Globalization and policy response: Three perspectives

Government and Opposition

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 237-253

  Sally, Razeen ^a   Henderson, David ^b   Rodrik, Dani ^c   Gray, John ^a  

^a Institute of Economic Affairs ^*

^b Institute of Economic Affairs   (United Kingdom)

^c PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010123907     PISSN: 0017257X     EISSN: 14777053     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1477-7053.00025     Document Type: Review

References (55)

1. Jan Tumlir, Economic Policy as a Constitutional Problem, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1984, pp. 16–22.
2. Jan Tumlir, ‘International Economic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism’, Ordo, 34 (1983), pp. 76–77
3. Razeen Sally, Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: Studies in Theory and Intellectual History, London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 59–60.
4. John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organisation, 36:2 (Spring 1982), pp. 209–231.
5. John Gerard Ruggie, ‘At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liberalization and Domestic Stability in the New World Economy’, Millennium:Journal of International Studies, 24:3 (Winter 1995), pp. 508–526.
6. There is a burgeoning anti-globalization literature. Among the better known statements are George Soros, The Crisis in Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered, New York, BBS/Public Affairs, 1998
7. Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy, New York, Zed Books, 1997.
8. For previous treatments, see his BBC Reith lectures of 1985, published as Innocence and Design: The Influence of Economic Ideas on Policy, London, Blackwell, 1986
9. A New Age of Reform?, London, Institute of Fiscal Studies, 1989.
10. David Henderson, The Changing Fortunes of Economic Liberalism, p. 11.
11. The Changing Fortunes of Economic Liberalism, pp. 58–60.
12. Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World, New York, Harper Collins, 1990.
13. Henderson, The Borderless World, pp. 61–63.
14. Also see David Henderson, ‘International Economic Integration: Progress, Prospects and Implications’, International Affairs, 68:4 (1992), pp. 633–653.
15. See, notably, Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992, Paris, OECD Development Centre, 1995.
16. Also see IMF World Economic Outlook, May 1997, Washington DC, IMF, Historical Annex, pp. 112–116.
17. Henderson, The Changing Fortunes of Economic Liberalism, pp. 58, 60–61.
18. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
19. Henderson, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, pp. 63–65.
20. For an interpretation of globalization that emphasizes the differences between now and then, see Michael D. Bordo, Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin, Is Globalisation Today Really Different Than a Hundred Years Ago?, NBER Working Paper 7195 (June 1999), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7195.
21. On the classical liberal view of international economic integration and the nation-state, see Sally, Classical Liberalism, Is Globalisation Today Really Different Than a Hundred Years Ago?, pp. 59–60.
22. Henderson, The Changing Fortunes of Economic Liberalism, p. 118. (Italics in the text.)
23. The Changing Fortunes of Economic Liberalism, pp. 111–121.
24. Dani Rodrik, Has Globalisation Gone Too Far?, p. 2.
25. Has Globalisation Gone Too Far?, pp. 4–5.
26. Has Globalisation Gone Too Far?, pp. 14–27.
27. Has Globalisation Gone Too Far?, pp. 50–55, 64.
28. Has Globalisation Gone Too Far?, p. 27.
29. Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation, Paris, OECD, 1998, pp. 73–75.
30. Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation, pp. 88–89, 106–107.
31. Henderson, The Changing Fortunes, p. 52.
32. Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far?, pp. 73, 81–85.
33. See John Gray, Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy, London, Routledge, 1989.
34. John Gray, False Dawn, pp. 2–3, 20–21, 211, 218.
35. False Dawn, pp. 88, 214, 232.
36. False Dawn, p. 80–81.
37. Gray, False Dawn, pp. 81–82.
38. See Paul Krugman's (characteristically) searing review of False Dawn: http:// web.mit.edu/krugman/www.gray.html
39. Gray, False Dawn, p. 86.
40. Gray, False Dawn, p. 88.
41. Gray, False Dawn, pp. 55–77.
42. False Dawn, pp. 61–62.
43. False Dawn, pp. 23, 200.
44. On both points, see Henderson, The Changing Fortunes, pp. 58–63.
45. See David Henderson's review of False Dawn in his ‘The Changing International Economic Order: Rival Visions of the Coming Millennium’, International Finance, 2:3 (1999).
46. Gray, False Dawn, p. 18.
47. False Dawn, p. 1–2, 7 ff.
48. See Sally, False Dawn, ch. 2.
49. Gray's misreading of classical liberalism is illustrated by the following: ‘… when Adam Smith founded classical economics on the premise of the rational “economic” man …’. Gray, False Dawn, p. 13.
50. Nowhere in The Wealth of Nations is there any mention of homo oeconomicus; it crops up for the first time – and then only impressionistically - in J. S. Mill's Principles. Gray's previous work does, however, display a more sophisticated awareness of the classical liberal tradition. See his Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy, London, Routledge, 1989.
51. Gray, False Dawn, pp. 93–94.
52. Sally (1998), chapter 6. Also see Razeen Sally, ‘The Economics and Politics of the German Miracle’, Government and Opposition, 30:4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 541–552.
53. Gray, False Dawn, p. 82.
54. Henderson The Changing Fortunes, pp. 82–86.
55. A key point in Paul Krugman's Pop Internationalism, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1996.