The Global Gamble on Financial Liberalization: Reflections on Capital Mobility, National Autonomy, and Social Justice

Ethics and International Affairs

Volumn 13, Issue , 1999, Pages 205-226

  Eichengreen, Barry ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84993694805     PISSN: 08926794     EISSN: 17477093     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.1999.tb00335.x     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Alan Cowell, “Annan Fears Backlash over Global Crisis,” New York Times, February 1, 1999, p. A10.
2. Paul Krugman, “Heresy Time,” http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/heresy.html (1998), p. 2.
3. Dani Rodrik, “The Global Fix,” The New Republic, November 2, 1998, pp. 17–18.
4. A point that is elaborated by David Soskice, “German Technology Policy, Innovation, and National Institutional Frameworks,” WZB Discussion Paper 96–319 (1996).
5. Krugman, “Heresy Time,” p. 2.
6. Jeffrey Sachs, “Creditor Panics: Causes and Remedies” (Harvard University, 1998, unpublished).
7. As argued in Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann, and Juergen von Hagen, “Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Latin America: The Case for a National Fiscal Council” (University of California, Berkeley, Inter-American Development Bank, and University of Mannheim, 1996, unpublished).
8. See Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, “Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions” (Harvard University and Columbia University, 1994, unpublished)
9. Juergen von Hagen and Ian Harden, “National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance,” European Economy, Reports and Studies, 1994.
10. Barry Eichengreen and Michael Mussa, “Capital Account Liberalization: Theoretical and Practical Aspects,” IMF Occasional Paper, no. 172 (December 1998).
11. Dani Rodrik, “Who Needs Capital Account Convertibility?” in Peter B. Kenen, ed., Should the IMF Pursue Capital Account Convertibility? Essays in International Finance No. 207, International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University.
12. As quoted in Paul Krugman, “Are Currency Crises Self-Fulfilling?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 406.
13. Robert King and Ross Levine, “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1993), pp. 717–37
14. Ross Levine, “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda,” Journal of Economic Literature 35, pp. 688–726
15. Jith Jayarante and Philip Strahan, “The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (August 1996), pp. 639–71.
16. Gerald Caprio, Jr., and Daniela Klingebiel, “Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad Policy or Bad Banking?” Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1997), pp. 79–104.
17. Richard Cooper, “Capital Account Liberalization: What's the Best Stance?” IMF Economic Forum, October 2, 1998. Http://www.imf.org/external/up/tr/1998/TR981002A.htm.
18. Barry Eichengreen, “The Asian Financial Crisis: The IMF and Its Critics,” Great Decisions (1999), pp. 19–23.
19. Martin Feldstein, “Refocusing the IMF,” Foreign Affairs 77 (March-April 1998), pp. 20–33.
20. Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland, “The Design of Reform Packages Under Uncertainty,” CEPR Discussion Paper no. 860 (November 1993).
21. Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty,” American Economic Review 81 (1991), pp. 1146–54.
22. This is the point made by Maurice Obstfeld, “Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features,” European Economic Review 40 (1996), pp. 1037–47.
23. See “Code of Good Practices for Fiscal Transparency,” http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/fad/trans/index.htm (IMF 1998).
24. Ethan Kapstein, “Distributive Justice and International Trade,” this volume.
25. Barry Eichengreen, “The Only Game in Town,” The World Today 54 (December 1999), pp. 317–20.
26. Group of Seven, “Declaration of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors,” http://www.imf.org/extemallnp/g103098dc.htm (1998).