Reexamining brain drain from the former soviet union

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 92-97

  Moody, R Adam ^a  

^a MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85008814562     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709608436643     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. Mark Hibbs, “Vulnerable’ Soviet Nuclear Experts Could Aid Clandestine Weapons Aims,” NuclearFuel, October 28, 1991, pp. 4-5.
2. Mark Hibbs “Nuclear Brain Drain So Far Theoretical,” Rossiya, February 5-11, 1992, p. 8
3. Mark Hibbs FBIS-SOV-92-028 (11 February 1992), pp. 7-8.
4. Mark Hibbs Vladimir Zakharov and Vladimir Fortov, “Science Is Already In A Coma,” Izvestiya, November 2, 1994, p. 4
5. Mark Hibbs FBIS-SOV-94-220 (15 November 1994), pp. 30-31.
6. Vladimir D. Shkolnikov, “Potential Energy: Emergent Emigration of Highly Qualified Manpower from the Former Soviet Union,” Ph.D. dissertation, RAND Graduate School, September 1994, p. 8.
7. Chris Bird, “Confusion Reigns as Russians Return Home,” New Scientist, January 8, 1994, p. 9
8. Stanislav Simanovsky et al. Brain Drain from Russia: Problems, Prospects, and Regulation (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), pp. 23, 48-49, 52, 57, 59, 77, 81
9. Tim Beardsley, “Brain Drain: Hard Times for Science in the Former Soviet Union,” Scientific American (April 1992), pp. 17, 20
10. William Potter, “Exports and Experts: Proliferation Risks From the New Commonwealth,” Arms Control Today 22 (January/February 1992), p. 36.
11. In October 1992, the Federal Migration Service of Russia (FMS) was established to tackle the growing problem of an in-pouring of refugees from strife-ridden regions within and outside Russia’s borders. However, as Bird points out, tracking migration patterns in the former Soviet Union is a daunting and virtually impossible task due to the large number of refugees and migrants who move under duress. Generating reliable data therefore becomes very difficult and, as in the case of emigration statistics, estimates are most often used. For an example of a FMS statistical report see “Statistics: Migration Growth Has Almost Doubled,” Delovoy Mir, April 18, 1995, p. 5
12. William Potter FBIS-SOV-95-091-S (11 May 1995), pp. 24-26.
13. Another irony is that the law places limits on the ability of the Russian State Statistical Committee to gather information on the positions found by emigrants abroad.
14. Elena Nekipelova, et al., “Emigratsiya Uchenykh: Problemy I Realnyye Otsenki,” Center for Research and Statistics of Science of the Russian Ministry of Science, Technology, and Higher Education and of the Russian Academy of Science, 1993, pp. 27-28
15. Shkolnikov, Emigratsiya Uchenykh: Problemy I Realnyye Otsenki p. 1.
16. Sarah Helmstadter, “The Russian Brain Drain in Perspective,” RFE/RL Research Report, October 23, 1992, p. 58
17. William C. Potter, “Nuclear Exports from the Former Soviet Union: What’s New What’s True,” Arms Control Today 23 (January/February 1993), p. 8.
18. According to Solon Arditis of ECOTEC Research and Consulting Ltd., in 1995 Russia established “an ‘Institute for Immigration Controls’ that [aims] in particular to train adequate personnel to assume immigration control functions at the main interrepublic borders.
19. Solon Arditis, “Exchange of Experience between the Russian Federation and Southern European Regions in the Field of Migrant Reintegration Policies,” Inter-national Migration Review (Winter 1995), p. 1050.
20. However, by February 1996, U.S., Russian, and CIS officials were still reporting that border control among nations of the former Soviet Union is nearly nonsexistent.”
21. Theresa Hitchens, “Experts: U.S. Nonproliferation Aid to CIS Is Not Enough,” Defense News, February 19-25, 1996, p. 12.
22. Correspondence to author from a U.S. government official, March 15, 1996.
23. Yademiy Samogonshchik Popalsya, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, May 8, 1996, p. 1
24. Vyacheslav Kokhanov, “Uran-235 Tyanet Na Tsentner,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 9, 1996, p. 3
25. Aleksei Tarabrin, “Okhotniki Smertelnogo Promysla,”Pravda (Ezhenedelnaya Gazeta), February 9-16, 1996, p. 3
26. O. Kireeva, “Vse Khorosho, Chto Khorosho Konchaetsya,” Yantamy Krai, January 25, 1996, p. 2.
27. Another related problem is “the willingness of Russian and CIS companies, private citizens and even government leaders to pursue profit at the expense of arms control measures.” Hitchens, p. 12.
