State subsidies in the global economy

State Subsidies in the Global Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-193

  Zahariadis, Nikolaos ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84994691853     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230610514     Document Type: Book

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