The CWC in the context of the 1925 Geneva debates

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 38-45

  Zanders, Jean Pascal ^a  

^a FREE UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSELS   (Belgium)

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EID: 85008857233     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709608436636     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. Chemical weapons are defined here as antipersonnel, casualty-causing, poison-agent weapons. Excluded from this usage are flamethrowers, incendiaries such as napalm, obscurant smoke, herbicides, and riot-control agents, which feature in the definitions advanced in some armed forces manuals. The two latter categories are the subject of officially sanctioned transfers to other states when intended for riot- control and law-enforcement purposes (e.g., police interventions during demonstrations or the spraying of coca fields in Latin America).
2. High-Level Meeting of the Security Council: Note by the President of the Security Council on Behalf of the Members, U.N. Security Council Document S/23500, January 31, 1992.
3. Jean Pascal Zanders, The Destruction of Old Chemical Munition in Belgium, paper delivered at the conference The Challenge of Old Chemical Scrap-Munition and Toxic Armament Wastes organized by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at Munster, F.R.G., October, 18-21, 1993 (proceedings forthcoming).
4. Letter dated October 27, 1983, from T. S. Gold, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical Matters),. addressed to Captain Joseph R. McClary, Navy Office of Legislative Affairs
5. Edward M. Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons. A Study of Proliferation (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1994), pp. 9-10.
6. For identification of the different actors and processes involved in different generations of CWW proliferation see, Jean Pascal Zanders, Towards Understanding Chemical-Warfare Weapons Proliferation, Contemporary Security Policy 16 (April 1995), pp. 91 ff.
7. Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War. Held at Geneva, May 4th to June 17th, 1925, League of Nations, Document A. 13. 1925. IX, September 1925, p. 155.
8. Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War League of Nations, Document A., p. 161.
9. Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War League of Nations, Document A., p. 161.
10. Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War League of Nations, Document A., p. 157.
11. Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War League of Nations, Document A., p. 530.
12. The Hungarian delegate also clarified that his proposal only concerned means of personal defense, i.e. gas masks, not the defensive use of gas.
13. Statement by the French delegate, League of Nations, Document A., p. 533.
14. French delegate, League of Nations, Document A., p. 534.
15. For instance, Article II, §9(b), which states that protective purposes are not prohibited under the CWC, Article X, §2, which states that nothing in the CWC will be interpreted as impeding the right of a state party to provide itself with means of protection against chemical weapons, and the Verification Annex, Part VI, §2(a), which allows production, acquisition and retention of Schedule 1 chemicals inter alia for protective purposes; §3, which allows the transfer of these chemicals to other states parties for such purposes; §8, which allows for the establishment by a state party of a single small-scale facility for the production of Schedule 1 chemicals for these purposes; and §10, which permits production for protective purposes of Schedule 1 chemicals in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year at one facility outside the single small-scale facility.
16. Herbert C. De Bisschop, The Role of Anti-Chemical Protection in De-terrence and the Need for Protection after a Global Chemical Convention in Jean Pascal Zanders, ed., The 2nd Gulf War and the CBW Threat, Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Conference on Chemical Warfare, Vredesonderzoek, Special Issue, (Interfacultair Overlegorgaan voor Vredesonderzoek, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, November 1995), pp. 165-169.
17. Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishes, 1994), p. 201.
18. Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp Proceedings A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, p. 156.
19. Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp., A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons pp. 308-309.
20. Committee discussion at A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons pp. 531-532
21. Annex 4, Report of the Military, Naval and Air Technical Committee on Chemical and Biological Warfare (Rapporteur: General de Marinis (Italy)), pp. 739-740.
22. Report of the Military, Naval and Air Technical Committee on Chemical and Biological Warfare., p. 540.
23. Rudibert Kunz; Rolf-Dieter Müller, Giftgas gegett Abdel Krim. Deutschland, Spanlen und der Gaskrieg in Spanisch-Marokko 1922-1927. Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte 34 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach GmbH + Co Verlaghaus KG, 1990), p. 59.
24. Zanders Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte (October 18-21, 1993).
25. The relevant passages in the CWC are: Article I, §l(a) and §l(d); Article VI, §2; Article VII, §l(c); and Article XI, §2(e). The schedules are defined in the Annex on Chemicals attached to the CWC. The regimes governing the transfer of chemicals are detailed in the Verification Annex, notably Part VI, B for Schedule 1 chemicals, Part VII, C regarding the transfer of Schedule 2 chemicals to nonstate parties, and Part VIII, C regarding the transfer of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-state parties. The import and export of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals to other states parties are the subject of the initial and annual declarations to be submitted by each state party (Part VII, A and Part VIII, A respectively).
26. Zanders Proceedings Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte, p. 155.
27. Zanders Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte., p. 161.
28. Zanders Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte., p. 156.
29. Zanders Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte, p. 162.
30. Statement by the representative of the British Empire in the Military, Naval and Air Technical Committee. Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte., p. 533.
31. Statement by the representative of the British Empire in the Military, Naval and Air Technical Committee. Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte., p. 162.
32. Interventions by the representatives of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Italy in the Military, Naval and Air Technical Committee. Proceedings Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte, pp. 529 and531.
33. Interventions by the representatives of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Italy in the Military, Naval and Air Technical Committee. Proceedings Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte., p. 315.
34. Thomas Stock and Anna De Geer, Chemical Trade Control and Article XI of the CWC [http://www.sipri.se/projects/group-cw/Paper- 4.html], June 1994.
35. Krutzsch Trapp, pp. 214-215.
36. Samir K. Sen, Controlling Non-nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction: Problems and Prospects in a Changing World, Comparative Strategy 15 (1996), pp. 174-175.
37. This trend is certainly observable for the European NATO-member states, many of whom had active CW armament programs during the interbellum. Similarly, if one observes the Gulf region, states that are highly dependent on an outside power (cf. the conservative monarchies) for their security display are far less associated with CW proliferation than the revolutionary regimes, which seek to meet each security challenge independently. (Jean Pascal Zanders, Dynamics of Chemical Armament: Towards a Theory of Proliferation, Ph.D. diss., Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1996.)