Eu Law as Private International Law? Reconceptualising the Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory

Journal of Private International Law

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 195-242

  Michaels, Ralf ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BREMEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84994751327     PISSN: 17441048     EISSN: 17578418     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17536235.2006.11424307     Document Type: Article

References (207)

1. In this article, I use “private international law” rather than “conflict of laws” or “choice of law” for two reasons. First, this is in accordance with European usage. Second, it brings out the focus on private interest that characterises the country of origin principle better than “conflict of laws” or “choice of law”, both of which suggest that the relevant question goes to which of several laws is applicable.,
2. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market (by the Commission), 5 March 2004, COM(2004) 2 final/3, Art 16, “Country of origin principle”:
3. Member States shall ensure that providers are subject only to the national provisions of their Member State of origin which fall within the coordinated field. Paragraph 1 shall cover national provisions relating to access to and the exercise of a service activity, in particular those requirements governing the behaviour of the provider, the quality or content of the service, advertising, contracts and the provider's liability
4. The Member State of origin shall be responsible for supervising the provider and the services provided by him, including services provided by him in another Member State
5. Member States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide services in the case of a provider established in another Member State, in particular, by imposing any of the following requirements:
6. an obligation on the provider to have an establishment in their territory;,
7. an obligation on the provider to make a declaration or notification to, or to obtain an authorisation from, their competent authorities, including entry in a register or registration with a professional body or association in their territory;,
8. an obligation on the provider to have an address or representative in their territory or to have an address for service at the address of a person authorized in that territory;,
9. the provider setting up a certain infra structure in their territory, including an office or chambers, which the provider needs to supply the services in question
10. an obligation on the provider to comply with requirements, relating to the exercise of a service activity, applicable in their territory;,
11. the application of specific contractual arrangements between the provider and the recipient which prevent or restrict service provision by the self-employed;,
12. an obligation on the provider to possess an identity document issued by its competent authorities specific to the exercise of a service activity;,
13. requirements which affect the use of equipment which is an integral part of the service provided;,
14. restrictions on the freedom to provide the services referred to in Article 20, the first subparagraph of Article 23(1) or Article 25(1).,
15. 3 In using the “Polish plumber” as a prime example at various points in this paper, I refer to an example frequently used to express pertaining fears in public debates, but take no view on whether these fears are justified. Nor do I analyse to what extent exactly the Service Directive would actually make only Polish law applicable to him. These questions were hotly debated and widely unclear; they have become moot in the most recent proposals. My main point in this paper is conceptual–how would a country-of-origin principle function if it applied–rather than substantive.,
16. P, Taggart, “Keynote Article: Questions of Europe–The Domestic Politics of the 2005 French and Dutch Referendums and their Challenge for the Study of European Integration” (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review 7, 16
17. “Editorial comments: The Services Directive Proposal: Striking a Balance between the Promotion of the Internal Market and Preserving the European Social Model?” (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 307, 309. For the changes made, see Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Services in the Internal Market (presented by the Commission), 4 April 2006, COM(2006) 160 final, Art 16 with comments at 10–12. See now Common Position adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market, 17 July 2006, Doc. 10003/06, Art 16
18. But see, for some early analyses, R, Savatier, “Le Marché commun au regard du droit international privé” (1959) 48 Revue critique de droit international privé 237; id., “Les aspects du droit international privé de la Communauté Économique “, in Travaux du Comité Français de droit international privé 1960–1962 (Paris, Dalloz, 1963), 17; K Zweigert, “Einige Auswirkungen des Einige Auswirkungen des der der Mitgliedstaaten”, in E, von Cammerer et al (eds), Probleme des europäischen Rechts. Festschrift für Walter Hallstein zu seinem 65. Geburtstag (Frankfurt/M, Klostermann, 1966), 555. For two recent accounts of the history, see Jannet A Pontier, Europees conflictenrecht–Een complexe geschiedenis in vogelvlucht (Amsterdam, Vossiuspers, 2005); K Kreuzer, “Zu Stand und Perspektiven des Europäischen Internationalen Privatrechts–Wie europäisch soll das Europäische Internationale Privatrecht sein?” (2006) 70 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 1, 8–30. For an argument to treat all EU law as conflict of laws, see C Joerges, “The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline” (2004) 14 Duke International and Comparative Law Journal 149; C Joerges, “European Law as Conflict of Laws” in C Joerges and J Neyers, “‘Deliberative Supranationalism’ Revisited” EUI Working Paper Law No 2006/20, 15, 23ff; see also A Furrer, Zivilrecht im gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kontext–Das Europäische Kollisionsrecht als Koordinierungsinstrument für die Einbindung des Zivilrechts in das europäische Wirtschaftsrecht (Berne, Stämpfli, 2002); C Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts durch die EU (Baden-Baden, Nomos, forthcoming)
