The political economy of state enterprise relations in China's Shaanxi province

Journal of Contemporary Asia

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 287-314

  Lee, Pak K ^a  

^a OPEN UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85006629597     PISSN: 00472336     EISSN: 17527554     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00472339780000181     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. The issue of local entrepreneurship during China's economic reforms has been studies by, among others, Byrd William A., Gelb Alsan, Why industrialize? The incentives for rural community governments China's Rural Industry:Structure, Development, and Reform Byrd William A., Qingsong Lin, Oxford University Press Oxford 1990 358 387 Marc Blecher, “Development state, entrepreneurial state:the political economy of socialist reform in Xinji municipality and Guanghan county,” in Gordon White (ed.), The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform:The Road to Crisis (Houndmills, Basingstoke:Macmillan Press, 1991), pp. 265–91; Michael Hubbard, “Bureaucrats and markets in China:the rise and fall of entrepreneurial local government,” Governance:An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1995), pp. 335–53; Victor Nee, “A theory of market transition:from redistribution to markets in state socialism,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 5 (1989), pp. 663–81; Victor Nee, “organizational dynamics of market transition:hybrid forms, property rights, and mixed economy in China,” Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 71, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1–27; Jean C. Oi, “The Chinese village, inc.,” in Bruce L. Reynolds (ed.), Chinese Economic Policy:Economic Reform at Midstream (New York, NY:Paragon House Press for Professors World Peace Academy, 1988), pp. 67–87; Jean C. Oi, “Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in China,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No.1 (1992), pp. 99–126; Andrew Walder, “Local bargaining relationships and urban industrial finance,” in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkely, CA:University of California Press, 1992), pp. 308–33; Gordon White, “Urban government and market reforms in China,” Public Administration and Development, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1991), pp. 149–70; and Christine Wong, “Between plan and market:the role of the local sector in post-Mao China,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1987), pp. 385–98.
2. Wiemer, Calla. 1992. Price reform and structural change:distributional impediments to allocation gains. Modern China, 18 (2):171–196.
3. September 1985. Shaanxi ribao September, (Shaanxi Daily), 1
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10. July 1989. Shaanxi ribao July, 25, 9 September, and 21 October
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12. December 1990. Shaanxi ribao December, 9
13. December 1990. Shaanxi ribao December, 15
14. April 1990. Shaanxi ribao April, 29, and 2 May
15. Another report said that by the end of 1989 these enterprises had bills payable amounting to 2.22 billion yuan, and were in default on delivering profits and taxes to the state totalling 550- million yuan Shaanxi ribao 1990 April 12
16. April 1990. Shaanxi ribao April, 6, China Daily, 28 April 1990.
17. September 1990. Shaanxi ribao September, 1
18. May 1990. Shaanxi ribao May, 2
19. Authors interview in Xi'an in January 1995; Shaanxi zhengbao 1994 11 18 18 (Shaanxi Government Report)
20. See Bowles Paul, White Gordon, Contradictions in China's financial reforms:the relationship between banks and enterprises Cambridge Journal of Economics 1989 13 4 481 495
21. March 1989. Shaanxi ribao March, 13
22. August 1989. Shaanxi ribao August, 9
23. March 1990. Shaanxi ribao March, 9, and 3 April
24. May 1990. Shaanxi ribao May, 2
25. 1990. Shaanxi nianjian 148–148. (Shaanxi Yearbook)
26. August 1989. Shaanxi ribao August, 26
27. Feng, Chang, and Shuangren, Dang. 1991. Dui Shaanxi mianhua fazhan xingshi zai renshi. Jihua yu shichang yanjiu,:10–11. (To understand the developmental trend of cotton production in Shaanxi again), (Planning and Market Research)
28. Naughton, Barry. 1992. Implications of the state monopoly over industry and its relaxation. Modern China, 18 (1):14–41. Christine P. W. Wong, “Central-local relations in an area of fiscal decline:the paradox of fiscal decentralization in post-Mao China,” China Quarterly, No. 128
29. Wong. April 1989. “ Central-local relations in an era of fiscal decline ”. In Shaanxi ribao April, 27
30. Naughton. Implications of the state monopoly over industry
31. See World Bank, China Budgetary Policy and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations World Bank Washington, D.C. 1993 82 82 Report No. 11094-CHA
32. See Lardy Nicholas R., Economic Growth and Distribution in China Cam bridge University Press Cambridge 71 73 2978, Christine P. W. Wong, “Public finance and economic decentralization,” in Walter Galenson (ed.), China's Economic Reform (South San Francisco, CA:The 1990 Institute, 1993), pp. 177–96.
