New challenges to the rationality assumption

Legal Theory

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 105-124

  Kahneman, Daniel ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84997912253     PISSN: 13523252     EISSN: 14698048     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1352325200000689     Document Type: Article

References (54)

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