Converting former soviet chemical weapons plants

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 78-89

  Tucker, Jonathan B ^a  

^a MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES   (United States)

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EID: 85008796707     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709608436654     Document Type: Article

References (91)

1. The decision by the U.S. Senate leadership on September 12, 1996, to postpone a vote on the CWC until after the November presidential election is likely to delay Russian ratification still further.
2. Viktor Litovkin, “Moscow Votes For Chemical Disarmament Convention, Though It Doesn’t Agree With Everything In It,” Izvestia, August 27, 1992, pp. 1, 4
3. Viktor Litovkin The Current Digest 44(34), 1992, p. 15.
4. Author’s telephone interview with a U.S. government official (name withheld on request), April 26, 1996.
5. A large number of facilities were involved in CW agent production in the Soviet Union before and during World War n. According to Vil Mirzayanov, a former chemical weapons scientist, “In Moscow alone there were at least six plants manufacturing toxic agents Generally speaking, you could say that in the European part of the country there was probably no population center of any size, any city, that did not manufacture chemical weapons.” Transcript of 2 July 1994 TV Program on Shikhany CW Center, Ostankino Television First Channel Network; in JPRS-TAC-94-009-L (18 August 1994), p. 23.
6. Andrei Maksimov, “A Look at the Former Chemical-Weapons Capital,” Segodnya, July 25, 1996, p. 9
7. Andrei Maksimov The Current Digest 48 (31), 1996, pp. 16-17.
8. Oleg Vishnyakov, “Binary Bomb Exploded” [Interview with Vi] Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov], Novoye Vremya, No. 44 (October 1992), pp. 4-9
9. Oleg Vishnyakov JPRS-TAC-92-033 (14 November 1992), pp. 44-49.
10. Mirzayanov claims that under the Foliant program, the Soviet Union secretly developed and tested three unitary CW agents. The first was Substance 33, a compound similar to the persistent nerve agent VX, of which 15, 000 tons were produced in the early 1980s in a full-scale production facility near the city of Novocheboksarsk in the upper Volga region. (Although Western analysts believed that the Novocheboksarsk facility produced VX, Mirzayanov says it actually produced Substance 33.) Two other unitary nerve agents were also developed: A-230, which was officially approved by the Soviet Army in 1988; and A-232, an agent similar to A-230 that never received Soviet Army approval. These agents were produced in limited quantifies and tested at military test sites in Shikhany, Russia, and at the Ust-Yurt site near the city of Nukus, Uzbekistan. The three unitary nerve agents were the basis for the development of the novichok series of binary weapons, which began in 1982 at the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) in Moscow and its affiliate in Volsk-17 (near Shikhany). The fust Soviet binary agent, novichok-5, was derived from the unitary nerve agent A-232. A test batch of five to 10 metric tons of novichok-5 was produced at a pilot-scale plant in Volgograd and field-tested in 1989 and 1990 at the CW testing ground in Nukus. According to Mirzayanov, novichok-5 is five to eight times more lethal than VX and practically defies medical treatment. Indeed, one of the chemical engineers involved in its development, Andrei Zheleznyakov, was exposed to the agent in a laboratory accident and became an invalid for life. GosNIIOKhT also developed a binary form of Substance 33 that has no established name but that Mirzayanov calls “novichok-#." This binary agent was tested at Nukus and Shikhany and was adopted by the Soviet Army as a chemical weapon in 1990.
11. Mirzayanov also reports that GosNIIOKhT developed a third binary agent called novichok-7, which has a similar volatility to the nerve agent soman but is approximately 10 times more effective. This binary agent was produced in experimental quantities (tens of tons) at pilot-scale production facilities in Shikhany and Volgograd, and was tested in 1993 at the Shikhany test site. Two other binary nerve agents, designated novichok-S and novichok-9, were also reportedly under development at GosNIIOKhT but were not produced.
12. Although the chemical structures of the novel CW agents are unknown, they are reportedly organophosphate compounds derived from accessible raw materials. According to Vladimir Uglev, the inventor of A-232, “The weapon’s originality lies in the simplicity of its components, which are used in civilian industry and which cannot therefore be regulated by international experts.” Moreover, since binary components are much less toxic than unitary nerve agents, the novichok series could be produced at commercial chemical plants that manufacture fertilizers and pesticides.
