Decision behaviour - improving expert judgement

Making Essential Choices with Scant Information: Front-End Decision Making in Major Projects

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 169-194

  Kirkebøen, Geir ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

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Indexed keywords

EID: 85009290198     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230236837     Document Type: Chapter

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