19. See J, Basedow, “The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam” (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 687; O Remien, “European Private Inter national Law, the European Community and its Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 53
20. But see J, Basedow, “Spécificité et coordination du droit international privé communautaire”, in Travaux du comité français de droit international privé 2002–2004 (Paris, Pédone, 2005), 275 (arguing that federalised codification of private international law is a novelty)
21. Eg for the private law of names in case of double nationality: Case C–148/02 Garcia Avello, decision of 2 October 2003, [2003] ECR–I 1161 3; Case C–96/04 Stadt Niebüll, Opinion of the Advocate General of 30 June 2005, paras 56–7. (The Court of Justice decided on 27 April 2006 it had no jurisdiction over the case.) Avello is interpreted as a return to Savignyan private inter national law by T Ballarino and B Ubertazzi, “On Avello and Other Judgments: A New Departure in the Conflict of Laws?” (2004) 6 Yearbook of Private International Law 85, 124–9
22. See (critically) E, Jayme and C, Kohler, “Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2001: Anerkennungsprinzip statt IPR?” [2001] Praxis des internationalen Privat-und Verfahrensrechts 501; P Lagarde, “Développe-ments futures du droit international privé dans une Europe en voie d'unification: quelques conjectures” (2004) 68 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 225; D Coester-Waltjen, “Das Anerkennungsprinzip im Dornröschenschlaf?” in HP, Mansel (ed), Festschrift für Erik Jayme I (Munich, Sellier, 2004), 121
23. Joerges,n 6, 154. For the origin of the quote, see Immanuel Kant, “The Contest of Faculties” in HS, Reiss (ed), Kant–Political Writings (2nd ed, 1991) (Der Streit der Fakultäten [1798])
24. For Savigny's continued (or renewed) importance, see M, Reimann, “Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century” (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 571; Ballarino and Ubertazzi,n 9; R Michaels, “Globalizing Savigny?”, http://ssrn.com/abstract=796228, in M, Stolleis and W, Streeck (eds), Dezentralisierung. Aktuelle Fragen politischer und rechtlicher Steuerung im Kontext der Globalisierung (Baden-Baden, Nomos, forth coming 2007)
25. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Consolidated Version) [1998] OJ C27, 34. Art 20 reads: “This Convention shall not affect the application of provisions which, in relation to particular matters, lay down choice-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations and which are or will be contained in acts of the institutions of the European Communities or in national laws harmonized in implementation of such acts.”
26. Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation, COM (2002) 654 final, 14 January 2003, 5. The French version is more strict and uses the word devra (“will have to”); this stricter use can also be found in the draft proposal for the Services Directive (n 2) at p 17, which, when quoting the Green Paper, replaces “should” with “must”
27. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”), 22 July 2003, COM (2003) 427 final
28. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I) (presented by the Commission), 15 December 2005, COM (2005) 650 final
29. Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations (“Rome II”), 21 Feb 2006, COM (2006) 83 final
30. But see, for criticism, Hamburg Group for Private International Law, “Comments on the European Commission's Draft Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non contractual Obligations” (2003) 67 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 1, 54–55
31. Whether Art 65 is an appropriate basis for private international law legislation or whether such legislation must be based on Arts 94, 95 of the Treaty, is irrelevant for purposes of this argument, since both make it a condition that private international law regulations are in fact necessary for the functioning of the internal market. This is not the subject of this article; see, for two recent critical views, PR Beaumont, “Private International Law of the European Union: Competence Questions Arising from the Proposed Rome II Regulation on Choice of Law in Non-contractual Obligations”, in Private Law, Private International Law and Judicial Cooperation in the EU–US Relationship (Thomson/West, CILE Studies Vol 2, 2005), 15; A Dickinson, “European Private International Law: Embracing New Horizons or Mourning the Past?” (2005) 1 Journal of Private International Law 197
32. See Rome I Proposal,n 16, Recitals 1, 4; Amended Rome II Proposal,n 17, Recitals 1, 4
33. Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the co-ordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities [1989] OJ L298/23; amended by Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 [1997] OJ L202/60. On the scope of the country-of-origin principle, see ECJ 9 July 1997, Joined cases C–34/95, C–35/95 and C–36/95; Konsumentombudsmannen KO v De Agostini (Svenska) Forlag AB; Konsumentbodsmannen v TV Shop i Sverige AB. For characterisation as a private international law norm, see A Thünken, “Multistate Advertising over the Internet and the Private International Law of Unfair Competition” (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 909, 939
34. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), [2000] OJ L178/1
35. 23 See also Recital 23: “This Directive neither aims to establish additional rules on private international law relating to conflicts of law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction of Courts; provisions of the applicable law designated by rules of private international law must not restrict the freedom to provide services as established in this Directive.”,