13. Sources on the secret Russian CW program include: Oleg Vishnyakov, “Binary Bomb Exploded” [Interview with Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov], Novoye Vremya, No. 44 (October 1992), pp. 49
14. Oleg Vishnyakov JPRS-TAC-92-033 (14 November 1992), pp. 44-49
15. Douglas L. Clarke, “Chemical Weapons in Russia,” RFE/RL Research Report 2 (January 8, 1993), pp. 47-48
16. Oleg Vishnyakov, “Interview with a Noose Around the Neck” [Interview with Vladimir Uglev], Novoye Vremya, No. 6 (February 1993), pp. 40-41, in
17. Oleg Vishnyakov JPRS-TAC-93-007 (13 April 1993), pp. 39-42
18. Virginie Coulloudon, “Russia: Chemical Threat: The Terrible Secret,” he Point, February 12, 1994, pp. 14-15
19. Virginie Coulloudon JPRS-TAC-94-001-L (22 February 1994), p. 14
20. Igor Ryabov, “‘Chemical War’ Against an Invisible Enemy,” Novoye Vremya, No. 5 (February 1994), pp. 4-6
21. Igor Ryabov JPRS-TAC-94-003 (7 March 1994), pp. 11-14
22. Lev A. Fedorov, Chemical Weapons in Russia: History, Ecology, Politics (Moscow, 1994), in JPRS-TAC-94008-L (27 July 1994)
23. Vil S. Mirzayanov, “Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider’s View,”
24. Amy E. Smithson et al. Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects, Report No. 17 (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, October 1995), pp. 21-33.
25. Fred Hiatt, “Russia Jails Scientist Over State Secrets,” The Washington Post, October 27, 1992, pp. A21, A27
26. Serge Schmemann, “K.G.B.’s Sue-cessor Charges Scientist,” The New York Times, November 1, 1992, p. 4
27. Gale Colby and Irene Goldman, “When Will Russia Abandon Its Secret Chemical Weapons Program?” Demokratizatsiya (Winter 1993/94), pp. 148-154.
28. Mirzayanov, “Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex,” p. 26-28.
29. James Ring Adams, “Russia’s Toxic Threat,” The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 1996, p. A14
30. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., “Impending CWC Debate,” The Washington Times, September 4, 1996, p. A16
31. Thomas W. Lippman, “Senate Foes Derail Chemical Weapons Treaty,” The Washington Post, September 13, 1996, p. Al.
32. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Threat Control Through Arms Control: Annual Report to Congress 1995 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1996), P-23.
33. Author’s telephone interview with an ACDA official, September26, 1996.
34. Celes Eckerman, “CWC Vote Delayed By U.S. Questions to Russia,” Arms Control Today 24 (September 1994), p. 29
35. Martin Sieff, “U.S. Says Russia Isn’t Coming Clean With Poison-Gas Data,” The Washington Times, June 24, 1994, p. A16.
36. The Russian government reportedly did not comply with the MOU requirement to declare all development facilities that devoted more than 50 percent of their manpower, floorspace, and funding to CW activities. Whereas the United States declared more than 100 CW development facilities, Russia declared only one building. (Author’s telephone interview with a U.S. government official (name withheld request) on April 26, 1996.) Yet reports in the Russian press indicate the existence of at least three clandestine CW development centers in the Moscow region alone, including the State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT), the Military Chemical Defense Academy, and the Scientific Research Institute for Chemical Machinery. See Vladimir Gusar, “Third-Generation Chemical Weapons Are Being Produced and Tested As Before,” VEK, No. 12, March 26 - April 1, 1993, p. 2
37. JPRS-TAC-93-007 (13 April 1993), p. 43.
38. Testimony by the Hon. R. JamesWoolsey, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: Chemical Weapons Convention, 103rd Congress, 2nd session [S.Hrg. 103-869], June 23, 1994, p. 164.
39. Mirzayanov, “Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex,” p. 25.
40. CWC, Article V, paragraph 13.
41. CWC Verification Annex, Part V, Section D, para 75.
42. Article V of the CWC states that a converted facility must not be more capable of being reconverted into a CWPF than any other facility used for legitimate purposes. In addition, Part V of the CWC Verification Annex places stringent conditions on CWPF conversion. It precludes a converted facility from producing, processing, or consuming the toxic chemicals and precursors listed on CWC Schedules 1 and 2, or any other toxic chemicals unless specifically authorized by the OPCW’s Executive Council and Conference of States Parties. The CWC guidelines also require the destruction of any “specialized” equipment and buildings used in CW agent production such as airtight enclosures, high-capacity ventilation systems, and reaction vessels and piping made of special corrosion-resistant materials. Without such specialized equipment in place, illicit CW production would pose serious hazards to plant workers and the environment.
43. Finally, Part V of the CWC Verification Annex requires that for the 10 years after the OPCW Director-General certifies that conversion is complete, the state party must give OPCW inspectors unimpeded access to the facility at any time. States parties possessing converted CWPFs must pay for the costs of verification over the entire 10-year period.
44. Vladimir Orlov, “Destruction of Chemical Weapons Could Cost Russia 25 Trillion Rubles” [Interview with Pavel Syutkin], The Monitor l (Fall 1995), pp. 19-20. (The Monitor is published by the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, Athens, GA.)