33. April 1990. Renmin ribao April, 8
34. April 1990. Renmin ribao April, 8
35. Data are taken from Shaanxi tongji nianjian 1992 153 153 (Statistical Yearbook of Shaanxi), 155–56.
36. Wong. 1987. “ Central-local relations in an era of fiscal decline ”. In Shaanxi Yearbook 286–286.
37. White. Urban government and market reforms in China
38. 1992. Statistical Yearbook of Shaanxi 153–153. 155–56.
39. Chen, Rulong, ed. 1988. Dangdai Zhongguo caizheng, 1–1. Beijing:Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe. (Contemporary Chinese Fiscal System), 375–76
40. Shaanxisheng jingji shehui fazhan zhanlue yanjiuShaanxinsheng remenin zhengfu jingji yanyiu shongxinShaanxi renmin chubanshe Xi'an 1987425425 (A Study of the Socioeconomic Development Strategy of Shaanxi)
41. 1987. Shaanxi Yearbook 283–284. 1988, p. 231; 1989, p. 270; 1990, p. 252.
42. World Bank. China:Budget Policy 86–86. Chen Yongjun, Zhongguo diqu jian shinchang fengsuo wenti yanjiu (A Study of the Problem of Regional Market Blockade in China) (Fushou:Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1994), p. 63.
43. World Bank. 1990. China:Revenue Mobilization and Tax Policy, 92–93. Washington, D.C.:World Bank.
44. Gordo White notes that the administrative and managerial burdens of subnational governments have burgeoned since the onset of economic reforms. Provincial governments in general and urban governments in particular have been given prime responsibility for the new priority sector such as commerce and services, housing and environmental issues White, Urban government and market reforms in China
45. See Wang Shaoguang, Central-local fiscal politics in China Changing Central-Local Relations in China:Reform and State Capacity Jian Hao, Lin Zhimin, Westview Press Boulder, CO 1994 91 112 Wong, “Central-local relations in an era of fiscal decline.
46. See Shaaxisheng tongjiju Shaanxi's Forty Years 219 219 541
47. Samuel, P.S. Ho. 1994. Rural China in Transition:Non-agricultural Development in Rural Jiangsu, 1978–1990, 231–231. Oxford:Clarendon Press.
48. See, for example Jiang Qinghai, Zhongguo quyu jingji fenxi Chongqing chubanshe Chongqing 1990 106 107 (An Analysis of China's Regional Economies)
49. See Bamett A., Doak China's Far West:Four Decades of Change Westview Press Boulder, CO 1993 578 580
50. 1993. Shaanxi Government Report,:7–7.
51. Liu, Shiwen, and Zhou, Zhirong. 1993. Shaanxi rencai ‘youshi’ hai neng han jishi. Jingji gaige,:35–37. (How long can Shaanxi shout that it has ‘superiority’ in human resources)?, (Economic Reform)
52. My observation contradicts that of Doak Bamett, See Bamett, China's Far West 75 75
53. 1994. Shaanxi Government Report,:3–3.
54. For an account of the neoclassical theory, see Balassa Bela, The lessons of East Asian development:an overview Economic Development and Cultural Change 1988 36 3 S273 S290 See Bela Balassa, “Reforming the system of incentives in developing countries,” World Development, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1975), pp. 365–82, of the neoclassical position opposing the strategy of selective promotion of infant industries.
55. For critiques of the neoclassical account of the East Asian success, see, to name but a few Alan M., Shahid Governments and Markets in Economic Development Strategies:Lessons from Korea, Taiwan, and Japan Praiger New York, NY 1989 Alice H. Amsden, Asian's Next Giant:South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market:Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1990); and Gordon White (ed.), Developmental States in East Asia (Houndmills, Basingstoke:Macmillan Press, 1988).
