What is neurophilosophy? A methodological account

Journal for General Philosophy of Science

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 91-127

  Northoff, Georg ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Epistemology; Neurophilosophical hypothesis; Neurophilosophy; Ontology; Principles; Standard arguments

Indexed keywords

EID: 85002252573     PISSN: 09254560     EISSN: 15728587     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:JGPS.0000035153.89143.4c     Document Type: Article

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