28. Public Law 102-509, 102nd Congress of the United States of America, October 24, 1992.
29. “Commonwealth and Baltic Scientists Immigration and Exchange Act of 1992,” Report 102-881, Part l, 102nd Congress of the United States of America, 2nd Session, September 21, 1992.
30. Adam Treiger, “Plugging the Russian Brain Drain: Criminalizing Nuclear-Expertise Proliferation,” Georgetown Law Journal (November 1993), p. 266.
31. One expert on the brain drain issue says that “[a] defense specialist from the former USSR would not, in all likelihood, be able to practice his/her profession in the United States because of the security regulations. Thus one could not dismiss a scenario where a Russian weapons specialist who was somehow able to leave a closed city for the United States only to fmd himself deprived of opportunity to work in his professional field leaves the U.S. for a ‘problem’ country where he would be guaranteed such an opportunity.”
32. Shkolnikov, Georgetown Law Journal p. 20.
33. “Topaz Project In Jeopardy” Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, January 31, 1996, pp. 7-8.
34. For an excellent review of the movement of Soviet scientists to the U.S. in the early 1990
35. Joyce Bamathan, et al., “The Soviet Brain Drain Is the U.S. Brain Gain,” Business Week, November 4, 1991, pp. 94-100.
36. Yuriy Kudimov, “Russian Physicists Working in Latin America,” Novoye Vremya, August 9, 1992, pp. 26-27
37. Yuriy Kudimov JPRS-TND-92-032 (9 September 1992), pp. 19-21.
38. Frank Gaffney, “Risky Reactors in Cuba?” The Washington Times, April 28, 1992, p. F3.
39. Yevgeniy Bovkun, “Nuclear Scientists Leaving CIS,” Izvestiya, October 20, 1992, p. 7
40. Yevgeniy Bovkun FBIS-SOV-92-205 (22 October 1992), p. 4.
41. The actual number of Russian immigrant scientists now residing in Israel is much larger. Of the 950, 000 Russians that have immigrated to Israel since the period of detente in the 1970s (750, 000 since the late 1980s), 10, 000 are scientists, 70 percent of whom are “working as truck drivers, bricklayers and in other jobs outside their fields.”
42. Joseph Berger, “Question Mark In Israel Ballot: ‘The Russians,” The New York Times, May 29, 1996, pp. Al, A8.
43. One of the hired Russian specialists is identified as “Sophia” a middle- aged expert in “aerospace deflection determination” who worked previously at the Research Institute for Applied Mathematics in Moscow. Another Russian employee is identified as “Mark,” a computer engineer who worked at the “Sverdlovsk nuclear facility” prior to emigrating to Israel in mid-1991. Mark’s employment history also includes work at two “leading Israeli software companies.”
44. Neal Sandler, “Real Rocket Science Comes to High Finance,” Business Week, January 17, 1994, pp. 69, 72.
45. Lee Katz, “Nuke Knowledge Coveted,” USA Today, January 8, 1992, p. 4A.
46. Anatoliy Karpychev, “My Opinion,” Pravda, January 21, 1992, p. 4
47. Anatoliy Karpychev FBIS-SOV-92-014 (21 January 1992), pp. 2-3.
48. Yevgeniy Bovkun, “Nuclear Scientists Leaving CIS,” Izvestiya, October 20, 1992, p. 7
49. Yevgeniy Bovkun FBIS-SOV-92-205 (22 October 1992), p. 4.
50. Heinz Vielain, “Nuclear Smuggling—Chancellor Kohl Sends Urgent Letter to Yeltsin,” Welt Am Sonntag, August 21, 1994, pp. 1-2
