-
1
-
-
85022429932
-
-
Thus leading conservative economist and Nobel Laureate George Stigler writes, See Stigler, The Theory of Price, rev. ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1952), 285. In a similar view, liberal economist and Nobel prize winner Paul Samuelson wrote about the new “welfare economics” designed to address the optimal distribution of income: “Without norms, normative statements are impossible. At some point welfare economics must introduce ethical welfare functions from outside economics. Which set of ends is relevant is decidedly not a scientific question of economics. This should dispel the notion that by a social welfare function is meant some one, unique, and privileged set of ends….” See Samuelson, “Comments on Welfare Economics,” in The Collected Papers of Paul Samuelson, ed. J. Stiglitz, 2 vols. (Boston: MIT, )
-
Thus leading conservative economist and Nobel Laureate George Stigler writes, “Such a criterion [of a good income distribution] depends partly upon one's ethical goals, of course-whether he seeks comfort or adventure, individualism or social action. Moreover the ethical factors are complex, and only a very naive and dogmatic set of judgements will permit one quickly to decide on the kinds and extent of inequality he likes.” See Stigler, The Theory of Price, rev. ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1952), 285. In a similar view, liberal economist and Nobel prize winner Paul Samuelson wrote about the new “welfare economics” designed to address the optimal distribution of income: “Without norms, normative statements are impossible. At some point welfare economics must introduce ethical welfare functions from outside economics. Which set of ends is relevant is decidedly not a scientific question of economics. This should dispel the notion that by a social welfare function is meant some one, unique, and privileged set of ends….” See Samuelson, “Comments on Welfare Economics,” in The Collected Papers of Paul Samuelson, ed. J. Stiglitz, 2 vols. (Boston: MIT, 1966), 2: 1102-4.
-
(1966)
Such a criterion [of a good income distribution] depends partly upon one's ethical goals, of course-whether he seeks comfort or adventure, individualism or social action. Moreover the ethical factors are complex, and only a very naive and dogmatic set of judgements will permit one quickly to decide on the kinds and extent of inequality he likes.
, vol.2
, pp. 1102-1104
-
-
-
2
-
-
85022428757
-
-
In general, an action that creates a benefit for one party will produce a loss of a different amount for the other.
-
The theft of a $100 bill is a case in point. In general, an action that creates a benefit for one party will produce a loss of a different amount for the other.
-
The theft of a $100 bill is a case in point
-
-
-
3
-
-
85022389123
-
-
reprinted from Les Prix Nobel en 1972 in Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Belknap Press for Harvard University, )
-
Arrow writes, “General competitive equilibrium above all teaches the extent to which a social allocation of resources can be achieved by independent private decisions coordinated through the market. We are assured indeed that not only can an allocation be efficient, but the result is Pareto-efficient. But, as has been stressed, there is nothing in the process which guarantees that the distribution be just. Indeed, the theory teaches us that the final allocation will depend on the distribution of initial supplies and of ownership of firms. If we want to rely on the virtues of the market but also want to achieve a more just distribution, the theory suggests the strategy of changing the initial distribution rather than interfering with the allocation process at some later stage.” See Kenneth Arrow, “General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, Collective Choices,” reprinted from Les Prix Nobel en 1972 in Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Belknap Press for Harvard University, 1983), 2: 222-23.
-
(1983)
General competitive equilibrium above all teaches the extent to which a social allocation of resources can be achieved by independent private decisions coordinated through the market. We are assured indeed that not only can an allocation be efficient, but the result is Pareto-efficient. But, as has been stressed, there is nothing in the process which guarantees that the distribution be just. Indeed, the theory teaches us that the final allocation will depend on the distribution of initial supplies and of ownership of firms. If we want to rely on the virtues of the market but also want to achieve a more just distribution, the theory suggests the strategy of changing the initial distribution rather than interfering with the allocation process at some later stage.” See Kenneth Arrow, “General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, Collective Choices
, vol.2
, pp. 222-223
-
-
writes, A.1
-
4
-
-
84952259001
-
-
Knight wrote, “That free enterprise is not a perfectly ideal system of social organization is a proposition not to be gainsaid, and nothing is further from the aims of the present writer than to set up the contention that it is. But in his opinion the weaknesses and failures of the system lie outside the field of the mechanics of exchange under the theoretical conditions of perfect competition.” Frank Knight, “Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
-
In “Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost,” Knight wrote, “That free enterprise is not a perfectly ideal system of social organization is a proposition not to be gainsaid, and nothing is further from the aims of the present writer than to set up the contention that it is. But in his opinion the weaknesses and failures of the system lie outside the field of the mechanics of exchange under the theoretical conditions of perfect competition.” Frank Knight, “Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (1924), 582.
-
(1924)
Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost
, pp. 582
-
-
|
