The Marshall Plan: Filling in Some of the Blanks

Contemporary European History

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 267-294

  Burk, Kathleen ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 85009547777     PISSN: 09607773     EISSN: 14692171     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0960777301002053     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and its Meaning (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955). I was given a copy of the pre-publication manuscript.
2. John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).
3. Henry Pelling, Britain and the Marshall Plan (London: Macmillan, 1988). See also my essay for beginners, ‘Britain and the Marshall Plan’, in Chris Wrigley, ed., Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), 210-30. For Germany, see below, n. 17 and for France, n. 30.
4. Maria Fernanda Rollo, Portugal e o Plano Marshall (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1994). The author has provided a summary of her argument in Hans H. J. Labohm, ed., The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan in Retrospect and in Prospect (The Hague: The Clingendael Institute of International Relations, 1997), 48-50. This is a very useful publication, giving information not easily available elsewhere, e.g. on Iceland and the Marshall Plan. For citations for articles on Belgium, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, see below, nn. 31-33.
5. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951 (London: Methuen, 1984). See also Milward's review of Hogan's book, ‘Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 13, no. 2 (Spring 1989), 231-53.
6. Mikko Majander, ‘The Limits of Sovereignty: Finland and the Marshall Plan in 1947’, Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 19, no. 4 (1994), 309-26. The Americans of course realised that this was not the Finnish government's own decision, and treated it relatively kindly.
7. Although the largest Communist Party per capita was that of Luxembourg. 9 The American Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, let it be known that if the Italians elected the Communist Party to power, there would be no Marshall aid for Italy. See, e.g., James Edward Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); John Harper, America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Rosaria Quartararo, ‘L'Italia e il Piano Marshall (1947-52), Storia Contemporanea, Vol. 15, no. 4 (1984), 647-722; Pier Paolo D'Attore, ‘Il Piano Marshall: Politica, Economica, Relazioni Internazionali Nella Ricostruzione Italiana’, Passato e Presente, no. 7 (1985), 31-63; David Ellwood, ‘La Propaganda del Piano Marshall in Italia’, Passato e Presente, no. 9 (1985), 153-71; and Elena Aga Rossi, ed., Il Piano Marshall e l'Europa (Rome, 1983).
8. Certainly this was the Soviet expectation. See Scott D. Parrish, New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947, International History of the Cold War Working Paper No. 9 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1994).
9. Silva (see below, p. 5) argues that Sweden's strategic value to the United States was limited: rather, he emphasises Washington's desire to keep the neutral states on board rather than alienating them.
10. One glaring lacuna in the bibliography of works on the Marshall Plan is a focus on the small states, which in certain contexts had an importance which outweighed their size - Belgium is only one example. There has been some work done on this subject, which was presented at a conference, The Marshall Plan and the Small States, held at the University of Oslo in November 1997; publication of the proceedings is apparently expected in due course. In particular, to what extent did the small states band together, beyond the already connected Benelux states? Did any of them see this as a way of safeguarding themselves against too-insistent American, or other large-state, pressure? Geiger in his article (see below) briefly mentions this with regard to Ireland, but scholars could tease out a fundamental web of interconnected relationships.
11. For Britain, a standard work for some time has been Andrew Carew, Labour and the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), while for France there is R. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemmas of Modernisation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
12. See also W. Sanford, The American Business Community and the European Recovery Program, 1947-52 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987).
13. Consisting of representatives from all of the recipient countries, this was established on American insistence to co-ordinate the European requests for aid before submitting a single unified request to the US agency which administered the ERP, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). See Richard T. Griffiths, ed., Explorations in OEEC History (Paris: Organisation for European Development, 1997).
14. Charles Kindleberger, Marshall Plan Days (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