36. See only P, Mankowski, “Das Herkunftslandprinzip als Internationales Privatrecht der e-commerce-Richtlinie” (2001) 100 Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 137; S Grundmann, “Das Inter nationale Privatrecht der E-Commerce-Richtlinie–was ist kategorial anders im Kollisionsrecht des Binnenmarkts und warum?” (2003) 67 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 246; G de Baere, “'Is this a Conflict Rule which I see Before Me?' Looking for a Hidden Conflict Rule in the Principle of Origin as Implemented in Primary European Community Law and in the Directive on Electronic Commerce” (2004) 11 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 287, 305–17; O Cachard, “Le domaine coordonné par la directive sur le commerce électronique et le droit international privé” (2004) 4 International Business Law Journal 161; all with further references
37. Case C–322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v 0800 DocMorris NV and Jacques Waterval, [2003] ECR I–14887; English case note by R Lang at (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 189; see also C Lenz, “Warenverkehrsfreiheit nach der DocMorris-Entscheidung zum Versand von Arzneimitteln” [2004] Neue juristische Wochenschrift 332; E Mand, “E-Commerce mit Arzneimitteln–Auswirkungen des Herkunftslandprinzips auf das Internationale Wettbewerbsrecht” [2003] Multimediarecht 77
38. n 2
39. See D, Martiny, “Die Anknüpfung an den Markt”, in Festschrift für Ulrich Drobnig zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1998) 389
40. Rome I Proposal,n 16, Art 5(1)
41. Amended Rome II Proposal,n 17, Art 5(1)
42. See Services Directive Proposal,n 2, 17 (under the slightly ironic heading of “Coherence with other Community Policies”): “they could, however, play an important role not only for the activities which are not covered by this Directive but also for the questions which are the object of derogations to the country-of-origin principle, notably the derogation in relation to contracts concluded by consumers, as well as the derogation relating to the non-contractual liability of the provider in the case of an accident occurring in the context of his activity which affects a person in a Member State which a provider visits”
43. See also J, Basedow, “Herkunftslandsprinzip und Internationales Privatrecht im europäischen Binnenmarkt für Dienstleistungen“, in Rozprawy prawnicze. Ksiega pamiatkowa Profesora Maksymiliana Pazdana (Krakow, Zakamycze, 2005), 29, 41–42
44. n 5; for criticism, see Editorial Comments,n 5; Charlemagne, “Not Yet Free to Serve” The Economist, 18 Feb 2006. The Common Position of the Council,n 5, goes back even to the unclear position of the e-commerce directive. Its Art 3(2) reads: “This Directive does not concern rules of private international law, in particular rules governing the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations, including those which guarantee that consumers benefit from the protection granted to them by the consumer protection rules laid down in the consumer legislation in force in their Member State.” See also consideration no 90, at 39
45. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market (the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive), 17 June 2003, COM (2003) Art 4
46. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market and Amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) [2005] OJ L149/22; see J Stuyck, E Terryn and T van Dyck, “Confidence Through Fairness? The New Directive on Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market” (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 107, 117–20
47. Modified proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements for consumers amending Council Directive 93/13/EC, 7 October 2005, COM(2005) 483 final, Article 21 and pp 7–8; see also Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 2002/0222 (COD), 5504/06, 6 February 2006
48. Case C–212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I–1459; Case C–208/00, Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), [2002] ECR I–9919; Case C–167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, [2003] ECR I–10155
49. Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), decision of 15 July 1999, [1999] Österreichisches Recht der Wirtschaft 719; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), decision of 13 March 2003–VII ZR 370/98, 154 Ent-scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 185; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), decision of 14 March 2005–II ZR 5/03, [2005] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1648; see also the contribution by Federal Court judge W Goette, “Zu den Folgen der Anerkennung ausländischer Gesellschaften mit tatsächlichem Sitz im Inland für die Haftung ihrer Gesellschafter und Organe” (2006) 27 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 541
50. Case No 81/87, The Queen v Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust [1988] ECR 5483, no 19; similarly L Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Aspen, 1995), 242
51. But see now Case C–411/03, SEVIC Systems AG, 13 December 2005 [2005] ECR I–10805; Case C–446/03, 13 December 2005, Marks & Spencer Plc v Halsey (Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I–10837. These newer decisions seem to suggest that discrimination between corporations acting within the founding state and corporations acting transnationally can constitute a violation of Arts 43, 48
52. W-H, Roth, “Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht nach Überseering” [2003] Praxis des internationalen Privat-und Verfahrensrechts 117, 121
53. M Virgós, Soriano and F J Garcimartín, Alférez, “Estado de origen v. estado de destino–Las diferentes lógicas del Derecho internacional privado” InDret 4/2004, art no 251, 2, available at http://www.indret.com/pdf/251_es.pdf
54. Amended Proposal,n 5, Art 3(2); Common Position,n 5, Art 3(2). This should mean that both the EC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations Art 5 and choice-of-law provisions in EC directives on consumer law prevail over the directive