45. Binary CW Munitions contain two separate cannisters filled with relatively nontoxic precursor chemicals that react to form a lethal agent while the munition is in flight to the target The United States developed three types of binary munitions: a 155mm artillery shell containing precursors of the volatile nerve agent sarin; the BIGEYE spray bomb containing precursors of the persistent nerve agent VX
46. Binary CW Warhead for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) containing precursors of a mixture of intermediate-volatility nerve agents. Although the 155mm shell and the BIGEYE bomb were produced, the MLRS system was terminated in 1990 in the final stages of development
47. Michael Moodie, “Ratifying the CWC: Past Time for Action,” Arms Control Today 26 (February 1996), pp. 7-8.
48. The official title of the BDA implementing protocol is: “Protocol of Updated Provisions Relating to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, agreed ad referendum in Geneva on March 26, 1993.”
49. Response to question for the record, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: Chemical Weapons Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-21), 103rd Congress, 2nd session, March 22, 1994 [S.Hrg. 103-869], p. 42.
50. United States, “Non-Paper Guidelines for Conversion Plans for Chemical Weapons Production Facilities,” October 14, 1993
51. Russian Federation, “Non-Paper Basic Guidelines to Implementing the Provisions on the Conversion of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities for Purposes Not Prohibited Under the Convention,” May 30, 1994.
52. The U.S. paper stated that by the end of the conversion process, “all specialized equipment and special features of buildings or structures” must be destroyed. In contrast, the Russian paper narrowed the scope of conversion by stating that by the end of the process, “the main production train and any chemical weapons filling machines” must be destroyed, plus “those specialized features of the buildings that make them distinct from standard buildings.” The Russian paper further defined “specialized equipment” as items of equipment involved in die final stage of CW agent production and having specifications “distinct from prevailing commercial industry standards.” The United States countered that commercial availability is not an adequate criterion, since commercial chemical plants are increasingly equipped with emission-control devices for enhanced environmental protection and worker safety, making them harder to distinguish from CWPFs. Thus, the U.S. paper stressed the need to assess the capability of the converted facility as a whole. Finally, the U.S. paper stressed the right of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to conduct routine inspections for 10 years after the conversion of a CWPF, while the Russian paper was silent on this issue.
53. Expert Group on Chemical Weapons and Associated Issues, “Background Paper: Basic Guidelines to Implementing The Provisions On The Conversion Of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities For Purposes Not Prohibited Under The Convention,” August 31, 1994 (Rev 1) and February 27, 1995 (Rev 2).
54. In discussing the timetable for destruction of CWPFs, the Expert Group on Chemical Weapons Issues did manage to agree on a list of chemical production equipment that would be termed “specialized.” [Expert Group on Chemical Weapons Issues, “Destraction of CW Production Facilities,” Document FOC CWPF 96/1.Rev 4, February 12, 1996.] The Expert Group also has been tasked to develop criteria for the toxicity and corrosiveness of chemicals that may be produced at a converted CWPF.
55. Russian Federation, “The Issue of Declaration of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities,” Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Tenth Session, document PC-X/B/WP.14, March 23, 1995, p. 1.
56. Russian Federation, “The Issue of Declaration of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities,” Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Tenth Session, document PC-X/B/WP.14, p. 4.
57. Russian Federation, “Statement by Mr. A.S. Ivanov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Tenth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the OPCW,” April 3, 1995 (English translation).
58. United Kingdom, “UK Comments on Russian Paper on Chemical Weapons Production Facilities (CWPFs),” The Hague, April 5, 1995.
59. Matthew Meselson and Justin Smith, “The CWC and the Destruction or Conversion of Chemical Weapon Production Facilities,” Working paper presented at the Third Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 19-21, 1995.
60. United Kingdom, “UK Comments on Russian Paper.”
61. Delegation of Germany, Statement by H.W. Beuth Dr., Alternate Representative, on “The Issue of Declaration of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities,” delivered in Working Group B session of the Tenth Plenary of the CWC PrepCom, April 5, 1995.
62. Russian Federation, “Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Eleventh Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” document PC-XI/11, July 25, 1995.
63. According to a U.S. government source, the Russians have removed all CW production equipment from at least two buildings at Volgograd. During a visit to the chemical complex under the Wyoming MOU, U.S. inspectors entered the building where methylphosphonic difluoride (a nerve agent precursor) had been produced and found it was completely empty. Author's telephone interview with an ACDA official, September 26, 1996.
64. Russian Federation, “Statement by the Head of Delegation,” July 25, 1995.
65. The items that Russia contends should have been declared are some mobile CW filling systems (which the United States considers free-standing equipment but Russia classifies as filling facilities) and a plant that muted the “OPA” component of the sarin binary artillery shell. OPA consists of two common industrial chemicals, isopropyl alcohol and isopropylamine. Since these compounds are not listed in the CWC Schedules of Chemicals, the United States maintains that the mixing plant is not a CWPF and hence is not declarable.
