Recent reinterpretations of the transcendental

Inquiry (United Kingdom)

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 289-314

  Pihlström, Sami ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84995708627     PISSN: 0020174X     EISSN: 15023923     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00201740410006384     Document Type: Article

References (36)

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3. Thomas Grundmann and Catrin Misselliom, ‘Transcendental Arguments and Realism’, in Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 205-218.
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