55. Amended Rome II Proposal,n 17, Art 1(2)(h). The ultimate reason for the exception may have been a political one–to account for interests of media providers. Since media providers would benefit from, and in all likelihood prefer, a country of origin rule, this explanation would be consistent with the analysis provided here
56. C, Kohler, “Verständigungsschwierigkeiten zwischen europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und internationalem Privatrecht” in Festschrift für Erik Jayme I (2004) 445, 457–59; J, Basedow, “EC Conflict of Laws–A Matter of Coordination”, in Seminário Internacional sobre a Comunitarizaçao do Direito Internacional Privado (Coimbra, Almedina, 2005) 17, 26
57. Cf JD González, Campos, “La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes et le non-Droit international privé” in Festschrift für Erik Jayme I (2004) 263
58. J, Basedow, “Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europäischen Binnenmarkt: favour offerentis” (1995) 59 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 1, 16–17; W Drasch, Das Herkunftslandprinzip im Internationalen Privatrecht (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1997), 344–49
59. M, Hellner, “The Country-of-origin Principles in the E-commerce Directive: A Conflict with Conflict of Laws?” in A, Fuchs, H Muir, Watt and É, Pataut (eds), Les conflits de lois et le système juridique communautaire (Paris, Dalloz, 2004) 205, 224, who suggests a similarity between the country-of-origin principle and the medieval system of personal laws
60. See the debate in Friedrich Carl von Savigny, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, and the Limits of their Operation in Respect of Place and Time (William Guthrie trans, Edinburgh, 1869), ss 350–59, 147
61. But see M, Fallon, “Le principe de proximité dans le droit de l'Union européenne”, in Le droit inter national privé: esprit et méthodes. Mélanges en l'honneur de Paul Lagarde (Paris, Dalloz, 2005), 241, 246ff
62. n 23 and accompanying text
63. Eg de, Baere,n 24, 297 and passim
64. H, Altmeppen, “Schutz vor ‘europäischen’ Kapitalgesellschaften” [2004] Neue Juristische Wochen-schrift 97, 100
65. de, Baere,n 24, 301 (internal footnote omitted); M Wilderspin and X Lewis “Les relations entre le droit communautaire et les règles de conflits de lois des Etats membres” (2002) 91 Revue critique de droit international privé 1, 21
66. E, Schanze and A, Jüttner, “Die Entscheidung für Pluralität: Kollisionsrecht und Gesellschaftsrecht nach der EuGH-Entscheidung ‘Inspire Art’” [2003] Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 661, 665–66; C Wendehorst, “Kollisionsnormen im primären Europarecht?” in S, Lorenz et al (eds), Festschrift für Andreas Heldrich zum 70. Geburtstag (Munich, Beck 2005), 1071; see also Basedow,n 31, 40–44
67. Eg K, Lipstein, “The Law Relating to the Movement of Companies in the European Com munity”, in Festschrift für Erik Jayme I, 527, 529. See also A Ohly, “Herkunftslandprinzip und Kollisionsrecht” [2001] Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht–Internationaler Teil (GRURInt) 899, 901–02 (arguing for a “kollisionsrechtlicher Mindestgehalt”, a minimal core of private inter national law)
68. Hellner,n 47, 217–24
69. at 222
70. at 223
71. N, Höning, “The European Directive on e-Commerce (2000/31/EC) and its Consequences on the Conflict of Laws” [2005] Global Jurist Topics vol 2, issue 2, art 2, http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol5/iss2/art2/, 27–28, 34–36
72. P, Bernard, “Cassis de Dijon und Kollisionsrecht–am Beispiel des unlauteren Wettbewerbs” (1992) 3 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 437 (for a brief exposition in English, see de, Baere,n 24, 291–92); M Fallon and J Meusen, “Private International Law in the European Union and the Exception of Mutual Recognition” (2002) 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 37, 40, 52
73. R, Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, in R, Zimmermann and M, Reimann (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), 339
74. Ibid, 374
75. Supra, 209
76. R, Ago, “Règles des conflits de lois” (1936–IV) 243 Recueil des Cours 302–08
77. WW, Cook, “The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws” (1924) 23 Yale Law Journal 457, 469: “the forum, when confronted by a case involving foreign elements, always applies its own law to the case, but in doing so adopts and enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical, or at least highly similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of decision found in the system of law in force in another state or country with which some or all of the foreign elements are connected”; Guinness v Miller, 291 Fed 769, 770 (SD NY 1923): “A foreign sovereign under civilized law imposes an obligation of its own as nearly homologous as possible to that arising in the place where the tort occurs” (per J Learned Hand)
78. Wendehorst,n 54, 1084
79. HE, Yntema, “The Historical Bases of Conflict of Laws” (1953) 2 American Journal of Comparative Law 297, 316 (“a theory which contains neither truth nor virtue”)
80. 209–10
81. See EF, Scoles et al, Conflict of Laws (St Paul, MN, West, 4th edn, 2004), 38–43
82. N, Jansen and R, Michaels, “Die Auslegung und Fortbildung ausländischen Rechts” (2003) 116 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß 3, 8–16 and passim
83. Supra, 210
84. Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 4 May 1971, 31 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) 58; for a discussion in English see FK Juenger, “The German Constitutional Court and the Conflict of Laws” (1972) 20 American Journal of Comparative Law 290; for a French translation see (1974) Revue critique de droit international privé 57 with the article by C Labrusse, “Droit constitutionnel et droit international privé en Allemagne fédérale”, at 1–46
85. For debate, see infra 220–21
86. For an impressive attempt to translate the US debate to the Common Market see H, Spamann, “Choice of Law in a Federal System and an Integrated Market”, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 8/01, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/012601.html
