disarmament’ would be all that would be in the offing for some time.
102. PRO CAB 131/16,DC(55)45, 17 Oct. 1955.
103. AA, A4968/2, report by joint planning staff, 10 Jan. 1955.
104. AA A1209/23, 57/5729, McBride to Menzies, 7 Jan. 1955.
105. AA A1209/23, 57/5706, NISC/N(55) 19, 10 Feb. 1955.
106. AA A4969/2, 25/16/18, cable 220, external affairs to Casey, 28 Feb. 1955.
107. There was a general reluctance by SEATO members in February 1955 to accept that ‘subversion was the principal danger’. Wyn Rees, Anglo-American approaches to alliance security, p. 127
108. FRUS, xx (1955–1957), pp. 2–3.
109. AA A4968/2, 25/16/18, cable 265, Tange to Australian embassy, Washington, 16 June 1955.
110. David Holloway, Stalin and the bomb (New Haven, 1994), pp. 307, 351.
111. National Archives Records Administration (NARA), RG59, Box 2504, note on prime minister's discussions in Washington, 14 Mar. 1955.
112. Clark and Wheeler, Origins of nuclear strategy, p. 160.
113. AA A1838/276, part 2, 720/10/8, 30 May 1956
114. PRO CAB 131/16, DC(55)7, DC(55) 9th meeting, 15 Sept. 1955.
115. AA A2031, defence committee minute 8/1955, 13 Jan. 1955.
116. Arnold, A very special relationship, p. 159.
117. W. J. Hudson, Blind loyalty: Australia and the Suez crisis, 1956 (Melbourne, 1989), p. 7.
118. AA A1 209/23, 57/5293, part 1, PMM(D)(56) 1st meeting, 3 July 1956.
119. The next day the British secretary for air stressed the need for an Indian Ocean military air route. The first Canberra squadrons had been deployed to the Baghdad pact in May. Wynn, RAF nuclear deterrent forces, pp. 124, 138.
120. AA A816/52, 14/301/734, Hancock to Shedden, 24 July 1956.
121. AA A816/31, 14/301/713, JPC, 19 Sept. 1956
122. submission 522 and decision 656, 22 Feb. 1957.
123. PRO CAB 131/17, DC(56)24, 1 Oct. 1956.
124. PRO DO35/6336, cable 2545, Menzies to Eden, 1 Nov. 1956.
125. W. Scott Lucas, Divided we stand: Britain, the US and the Suez crisis (London, 1991), p. 186.
126. Hudson, Blind loyalty, p. 70.
127. AA A1209/23, 57/4067, letter, Townley to McBride, 12 Sept. 1956.
128. AA A1209/23, 57/4067, ‘Nuclear weapons for the Australian forces’.
129. The joint intelligence committee advised that Australia would be vulnerable to missiles which could be launched from Timor and from Soviet bomber bases in Antarctica. AA, A816/31, 14/301/713, JIC(M)(56)35.
130. AA A1209/23, 57/4067, ‘Nuclear weapons for the Australian forces’.
131. AA A1209/23, 57/4067.
132. NSC meetings, 309 (11 Jan. 1957);319 (11 Apr. 1957)
133. NARA, RG59, box 2504, file 0051.
134. PRO EG1/152, press release, 12 July 1957.
135. New York Times, 20 Sept. 1957, CPD, 16 (19 Sept. 1957), p. 798.
136. P. Pringle and J. Spigleman, The nuclear barons (New York, 1983), p. 247.