On the moral status of the rule of law

Cambridge Law Journal

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 65-97

  Kramer, Matthew H ^a  

^a CHURCHILL COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010174883     PISSN: 00081973     EISSN: 14692139     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0008197304006518     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. For a full-scale exposition of the eight principles of legality, see Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised edition (New Haven 1969), chap. 2.
2. I have examined Fuller's work at length in my In Defense of Legal Positivism (Oxford 1999) [hereinafter cited as IDLP], ch. 3.
3. Charles Dickens, The Old Curiosity Shop (Everyman edition, London 1995), p. 231.
4. For a discussion of the difference between scalar and non-scalar properties, see Matthew H. Kramer, The Quality of Freedom (Oxford 2003), pp. 169–184.
5. N.E. Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence, 2nd. edn. (London 2002) [hereinafter cited as Simmonds, Issues].
6. Central Issues in Jurisprudence, p. 226.
7. For a passage that similarly elides the distinction between actual motivations and reasons-for-action, see Central Issues in Jurisprudence, p. 230.
8. Simmonds, Issues, chap. 8
9. N.E. Simmonds, “Rights at the Cutting Edge”, in Matthew H. Kramer, N.E. Simmonds, and Hillel Steiner, A Debate over Rights (Oxford 1998), pp. 113, 146–195.
10. Simmonds, Issues, 239–240. Because of constraints of space, I have here had to leave some of Simmonds's replies undiscussed. I respond to them fully in the chapter from which this article has been excerpted.