51. Heinz Vielain JPRS-TND-94-017 (8 September 1994), pp. 43-44.
52. Heinz Vielain “Nuclear Experts Leave for Libya, Iran,” Der Spiegel, February 24, 1992
53. Heinz Vielain FBIS-SOV-92-037 (25 February 1992), pp. 3-4.
54. Heinz Vielain “Poverty Summit-Nuclear,” Associated Press, March 12, 1995
55. Heinz Vielain Executive News Service, March 12, 1995.
56. Vielain, Executive News Service pp. 1-2.
57. Reuter, Executive News Service 29, 1994
58. Heinz Vielain “Russia Sharing Secret Nuclear Work,” Executive News Service, November 30, 1994.
59. Mikhail Urusov, “Russia Is Arming China,” Moscow News, October 7, 1994, p. 8.
60. Mikhail Urusov Hanguk Hbo, February 7, 1992, p. 1
61. Mikhail Urusov FBIS-EAS-92-073 (15 April 1992), p. 37.
62. Mikhail Urusov KBS-1 Radio Network, December 20, 1992
63. Mikhail Urusov FBIS-EAS-92-245 (21 December 1992), p. 32.
64. Yonhap, FBIS-EAS-92-245 December 21, 1992
65. Yonhap FBIS-EAS-92-245 (21 December 1992), p. 32-33.
66. Yonhap, FBIS-EAS-92- 245 December 2l, 1992
67. Yonhap FBIS-EAS-92-245 (21 December 1992), pp. 32-33.
68. Kim Sok-hwan, Chungang Ilbo, January 13, 1993, p. 2
69. Kim Sok-hwan FBIS-EAS-93-009 (14 January 1993), pp. 17-18.
70. Yevgeniy Tkachenko, Itar-Tass, February 10, 1993
71. Yevgeniy Tkachenko FBIS-SOV-93-026 (10 February 1993), pp. 11-12.
72. Bovkun FBIS-SOV-93-026 p. 7.
73. Vielain, FBIS-SOV-93-026 pp. 1-2.
74. Michael Lysobey of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, interview with Anatoliy Yakoushev, Deputy Director of the Belarusian Institute of Power Engineering Problems, Minsk, Belarus, April 19, 1996. According to Yakoushev, Belarus places no travel restrictions on the institute’s employees; a nuclear scientist is only required to obtain a visa to visit “any country.” Current Belarusian law places no further constraints on a nuclear scientist’s travel abroad.
75. Vielain “Emigration Laws and Policies of the Russian Federation,” House Document 104-91, 104th Congress of the United States of America, 1st Session, June 30, 1995, p. 3. The nature of the state secrets that prevented their emigration is not given in the document.
76. John Lepingwell, “Russian Nuclear Industry Problems,” RFE/RL Daily Report, August 23, 1993.
77. Hans-Henning Schroeder, “Conversion in the USSR: Procedures in Search of Planning,” Reports of the Federal Institute For East Europe and International Studies (October 1992), pp. 37-39.
78. The Sverdlovsk region is the site of uranium enrichment and processing and warhead assembly and dismantlement, and the site of one of the Soviet Union’s biological weapons research, development, and production centers; the Soviet biological weapons program reportedly ceased in March 1992. Interestingly, in September 1992 (just prior to the reported flight of some 30, 000 workers from the Sverdlovsk military-industrial complex), Russia pledged in a joint statement with the U.S. and the U.K. to reduce “the number of personnel involved in [its] military biological programs by 50 percent,” and to reduce “funding for military biological research by 30 percent.”
79. Milton Leitenberg, “The Biological Weapons Program of the Former Soviet Union,” Biological (September 1993), pp. 187-191.
80. Martin Sieff, “Russia Opens Door To Biological Arms Checks,” The Washington Times, September 15, 1992, p. A7.
81. Alan Cooperman and Kyrill Belianinov, “Moonlighting By Modem in Russia,” U.S. News and World Report, April 17, 1995, pp. 45, 48.
82. Paul R. Josephson, “Russian Scientific Institutions: Internationalisation, Democracy and Dispersion,” Minerva (Spring 1994), p. 4.
83. Paul R. Josephson “Ukraine Academy of Sciences at ‘Edge of Abyss” Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, November 17, 1995, pp. 7-8.
84. Viktor Zelensky, Director of the Ukrainian National Science Center, Kharkiv Physics and Technology Institute, the loss of scientists from the institute is more of a concern than the potential theft of nuclear-materials. As of late May 1996, none of the scientists at the institute had been paid for four months. Of the 1, 839 scientists working at the institute, about 150 worked directly on the Soviet weapons program. Emily Ewell of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, interview with Viktor Zelensky, Director of the Ukrainian National Science Center, Kharkiv Physics and Technology In-stitute, Kharkiv, Ukraine, May 27-28, 1996.
85. Viktor Zelensky “Russia Sets Aside Funds to Retain Scientists,” Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, January 11, 1996, p. 10.
86. Joint Statement of the Governing Board Meeting (March 28-29, 1996) of the International Science and Technology Center, March 29, 1996. The project on which a scientist works may be extended beyond the three year limit. For a more detailed evaluation of the science center initiative’s implementation, development, and current effectiveness.
87. R. Adam Moody, “A Case Study on the Cooperative Threat Reduction Science Center Ini tiative,” in William Potter and John Shields, eds., The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Donor and Recipient Country Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) (forthcoming).
88. Glenn Schweitzer, Moscow D.M.Z.: The Story of the International Effort to Convert Russian Weapons Science to Peaceful Purposes (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996).
89. Shkolnikov, The Story of the International Effort to Convert Russian Weapons Science to Peaceful Purposes pp. 48-49, 58-59.