87. See S, Fruehwald, “Constitutional Constraints on Choice of Law” (1998) 24 University of Dayton Law Review 40, 40: “Current constitutional constraints, however, are minimal.” To see how minimal, see Allstate Ins Co v Hague, 449 US 302 (1981); SunOil Co v Wortman, 486 US 717 (1988)
88. For debate, see infra 220
89. Supra, 209–10
90. Supra, 210
91. K, Schurig, “Lois d'application immédiate und Sonderanknüpfung zwingenden Rechts: Erkennt-nisfortschritt oder Mystifikation?” in Holl and Klinke (eds), Internationales Privatrecht, internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (Cologne, Heymanns, 1985), 55–76
92. Hellner, who advocates the analogy to mandatory norms, sees the basis for applicability of such internationally mandatory norms not in their own determination, but rather in Arts 7(2) and 7(1) of the Rome I Convention. Even if the intended Rome I Regulation does not contain a rule on the applicability of foreign mandatory norms, Hellner argues “that a general obligation to apply foreign mandatory rules already exists at least to the extent that these rules are made mandatory by EU law for the purpose of facilitating one of the fundamental freedoms, viz. the freedom to provide services” (n 47, 221–21). Such a general obligation would be a private international law norm based on the Treaty that would supersede the directive anyway; an additional category of “internationally mandatory norms” would not be necessary
93. M, Gutzwiller, Book Review (1936) 10 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 1056, 1064–65
94. AV, Dicey, “On Private International Law as a Branch of the Law of England” (1890) 6 Law Quarterly Review 1–21 and 113–27. This article found its way, almost unchanged, as “Introduction” into AV, Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws (1896). For the history of the idea in England see KH Nadelmann, “Some Historical Notes on the Doctrinal Sources of American Conflict of Laws”, in Nadelmann, Conflict of Laws: International and Interstate, 1, 14–20 (originally in Ius et Lex. Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag von Max Gutzwiller (1959) 263, 276–81). Nadelmann (17) points out that Dicey himself mentioned the principle earlier in a book review in (1885) 1 Law Quarterly Review 246, 248. Dicey borrowed the idea from his colleague and friend Thomas Erskine Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence (1880) 288 n 1; for a glowing review of Holland's book, see AV, Dicey, “The Study of Jurisprudence” (1880) 5 Law Magazine and Review; A Quarterly Review of Jurisprudence and Quarterly Digest of All Reported Cases 5th Series 382
95. Dicey,n 82, 10: Similarly In re Askew [1930] 2 Ch 259, 267–68; GC Cheshire, Private International Law (1935) 6
96. Holman v Johnson, 1 Cowp 341, 98 ER 1120, [1775–1802] All ER Rep 98 (1775) per Lord Mansfield
97. Dicey,n 82, 113
98. The other two concern the supremacy of acts of the English parliament, and the interference with the authority of a foreign sovereign within the country whereof he is sovereign. See 123–24
99. Ibid, 118
100. Ibid, 120–21
101. Ibid, 114–15
102. See HE, Yntema, “The Comity Doctrine”, in E, von Caemmerer, A, Nikisch and K, Zweigert (eds), Festschrift für Hans Dölle I (Tübingen, Mohr, 1963), 65; reprinted with an introduction by K Nadelmann in (1966) 65 Michigan Law Review 1; see also A Watson and J Story, The Comity of Errors (Athens, GA, University of Georgia Press, 1992). Both Dicey and Beale were critical of comity; see Dicey,n 82, 9–10; JH Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws I (1935) s 6, 53–55; similarly Cheshire,n 83, 6
103. Beale wrote a very favourable review of Dicey's treatise. See JH Beale, “Dicey's ‘Conflict of Laws’” (1896) 10 Harvard Law Review 168
104. JH, Beale, Three Cases on the Conflict of Laws (Cambridge, MA, Harvard Law Review Publishing Association, 1902), 517. The similarity to English private international law is no coincidence–Beale cites here to King v Sarria, 24 Sickels 24, 31 (CA NY 1877), which decision in turn cites to Westlake's treatise on private international law
105. Beale,n 90, §5.2, 52
106. Supra, n 91, 169–71
107. TE, Holland, “De l'application de la loi “ (1880) 12 Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 565; for his embrace of vested rights see 574 n 2
108. For a comparison between Dicey's vested-rights theory and Pillet's theory of droits acquis, see H Muir Watt, “Quelques remarques sur la théorie anglo-américaine des droits acquis” [1986] Revue critique de droit international privé 425. The first French mention of droits acquis as the basis of private international law appears to be in Comte de Vareilles-Sommières, La synthèse du droit international privé I (1897) 31. For this reason, Beale considered him particularly relevant; see Beale,n 90, l
109. A, Pillet, Traité pratique de droit international privé I (Paris, Sirey, 1923), 5 (no 2). The rights of foreigners and nationality law are still sometimes considered part of private international law in France. See, eg, P Mayer and V Heuzé, Droit international privé (Paris, LGDJ, 8th edn, 2004), 607–712 (nos 836–1027)
110. Pillet, 106: “The way to resolve conflicts is to give preference to the law of the state which has the greatest interest that the goal pursued by the law in question be attained…that its law regulate the litigation. If a sacrifice must be made, it should be as small as possible.” For the “comparative impairment” approach in the United States, see W Baxter, “Choice of Law and the Federal System” (1963) 16 Stanford Law Review 1; for a recent assessment, see EA O'Hara and WH Allen, “Second Generation Law and Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter's Comparative Impairment and Beyond” (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 1011. The similarity between Pillet and Baxter is occasionally recognised; see, eg, W Tetley, “A Canadian Looks at American Conflict of Law Theory and Practice, Especially in the Light of the American Legal and Social Systems” (2000) 38 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 299, 314 n 47; J Trachtman, “Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction” (2001) 42 Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 26 n 91