56. See Dosi Giovanni, Tyson Laura, D'Andrea Zysman John, Trade, technologies, and development:a framework for discussing Japan Politics and Productivity:How Japan's Development Strategy Works Johnson Chalmers, Tyson Laura, D'Andrea Zysman John, HarperBusiness New York, NY 1989 3 38 in
57. The following account of industrial upgrading in Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan is taken from Haggard Stephan, Cheng Tun-jen, State and foreign capital in the East Asian NICs The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism Deyo Frederic C., Cornell University Press Ithaca and London 1987 84 135 Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift:State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York, NY:Columbia University Press, 1991), chapter 5.
58. See Bello Walden, Rosenfeld Stephanie, Dragons in Distress:Asia's Miracle Economies in Crisis Institute for Food and Development Policy San Francisco, CA 1990 57 58 Yoon Je Cho and Joon-Kyung Kim, Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 286 (Washington, D.C.:World Bank, 1995), p. 17.
59. Woo. Race to the Swift 132–133.
60. See Bello, Rosenfeld, Dragons in Distress 57 57 59; Haggard and Cheng, “State and foreign capital,” pp. 124–25; Cho and Kim, Credit Policies, pp. 25, 87; Woo, Race to the Swift, chapters 5 and 7.
61. See Woo, Race to the Swift 187ff 187ff
62. The Taiwanese government had invested US$500 million in the park The Economist 1994 May 101 103 21
63. Constance Squires Meaney. 1994. “ State policy and the development of Taiwan's semiconductor industry ”. In The Role of the State in Taiwan's Development, Edited by:Aberbach, Joel D., Dollar, David, and Sokoloff, Kenneth L., 170–192. Armonk, NY:M.E. Sharpe. in
64. The fiasco of Taiwanese Big Automobile Plan Project in the late 1970's was a case in point. For more details, see Arnold Walter, Bureaucratic politics, state capacity, and Taiwan's automobile industrial policy Modern China 1989 15 2 178 214
65. See Bello, Rosenfeld, Dragons in Distress 114 115 253–55; Haggard and Cheng, “State and foreign capital,” p. 127.
66. See Bello, Rosenfeld, Dragons in Distress 4 4 Cho and Kim, Credit Policies, pp. 9,17; Woo, Race to the Swift, p. 45.
67. The average growth rate between 1978 and 1994 is 15.8 per cent per year Statistical Yearbook of Shaanxi 1991 380 380 1995, p. 257
68. Johnson, Chalmers. 1985. MITI and the Japanese Miracle:The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, 17–17. Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press. 23
69. 1991. Statistical Yearbook of Shaanxi 381–383.
70. 1990. Shaanxi Yearbook 149–149.
71. 1994. Shaanxi Yearbook 134–134.
72. See Amsden, Asia's Next Giant 146 146
73. White, Gordon. 1991. “ The road to crisis:the Chinese state in the era of economic reform ”. In The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform:The Road to Crisis, Edited by:White, Gordon. 1–20. Houndmills, Basingstoke:Macmillan Press. in
74. See Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle 313 314
75. Bruton, Henry J., 1992. “ International aspects of the role of government in economic development ”. In State and Market in Development:Synergy or Rivalry?, Edited by:Putterman, Louis G., and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. 101–130. Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers. in
76. See Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle 309 314
77. A tax assignment system (fen shui zhi) was formally introduced in 1994. For more details, see Chung Jae, Ho Beijing confronting the provinces:the 1994 taxsharing reform and its implications for central-provincial relations in China China Information 1994–1995 9 2/3 1 23 Tsang Shuki and Cheng Yukshing, “China's tax reforms of 1994:breakthrough or compromise,” Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 9 (1994), pp. 769–88:Christine P.W. Wong,” Fiscal reform in 1994,” in Lo Chikin, Suzanne Pepper and Tsui Kai-yuen (eds.), China Review 1995 (Hong Kong:Chinese University Press, 1995), chapter 20.