Financial Distress and Corporate Performance

The Journal of Finance

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 1994, Pages 1015-1040

  OPLER, TIM C ^a   TITMAN, SHERIDAN ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84993839712     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb00086.x     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. A further investigation of the bankruptcy cost question
2. The resolution of claims in financial distress: The case of Massey Ferguson
3. Leverage, risk of ruin and the cost of capital
4. A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting
5. The threat of unionization, the use of debt, and the preservation of shareholder wealth
6. The costs of conflict resolution and financial distress: Evidence from the Texaco‐Pennzoil litigation
7. Sunk Investment, Bargaining and Choice of Capital Structure
8. The cross‐section of expected stock returns
9. A 'signal‐jamming' theory of predation
10. Management turnover and financial distress
11. CEO compensation in financially distressed firms: An empirical analysis
12. The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan
13. The eclipse of the public corporation
14. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
15. Contagion and intra‐industry effects of bankruptcy announcements: An empirical analysis
16. Financial policy and a firm's reputation for product quality
17. Debt, agency costs and industry equilibrium
18. Determinants of corporate borrowing
19. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
20. Capital structure and firm response to poor performance: An empirical analysis
21. The determinants of leveraged buyout activity: Free cash flow vs. financial distress costs
22. Capital structure as a bargaining tool: The role of leverage in contract renegotiation
23. Financial signalling and the “deep‐pocket” argument
24. The determination of financial structure: The incentive‐signalling approach
25. Financial market imperfections, firm leverage and the cyclicality of employment
26. Liquidation values and debt capacity: A market equilibrium approach
27. Some aspects of the pure theory of corporate finance: Bankruptcies and take‐overs
28. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies
29. The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation decision
30. The determination of capital structure choice
31. Financial distress, reorganization and organizational efficiency