111. JP, Niboyet, Traité de droit international privé français I (Paris, Sirey, 1938), 284–85
112. 284–93; on the avoidance of conflict, see Muir Watt,n 96, 430
113. Similarly JP, Niboyet, “Territoriality and Universal Recognition of Rules of Conflict of Laws” (1952) 65 Harvard Law Review 582, 594–95
114. Pillet,n 97, 536–44
115. Niboyet,n 98, 287: “le problème de l'efficacité internationale des droits définitivement constitués”. Niboyet translated the First Restatement into French Law
116. Ibid
117. Ibid, 294
118. Thus indeed H, Müller, Der Grundsatz des wohlerworbenen Rechts im internationalen Privatrecht. Geschichte und Kritik (Friederichsen, de Gruyter, 1935), 176 and passim; for criticism, see Gutzwiller,n 81
119. The first author using the concept was Baldus, according to EM Meijers, “L'histoire des principes fondamentaux du droit international privé” (1934–III) 49 Recueil des Cours 543, 607; see also Gutzwiller,n 81, 1058
120. U, Huber, De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis (Praelectiones iuris Romani et hodierni, vol II, book 1, Title iii, 1689). On Huber see now N Hatzimihail, Pre-Classical Conflict of Laws (SJD Thesis Harvard, 2002), ch 5; on Huber's importance for Dicey, see L Davies, “The Influence of Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law” (1937) 18 British Yearbook of International Law 49, 59
121. Heinrich Freiherr, von Cocceji, Exercitationum curiosarum, Palatinarum, Trajectinarum et Viadrinarum, volumen primum, Disp 54 Tit 7 no 5 in C, Von Bar and P, Dopffel (eds), Deutsches Internationales Privatrecht im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 528: “Ut enim Divini ac Gentium Juris est ut quisque pareat ei, cui subjectus est, ejusque leges in suis actibus observet, ita ejusdem Gentium juri est, ut jus ex illa observatione natum ubique valeat, et a nullo aufferri possit. Igitur extra territorium jus dici non potest; at contra in territorio rite actum ubique valet, ita ut Jure Naturae nemo, ac ne Princeps quidem jus quaesitum inde aufferre queat” (my translation)
122. Huber's original text is: “Rectores imperiorum id comiter agunt, ut jura cuiusquue populi intra terminus ejus exercita, teneant ubique suam vim, quatenus nihil potestati aut juri alterius imperantis ejusque civium praejudicetur.” (“Those who exercise sovereign authority so act from comity that the laws (iura) of each nation having been applied within each own boundaries should retain their effect everywhere so far as they do not prejudice the power or rights of another government or its subjects”; translation after EG Lorenzen, “Huber's De Conflictu Legum” (1918–19) 13 Illinois Law Review 375, 401–18, reprinted in Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws 162 (1947). The first English translation of Huber's text is in Emory v Grenough, 3 US 369, 370 (1797); for another translation, see Davies,n 108, 64–78
123. Müller,n 106, 125–128; contra Davies,n 108, 59; Meijers,n 107, 670; RD Kollewijn, Geschiedenis van de nderlandse wetenschap van het internationaal privaatrecht tot 1880 (Amsterdam, Noord-Hollandsche Uitgeversmij, 1937), 145–46
124. P, Dopffel, “Einführung”, in von Bar and Dopffel,n 109, 1, 4
125. Ius gentium is a global common law rather than a law between nation states. See, most recently, J Waldron, “Foreign Law and the Modern Ius gentium” (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 129, 132ff
126. Müller,n 106, 149–51
127. FW, Tittmann, De competentia legum externarum et domesticarum in defiendis potissimum iuribus coniugum (Halle, Gebauer, 1822); for analysis see Müller,n 106, 180–87
128. GF, Puchta, Pandekten (Leipzig, Barth, 12th edn, 1877), s 113, 172: “…daß ein Staat, indem er den Fremden als Rechtssubjekt anerkennt, ihm auch die schon erworbenen Rechte (vorausgesetzt solche, deren Möglichkeit er überhaupt anerkennt) zugesteht, mit anderen Worten, daß er dessen Wirksamkeit als Person nicht erst von dem Augenblick datirt, wo derselbe mit seinem Recht und den es schützenden Anstalten in Berührung kommt”; F Lassalle, Das System der erworbenen Rechte I (Leipzig, Brockhaus, 2nd edn, 1880), 303; cf Müller,n 106, 191–201
129. 117 US Const amend XIV, s 1.,
130. Home Insurance v Dick, 281 US 397, 410 (1930)
131. US Const Art IV, s 1. See, eg, Bradford Electric Light Co Inc v Clapper, 286 US 145 (1932); Alaska Packers Association v Industrial Accident Commission, 294 US 532 (1935); Pacific Employers Insurance Co v Industrial Accident Commission, 306 US 493 (1939)
132. Watson v Employers Liability Assurance Corp, Limited, 348 US 66 (1954); Clay v Sun Ins Office, Limited, 377 US 179 (1964)
133. Allstate Insurance Co v Hague 449 US 302, 313 (1981); see also Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts 472 US 797 (1985); Sun Oil Co v Wortman 486 US 717 (1988)
134. Ibid
135. For a recent attempt to “resuscitate a few key concepts that Beale got right” see K, Roosevelt, “The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts” (1999) 97 Michigan Law Review 2448, quote at 2458 n 48
136. Dalrymple v Dalrymple (1811) 2 Hagg Const 54, 58, 59, emphasis added
137. This is the main element of “vestedness” as used by P, Dane, “Vested Rights, “Vestedness” and Choice of Law” (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1191
138. Supra, 209
139. Tittmann,n 115, 7
140. HJ, Hilling, Das kollisionsrechtliche Werk Heinrich Freiherr v. Coccejis (1644–1719) (Universitätsverlag Osnabrück, 2002), 16
141. Johann, Marquard, Tractatus de iure mercatorum (Frankfurt, Thom. Matt. Goetz, 1662), lib 1 cap 6 de confirmatione privilegiorum mercantilium; cited after Gutzwiller,n 81, 1060
142. For explicit inclusion of privileges, see Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (1934) s 382(2): “A person who acts pursuant to a privilege conferred by the law of the place of acting will not be held liable for the results of his act in another state.”
