Do We Have A Right to Common Goods?

Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 213-225

  Marmor, Andrei ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85007579736     PISSN: 08418209     EISSN: 20564260     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0841820900000485     Document Type: Review

References (25)

1. See Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at ch. 7 and also, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at ch.
2. Not always: we do tend to assume that parents, for example, have a duty to love their children.
3. On the difference between these two types of collective action problems I have elaborated in my Positive Law and Objective Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
4. Right-based Moralities" in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 182
5. Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 14.
6. Waldron, supra note 4 at 355 and Rdaume, at 10-11.
7. Rfiaume, supra note 4 at 11. Unlike Reaume, however, I am somewhat less certain that this is an essential element of common goods.
8. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, supra note 1 at ch. 1.
9. Raz also claims, however, that such public good externalities also tend to be non-competitive in their nature. I have expressed my doubts about this optimism in my "On the Limits of Rights" (1997) 16 Law and Phil. I.
10. Rfiaume (in "Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods" supra note 4 at 9 and 11) makes a very similar point to Waldron's, which I find flawed for the same reason.
11. C. Alon Harel, "Review Essay: Free Speech Revisionism: Doctrinal and Philosophical Challenges" (1994) 74 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 687
12. Michael Hartney, "Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights" (1991) 4 C.J.L.J. 293 at 298-300.
13. Waldron, supra note 4 at 355.
14. R6aume, supra note 4 at 13.
15. Perhaps they are wrong, but if so, their mistake is about substantive morality, not about the conceptual framework of duties discourse.
16. R6aume raises a similar point about equality of opportunity in "Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods" supra note 4 at 10. 19.
17. To be sure, I am not trying to suggest that any instance of exclusion is wrong.
18. To some extent, groups need to define themselves by certain forms of exclusion, and I do not want to imply that any group-self-determination is necessarily bad.
19. Harel, "Revisionist Theories of Rights: An Unwelcome Defense" (1998) 11 C.J.L.J. 227 at 241.
20. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 35.
21. Equality and Minority Cultures" (2000) 3 Democratic Culture 149.
22. Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) and Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 21
23. Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights" in W. Kymlicka, ed., The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 228
24. The overall considerations about the desirability of such practices are much more complex, of course. For instance, the question of feasible alternatives is often crucial.
25. Chaim Gans, the example is problematic: It is arguable that the values of the academia are not only the business of the academic circles, as it may well be in the interests of outsiders, that is, the community at large, that the academic institutions share certain values and instantiate them.