Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms

The Journal of Finance

Volumn 50, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 301-318

  LERNER, JOSH ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84993865817     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05175.x     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists
2. New directions in research on venture capital finance
3. The role of venture capital in the creation of public companies: Evidence from the going‐public process
4. Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition
5. Contemporary banking theory
6. Separation of ownership and control
7. Venture capital formation, investment, and regional industrialization
8. What do venture capitalists do?
9. The determinants of board composition
10. The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan
11. Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans
12. Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers
13. Venture capitalists and the decision to go public
14. Venture capital certification in initial public offerings
15. The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from small business data
16. Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm's‐length debt
17. The structure and governance of venture‐capital organizations
18. Outside directors and CEO turnover
19. Organization form, residual claimants, and corporate control