143. Supra, 208–09
144. A, Pillet, “La théorie générale des droits acquis” (1925–III) Recueil des Cours 485, 533: “la solution la plus libérale des deux” (the more liberal solution of the two)
145. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co v Delta & Pine Land Co, 292 US 143 (1934) (a Tennessee claim time-barred under Tennessee law cannot be enforced under Mississippi law). The case was practically overruled by Allstate Ins Co v Hague,n 74, 308 n 11
146. Cocceji,n 109; cf. Hilling,n 128, 51–54
147. Case C–120/78, Rewe-Zentral-AG/Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, decision of 20 February 1979, [1979] ECR 649 para 8
148. Supra, 215
149. de, Baere,n 24, 299–302
150. MF, Kightlinger, “A Solution to the Yahoo! Problem? The E-Commerce Directive as a Model for International Cooperation on Internet Choice of Law” (2003) 24 Michigan Journal of International Law 719
151. Dicey,n 82, 116
152. Niboyet,n 99, no 937, 294
153. And perhaps returning to such a limitation, see DP, Fidler, “The Return of the Standard of Civilization” (2001) 2 University of Chicago International Law Journal 137
154. CG, Wächter, “Ueber die Collision der Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten (Fortsetzung)” (1842) 25 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 1, 1–9. A partial English translation of the relevant section on vested rights can be found in Nadelmann,n 82, 16; a different part of this essay has been translated to English, together with an introductory note, as KH Nadelmann, “Wächter's Essay on the Collision of Private Laws of different States” (1964) 13 American Journal of Comparative Law 414
155. Savigny,n 48,147
156. Cook,n 65; see also HE, Yntema, “The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws” (1927–28) 37 Ya le L a w J o u r n a l 468, 476–83; D Cavers, “A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem” (1933) 47 Harvard Law Review 173, 175–76
157. Eg Mayer and Heuzé,n 97, nos 110–112, 81–82; B Audit, Droit international privé (Paris, Economica, 4th edn, 2006), no 233, 192
158. P, Arminjon, “La notion des droits acquis en droit international privé “ (1933–II) 44 Recueil des Cours 1. See also H Weiller, Der Schutz der wohlerworbenen Rechte im internationalen Privatrecht (Diss Frankfurt/M, 1934)
159. AV, Dicey, Conflict of Laws LXV (6th edn by Morris and others, 1949). Cf FA Mann, Book review (1949) 12 Modern Law Review 518, 520: “he has greatly improved the formulation of the vested-rights theory”. The change was criticised as insufficient by D Cavers, Book review (1950) 63 Harvard Law Review 1278, 1280 (“Clarification here is needed”) and M Rheinstein, Book review (1950) 25 New York University Law Review 180, 182 (“What good beyond the avoidance of too radical a break with the tradition of the master's language can possibly be achieved with the preservation of a terminology reminiscent of the vested-rights theory?”)
160. See infra, 228
161. JHC, Morris, The Conflict of Laws (London, Stevens, 1971), 523. Similarly N deBelleville Katzenbach, “Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law” (1956) 65 Yale Law Journal 1087, 1087–88 (”the theory of vested rights has been brutally murdered by Cook, Lorenzen and others, though it still flits ghostlike through many decisions“); RD Carswell, “The Doctrine of Vested Rights in Private International Law” (1959) 8 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 268, 268 (“Few theories have suffered more at the hands of their rivals”)
162. P, Mankowski, “Wider ein Herkunftslandprinzip für Dienstleistungen im Binnenmarkt” [2004] Praxis des internationalen Privat-und Verfahrensrechts 385
163. Carswell,n 149, 275
164. Mayer and Heuzé,n 97, no 112, 82
165. Arminjon,n 146, 58: “La nature d'une question ne change pas parce que sa solution est évidente.”
166. Arminjon,n 146, 59ff
167. Brilmayer,n 38, 31, 37–41
168. Yntema,n 144, 477–78; EE, Cheatham, “American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility” (1945) 58 Harvard Law Review 361, 380–81
169. Carswell,n 149, 279
170. Horwitt v Horwitt, 90 FSupp 528, 530 (D Conn 1950)
171. Savigny,n 48, 147 (William Guthrie, trans, Edinburgh 1869): “Dieser Grundsatz führt auf einen bloßen Zirkel. Denn welche Rechte wohlerworben sind, können wir nur erfahren, wenn wir zuvor wissen, nach welchem örtlichen Rechte wir den vollzogenen Erwerb zu beurteilen haben.”
