The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems

The Journal of Finance

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 1993, Pages 831-880

  JENSEN, MICHAEL C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84993848601     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x     Document Type: Article

References (159)

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3. Organizational changes and value creation in leveraged buyouts: The case of O. M. Scott and Sons Company
4. Optimal sequential investment when capital is not readily reversible
5. Capabilities and capital investment: New perspectives on capital budgeting
6. The hidden costs of stock market liquidity
7. Shareholder passivity reexamined
8. Restructuring petrochemicals: A comparative study of business and government to deal with a declining sector of the economy
9. The choice of organizational form: The case of franchising
10. The market for corporate control: The empirical evidence since 1980
11. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments
12. Corporate financial policy and corporate control: A study of defensive adjustments in asset and ownership structure
13. Proxy contests and the governance of publicly held corporations
14. Union negotiations and corporate policy: A study of labor concessions in the domestic steel industry during the 1980s
15. Going private: Minority freezeouts and stockholder wealth
16. Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance: The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests
17. Voluntary restructuring: The case of General Mills
18. Habitual routines in task‐performing teams
19. Exit
20. Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers
21. Reinventing the outside director: An agenda for institutional investors
22. Trouble debt restructurings: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default
23. One share/one vote and the market for corporate control
24. Subordination of American capital
25. Teams, leaders, and organizations: New directions for crew‐oriented flight training
26. The stock market's valuation of R & D investment during the 1980's
27. Corporate governance: Voting rights and majority rules
28. The theory of capital structure
29. Does corporate performance improve after mergers?
30. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: An exploratory analysis
31. Monitoring an owner: The case of Turner Broadcasting
32. Organization theory and methodology
33. The agency costs of free cash flow: Corporate finance and takeovers
34. The takeover controversy: Analysis and evidence
35. Takeovers: Their causes and consequences
36. Eclipse of the public corporation
37. Active investors, LBOs, and the privatization of bankruptcy
38. Corporate control and the politics of finance
39. Effects of LBOs on tax revenues of the U.S. Treasury
40. Knowledge, control and organizational structure
41. Performance pay and top‐management incentives
42. CEO incentives—It's not how much you pay, but how
43. The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors
44. The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value
45. Campeau's acquisition of Federated: Value added or destroyed
46. Management buyouts: Evidence on taxes as a source of value
47. How risky is the debt in highly leveraged transactions?
48. The evolution of buyout pricing and financial structure in the 1980s
49. Contagion and competitive intra‐industry effects of bankruptcy announcements: An empirical analysis
50. A test of the free cash flow hypothesis: The case of bidder returns
51. Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: An empirical analysis
52. The effects of leveraged buyouts on productivity and related aspects of firm behavior
53. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance
54. Rethinking the trust question
55. The agency costs of free cash flow: Acquisition activity, and equity issues
56. Capital structure and firm response to poor performance: An empirical analysis
57. Consequences of leveraged buyouts
58. Reversions of excess pension assets after takeovers
59. Capital choices: Changing the way America invests in industry
60. Capital disadvantage: America's failing capital investment system
61. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight
62. Proxy voting and the SEC: Investor protection versus market efficiency
63. Beyond takeovers: Politics comes to corporate control
64. Political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public companies
65. a political theory of American corporate finance
66. Do union wealth concessions explain takeover premiums? The evidence on contract wages
67. The structure and governance of venture‐capital organizations
68. Capital market myopia
69. Breach of trust in hostile takeovers
70. Management entrenchment: The case of manager‐specific investments
71. Corporate ownership structure and performance: The case of management buyouts
72. Remaking the public corporation from within
73. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies
74. Stock prices and top management changes
75. Outside directors and CEO turnovers
76. Financial distress, reorganization, and organizational efficiency
77. What really went wrong at Revco?