Complicity

Israel Law Review

Volumn 30, Issue 1-2, 1996, Pages 140-145

  Fletcher, George P ^a  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85009613265     PISSN: 00212237     EISSN: 20479336     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0021223700014990     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. See StGB §§ 27(2), 49(1).
2. Model Penal Code, section 2.06(2)(a).
3. For a full discussion of this theory, with citations to appropriate authorities, see George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) 642–644.
4. On the scope of this justification, see, e.g. Model Penal Code § 3.02, StGB § 34.
5. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S.228 (1987) (requiring the defendant to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence did not violate due process).
6. This is known as the Pinkerton doctrine, as enunciated in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
7. The rule now seems to be in growing disfavor. See United States v. Staples, 114 S.Ct.1793 (1994), holding that defendant could not be convicted of the felony of possessing a prohibited firearm without proof of knowledge that the “gun would fire automatically”.
8. See also State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1986), holding that defendant owner of a bar could be liable for criminal penalties for serving liquor to a minor only on proof that he had knowledge of the sale or that “he gave express or implied consent” to the sale. Yet in Guminga the court affirmed the possibility, on the same facts; of “civil penalties” such as license revocation and a fine.