172. Wächter,n 141, 4–5 (translation partly mine, partly following Nadelmann,n 82, 16). The original German text is: “Ueberhaupt dürfte es auf einer petitio principii beruhen, wenn man die Frage, ob unser Richter nach fremden Gesetzen in gewissen Fällen zu sprechen habe, nach dem Grundsatze entscheiden will, daß er wohlerworbene Rechte schützen müsse. Will man bei einem im Auslande begründeten Rechtsverhältnisse für das nach fremden Gesetzen erworbene Recht unbedingten Schutz auch im Inlande in Anspruch nehmen: so argumentiert man aus einer Prämisse, die noch gar nicht erwiesen ist, und setzt etwas voraus, was erst zu erweisen ware, nämlich, daß jenes Rechtsverhältnis nach fremden und nicht nach einheimischen Gesetzen zu beurtheilen sei.” Wächter himself cites for his insight to August Siegmund Kori, Erörterungen praktischer Rechtsfragen aus dem gemeinen und Sächsischen Civilrechte und Civilprocesse III (Dresden, Leipzig, Arnoldische Buchhandlung, 1833) 3 note, who argues as follows against Tittmann (n 115): “ob Jemand aus einer im Auslande vorgenommenen Handlung ein Recht erworben habe? bestimmt sich allererst darnach: ist die Handlung nach ausländischen oder inländischen Gesetzen zu beurtheilen?” (”Whether someone has acquired a right due to an act committed abroad, is determined primarily by whether foreign or domestic law must be applied to the act.”) Kori in turn responded to other aspects of Wächter's essay; see Kori, “Ein Beitrag zu der Theorie über Collision der Gesetze verschiedener Staaten, vornehmlich zur Beleuchtung der Wächter'schen Ansicht” (1844) 27 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 309. On Kori's approach see (briefly) Müller,n 106, 216–17
173. Eg Savigny,n 48, 147 (“merely formal“). See, generally, HLA Hart, “Self-referring Laws”, in id., Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1983), 170–78
174. CfArminjon,n 146, 37 ff
175. Similarly Roosevelt,n 123, 2467
176. Eg Carswell,n 149, 271
177. See already EG, Lorenzen, “Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws” (1923–4) 33 Yale Law Journal 736
178. E, Bartin, Principles de droit international privé I (Paris, Domat Montchrestien, 1930), s 78, 195; G Kegel and K, Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (Munich, Beck, 9th edn, 2004), s 1 VI, 25
179. Mankowski,n 150, 388–9
180. See H Muir, Watt, “Aspects économiques du droit international privé” (2004) 307 Recueil des Cours 25, 191–93
181. Wächter,n 142, 8–9
182. Alabama Great Southern RR Co v Carroll, 97 Ala 126 (S Ct Ala, 1892). Although the decision predates formulation of the vested-rights theory in the USA, its reasoning is fully compatible
183. Mankowski,n 150, 387
184. Wächter,n 142, 6 (my translation)
185. M, Bernard, “Principes du droit international privé” (1906) Journal du droit international (Clunet) 1064, 1068–69
186. Müller,n 106, 298–307; WR Wichser, Der Begriff des wohlerworbenen Rechts im internationalen Privatrecht (Zurich, Polygraphischer Verlag AG, 1955), 18
187. Wilderspin and Lewis,n 53, 33; de, Baere,n 24, 303–05; Mankowski,n 150, 386–88
188. J, Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 4th edn, 2001), s 21.I.2b, 143–44
189. See Müller,n 106, 309–10
190. See Müller,n 106, 185–86 (discussing Tittmann)
191. Cocceji,n 109
192. Restatement (First) s 311, comment d; cf Brilmayer,n 38, 40–41
193. Gutzwiller,n 81, 1065
194. R, Maurenbrecher, Lehrbuch des gesamten heutigen deutschen Privatrechts I (Bonn, Eduard Weber, 1840), 312
195. KG, von Wächter, Pandekten I (Leipzig, Breitkopf & Härtel, 1880), 152–3
196. ECJ (15 July 1964), case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, [1964] ECR 585
197. Basedow,n 46, 18–19
198. Mankowski,n 150, 387
199. Ronald, Dworkin, “Rights as Trumps” in J, Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press, 1984), 152. For a helpful clarification that Dworkin's “rights as trumps” metaphor suggests protection of individuals against governments, not against the common good, see J Waldron, “Pildes on Dworkin's Theory of Rights” (2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 301
200. For both arguments see EA, O ‘Hara and LE, Ribstein, “From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law” (2000) 67 University of Chicago Law Review 1151
201. Art 17(20) of the 2004 Proposal and Art 17(15) of the 2006 Common Position exclude only liability for “an accident involving a person”
202. Notably, the same reasoning is not applied where the sovereign interests of the EU clash with the private interests of third country domiciliaries, as becomes clear from the Ingmar decision of the Court of Justice. See R Michaels and H-G Kamann, “Grundlagen eines allgemeinen gemeinschaftlichen Richtlinienkollisionsrechts–‘Amerikanisierung’ des Gemeinschafts-IPR?” (2001) 12 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht 301, 311
203. R, Michaels, “Two Economists, Three Opinions? Economic Models for Private International Law–Cross-Border Torts as Example” in J, Basedow and T, Kono (eds), An Economic Analysis of Private International Law (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 143, 178–79
204. Joerges, “The Challenges of Europeanization”,n 6, 178–79
205. For debate, see G-P, Calliess, “Coherence and Consistency in European C A Progress Report” (2003) 6 German Law Journal 333, 363ff
206. Brilmayer,n 38, 221ff
207. It is a three-track endeavour if we distinguish, within “traditional” private international law, the Savignyan multilateral approach from the unilateral approach of governmental interest analysis. For application of the latter, see Joerges,n 6. In this sense, I see my and Joerges' analyses as coexisting rather than mutually exclusive