Markets vs auctions: Approaches to distributed combinatorial resource scheduling

Multiagent and Grid Systems

Volumn 1, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 251-262

  Gradwell, Peter ^a   Padget, Julian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BATH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Distributed market performance; Grid; Resource allocation; Trading agents

Indexed keywords

OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; EVALUATION STRATEGIES; GRID; MARKET PERFORMANCE; MULTIDIMENSIONALITY; RESOURCE-SCHEDULING; SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT; TRADING AGENT;

COMMERCE;

EID: 85005991825     PISSN: 15741702     EISSN: 18759076     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3233/MGS-2005-1403     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. D. Abramson, R. Sosic, J. Giddy and B. Hall, Nimrod: A tool for performing parameterised simulations using distributed workstations, in HPDC, 1995, 112-121.
2. P. Anthony, W. Hall, V. Dang and N. Jennings, Autonomous agents for participating in multiple online auctions, in Proc. of the IJCAIWorkshop on EBusiness and the Intelligent Web, Seattle WA, USA, 2001.
3. F. Berman, A. Chien, K. Cooper, J. Dongarra, I. Foster, D. Gannon, L. Johnsson, K. Kennedy, C. Kesselman, J. Mellor-Crummey, D. Reed, L. Torczon and R. Wolski, The GrADS Project: Software support for high-level Grid application development, The International Journal of High Performance Computing Applications 15(4) (2001), 327-344. Available via http://www.cs.rice.edu/-johnmc/papers/GrADSJHPCA-01.pdf.
4. D. Cliff and J. Bruen, Zero is not enough: On the lower limit of agent intelligence for continuous double auction markets, Tech. Rep. no. HPL-97-141, Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, (1997), 1998.
5. P. Cramton, Y. Shoham and R. Steinberg, Combinatorial auctions, in Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2005.
6. V.D. Dang and N.R. Jennings, Optimal clearing algorithms for multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions with demand/supply function bidding, in ICEC '03: Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce, ACM Press, 2003, 25-30.
7. S.J. Fink, S.B. Baden and S.R. Kohn, Flexible communication mechanisms for dynamic structured applications, inWorkshop on Parallel Algorithms for Irregularly Structured Problems, 1996, 203-215.
8. M. Franklin and M. Reiter, The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service, in Proc. IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, Oakland, Ca, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1995, 2-14.
9. M. He and N.R. Jennings, Southamptontac: Designing a successful trading agent, in ECAI, 2002, 8-12.
10. W.Ketter, E. Kryzhnyaya, S. Damer, C. McMillen, A. Agovic, J. Collins and M.L. Gini, Analysis and design of supply-driven strategies in tac scm, 2004.
11. J.F Kurose and R. Simha, A microeconomic approach to optimal resource allocation in distributed computer systems, in IEEE Transactions On Computers Vol. 38, 1989, 705-716.
12. L. Lamport, R. Shostak and M. Pease, The Byzantine Generals Problem, ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 4(3) (July 1982), 382-401.
13. K. Leyton-Brown, Resource Allocation in Competitive Multiagent Systems, PhD thesis, Stanford University, August 2003.
14. K. Leyton-Brown, E. Nudelman and Y. Shoham, Learning the empirical hardness of optimization problems: The case of combinatorial auctions, in Constraint Programming (CP), 2002.
15. K. Leyton-Brown, M. Pearson and Y. Shoham, Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms, in ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2000.
16. T. Finin et al., L. Ding, Strategies and Heuristics Used by the UMBCTAC Agent.
17. R. Mailler, Comparing two approaches to dynamic, distributed constraint satisfaction, in AAMAS 2005: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2005, 1049-1056.
18. P.R. Wurman, M.P. Wellman, W.E. Walsh and J.K. MacKie-Mason, Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling, 1998.
19. A. Osepayshvili, M. Wellman, D. Reeves and J. MacKie-Mason, Self-confirming price prediction for bidding in simultaneous ascending auctions, in: Computing and Markets, D. Lehmann, R. Müller and T. Sandholm, eds, number 05011 in Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Internationales Begegnungsund Forschungszentrum (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany, 2005. [date of citation: 2005-01-01].
20. J. Padget and R. Bradford, A π-calculus model of the spanish fishmarket, in Proceedings of AMET’98, volume 1571 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Springer Verlag, 1999, 166-188.
21. D. Parkes, Computational mechanism design-taming the strategic dragon without invoking the complexity monster, Talk given at AAMAS03.
22. D.C. Parkes and J. Shneidman, Distributed implementations of vickrey-clarke-groves mechanisms, in Proc. 3rd Int. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, 2004, 261-268.
23. Globus Project. http://www.globus.org/, Last accessed March 2005.
24. J.-A. Rodríguez, P. Noriega, C. Sierra and J. Padget, FM96.5 A Java-based Electronic Auction House, in Proceedings of 2nd Conference on Practical Applications of Intelligent Agents and MultiAgent Technology (PAAM’97), London, UK, April 1997, 207-224, ISBN 0-9525554-6-8.
25. T. Sandholm, Optimal winner determination algorithms, in: Combinatorial Auctions, chapter 14, P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg, eds, MIT Press, 2005.
26. T. Sandholm, S. Suri, A. Gilpin and D. Levine, CABOB: Afast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions, in Management Science, Special Issue on Electronic Markets, 2005.
27. J. Sherwani, N. Ali, N. Lotia, Z. Hayat and R. Buyya, Libra: a computational economy-based job scheduling system for clusters, Softw., Pract. Exper. 34(6) (2004), 573-590.
28. J. Shneidman and D.C. Parkes, Rationality and self-interest in peer to peer networks, in IPTPS, 2003, 139-148.
29. J. Shneidman and D.C. Parkes, Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes, in PODC, 2004, 88-97.
30. S.G. Stubblebine and P.F. Syverson, Fair on-line auctions without special trusted parties, 1999. http://www.cs.columbia.edu/-stu/99stubblebine.ps.
31. R. Suri and Y.-C. Ho, Resource management for large systems: Concepts, algorithms, and an application, IEEE Transactions On Automatic Control 4 (1980), 651-662.
32. R.D. Terry, HarTAC-The Harvard TAC SCM '03 Agent.
33. T. Eymann et al., Catallaxy-based grid markets.
34. S.S. Vadhiyar and J.J. Dongar, A metascheduler for the grid, 2002. Available via http: //www.cs.utk.edu/-vss/publications/vadhiyar-metascheduler.pdf.
35. V.K.W. Leinberger and G. Karypis, Job scheduling in the presence of multiple resource requirements, Technical report, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Minnesota, 1999. Available from http://www.supercomp.org/sc99/proceedings/papers/leinberg.pdf.
36. C.S. Yeo and R. Buyya, A taxonomy of market-based resource management systems for utility-driven cluster computing, 2004.
37. K.L.-B.Y. Fujishima and Y. Shoham, Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches, 1998.
38. ZDNet. http: //news.zdnet.co.uk/hardware/0,39020351,39165622, 00.htm Last accessed August 2005.