15. William Diebold, Trade and Payments in Western Europe: A Study in European Economic Cooperation 1947-1951 (New York: Harper & Bros [for the Council on Foreign Relations], 1952).
16. As revealed by Sallie Pisani in The CIA and the Marshall Plan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991).
17. See, e.g., ‘The Politics of Productivity: Foundation of American International Economic Policy of the Second World War’, International Organisation, Vol. 31, no. 4 (1977), 607-33; idem, ‘The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth Century Western Europe’, American Historical Review, Vol. 86 (1981), 327-52; and idem, In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
18. Mary Browne, Till Geiger and Michael Kennedy, eds., Ireland, Europe and the Marshall Plan.
19. What is wrong with ‘gain access to'? Almost as bad is Silva's use of managerial English (below, p. 81): ‘Recent scholarship has tended to downsize both the extent of economic crisis in postwar Europe and the impact of American aid on that crisis.’
20. See the ur-description and judgement of the use of elegant variation in the eponymous entry in H. W. Fowler's Modern English Usage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn,1965), pp. 148-51. It famously begins, ‘It is the second-rate writers, those intent rather on expressing themselves prettily than on conveying their meaning clearly, and still more those whose notions of style are based on a few misleading rules of thumb, that are chiefly open to the allurements of elegant variation… the real victims, first terrorized by a misunderstood taboo, next fascinated by a newly discovered ingenuity, and finally addicted to an incurable vice, are the minor novelists and the reporters’ - but not, I hasten to add, Dr Silva, whose prose is usually straightforward and clear.
21. See also Geèrard Bossuat, La France, l'aide ameèricaine et la construction europeèenne 1944-54, 2 vols. (Paris: Comiteè pour l'histoire eèconomique et financieére, Ministeére des Finances, 1993) and L'Europe occidentale aé l'heure ameèricaine: Le Plan Marshall et l'uniteè europeèenne 1945-1952 (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1992); Irwin M. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and the articles on France in Animation de la recherche, Le Plan Marshall et le releévement eèconomique de l'Europe (Paris: Comiteè pour l'histoire et financieére, Ministeére des Finances, 1993).
22. See for now the articles by Ginette Kurgan-van Hentenryk: ‘La Belgique et le Plan Marshall: les neègociations belgo-ameèricaine (juin 1947-juillet 1948)’, Animation de la Research, Le Plan Marshall, 69-86; ‘La Belgique et le releévement eèconomique de l'Allemagne 1945-1948’, Relations Internationales, Vol. 51 (1987), 343-63; ‘Le Plan Marshall et le deèveloppement eèconomique de la Belgique’, in E. Aerts et al., eds., Studia Historica êconomica. Liber Amicorum Herman Van der Wee (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1993), 157-72; and ‘La Belgique et le Plan Marshall ou les paradoxes des relations belgoame èricaines’, Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire. Fasc. 2: Histoire Meèdieèvale, Moderne et Contemporaine, Vol. 71 (1993), 290-353. See also Isabelle Cassiers, ‘ “Belgian Miracle” to Slow Growth: the Impact of the Marshall Plan and the European Payments Union’, in Barry Eichengreen, ed., Europe's Postwar Recovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 271-91.
23. See Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, ‘ “Big Stick” Diplomacy: the Netherlands Between Decolonisation and Alignment, 1945-1949’, International History Review, Vol. 14 (1992), 45-70 and E. H. van der Beugel, ‘An Act Without Peer: The Marshall Plan in American-Dutch Relations’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (1982), 456-69.
24. See Thierry Grosbois, ‘Le Benelux et le Plan Marshall, une union douanieére face au roi dollar’, Relations Internationales, Vol. 51 (1987), 515-28; Cees Wiebe and Bert Zeeman, ‘Benelux’, in David Reynolds et al., eds., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (London: Yale University Press, 1994), 167-93; and Erik Bloemen, ‘A Creditor's Dreams and Nightmares: Benelux and the Foundation of the European Payments Union’, in Griffiths, Explorations in OEEC History, 201-8.
25. See thus far H. é. Pharo, ‘Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction: Norway Faces the Marshall Plan’, Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 1, no. 1 (1977); idem, ‘The Marshall Plan and the Modernisation of the Norwegian Economy’, Animation de la recherche, Le Plan Marshall, 591-605, and E. Brofoss, ‘The Marshall Plan and Norway's Hesitation’, Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 1, no. 2 (1977).
26. See V. Sorensen, ‘The Politics of Closed Markets: Denmark, the Marshall Plan, and European Integration, 1945-1963’, International History Review, Vol. 15 (1993), 23-45; N. Petersen, ‘The Cold War and Denmark’, Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 10 (1985), 191-209; and Leon Dalgas Jensen, ‘Denmark and the Marshall Plan, 1947-8: The Decision to Participate’, Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 14, no. 1 (1989), 57-83.