66. Author’s telephone interview with Richard D. Andrea, Acting Chief, Chemical and Biological Policy Division, U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, April 9, 1996.
67. Delegation of the Russian Federation, “The Issue of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities,” Informal Working Paper, September 22, 1995 (English translation).
68. One scenario for clandestine production of CW agent at a converted facility would be to produce an organophosphorus nerve agent such as sarin in short production campaigns, then flush the system and switch to production of an organophosphorus compound with a similar chemical structure such as the pesticide malathion or the fire retardant DMMP. In this case, on-site sampling and analysis might either fail to detect the nerve-agent residue or could yield ambiguous results.
69. Author’s telephone interview with Vil Mirzayanov, September 17, 1996.
70. Author’s telephone interview with Thomas Cataldo, Deputy Director, Chemical Weapons Treaty Management Office, U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, September 3, 1996.
71. R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. to Discuss Concerns on Chemical Arms Pact With Moscow,” The Washington Post, August 9, 1996, p. A22.
72. Author’s telephone interview with an ACDA official, September 3, 1996.
73. Delegation of the Russian Federation, “Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Fourteenth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Organisation for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons,” document PC-XIV/16, July 22, 1996 (emphasis added).
74. John Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, statement at press conference on “Chemical Weapons Convention and Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations,” August 7, 1996. (Transcript by Federal News Service.)
75. Author’s telephone interview with Richard D’Andrea, ACDA, September 10, 1996.
76. John Barry, “Planning a Plague7” Newsweek, February 1, 1993, pp. 40-41
77. Anthony Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex? The Conversion of Biological Weapons’ Facilities in the Russian Federation,” Contemporary Security Policy 17 (April 1996), pp. 80-112.
78. Bill Gertz, “Germ Warfare Gives Way to War on Germs,” The Washington Times, April 6, 1995, p. A13.
79. Rose Gottemoeller, “Development of Complex Incentive Strategies for Nonproliferation Policy,” paper delivered at the Aspen Strategy Seminar, Aspen, Colorado, July 28, 1996.
80. Author’s telephone interview with Vil Mirzayanov, September 17, 1996.
81. Author’s telephone interview with Michael Walls, Chemical Manufacturers Association, September 13, 1996.
82. Author’s telephone interview with Vil Mirzayanov, September 17, 1996.
83. Author’s telephone interview with an ACDA official, September 26, 1996.
84. Author’s telephone interview with Kevin Flamm, U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, September 23, 1996.
85. Author’s telephone interview with Thomas Cataldo, U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, September 25, 1996.
86. Author’s telephone interview with Richard D’ Andrea, ACDA, April 9, 1996.
87. Since 1992, the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has sought to help the newly independent states of Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine control and reduce threats posed by weapons of mass destruction inherited from the former Soviet Union. According to the Congressional General Accounting Office, DOD has allocated $68 mil. lion in fiscal year (FY) 1992-96 CTR funds to support research and development on Russian CW destruction. On July 30, 1996, Congress approved another $78.5 million in FY 1997 to continue program support, including further development of CW and munitions processing equipment and the design of a pilot CW destruction facility, and $15 million for dismantlement of Russian chemical and biological weapons facilities. However, the final language of the conference bill specifically excludes the use of these funds for the conversion of former CWPFs, reflecting the long-held House position against supporting defense conversion in Russia. Thus, any U.S. funding for CWPF conversion would have to come from other sources. See “Congress OK’s Increased Funds for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement,” Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor 3 (20), August 13, 1996, p. 1
88. U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program GAO/NSIAD-96-22, September 27, 1996, p. 20.
89. Whereas the production equipment at a converted CWPF would be new, the walls and floors would almost certainly be contaminated with phosphorus from past production activities. Thus, sampling areas of the plant outside the production line would probably yield ambiguous results.
90. One approach to remote monitoring, known as “Sample Now, Analyze Later” (SNAL) involves taking samples automatically from the production line at random intervals. A prototype SNAL device, developed by a team at the University of Hamburg, can store 1, 200 samples over a period of the year on a single polyethylene cassette tape. The device extracts a few micrograms of material directly from the production line through a silicon transfer membrane and deposits the sample on the magnetic tape along with data on the date and time of sampling. Several months later, inspectors can use a portable instrument to analyze the accumulated samples retrospectively and read the associated data.
91. Gerhard Matz, University of Hamburg, “Sampling Organics on a Magnetic Tape Reporter System for Retrospective Analysis by a Mobile Mass Spectrometer,” paper given at the Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Technology Research and Development Conference, Herndon, VA, March 3, 1993.