To be or not to be… credible that is: A model of reputation and credibility among competing firms

Corporate Communications: An International Journal

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 19-29

  Herbig, Paul ^a   Milewicz, John ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate image; Influence

Indexed keywords

EID: 84993087705     PISSN: 13563289     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/eb046526     Document Type: Review

References (28)

1. Shapiro, C., “Consumer information, product quality, and seller reputation”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, 1982, pp. 20-35.
2. Goldberg, M.E. and Hartwick, J., “The effects of advertiser reputation and extremity of advertising claim on advertising effectiveness”. Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 17, September 1990, pp. 172-85.
3. Moorthy, K.S., “Using game theory to model competition”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. XXII, August 1985, pp. 262-82.
4. Wernerfelt, B., “Umbrella branding as a signal of new product quality: an example of signaling by posting a bond”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19 No. 3, Autumn 1988, pp. 458-67.
5. Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., “Predation, reputation and entry deterrence”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.27, 1982, pp. 280-312.
6. DeJong, D.V., Forsythe, R. and Lundholm, R.J., “Ripoffs, lemons, and reputation formation in agency relationships: a laboratory market study”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, 1985, pp. 809-20.
7. Rogerson, W.P., “Repeated moral hazard”, Econometrica. Vol. 53 No. 1, January 1985, pp. 13-20.
8. Sobel, J., “A theory of credibility”. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 52, pp. 557-73.
9. Shapiro, C., “Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, November 1983, pp. 659-79.
10. Rogerson, W.P., “Reputation and product quality”. The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, August 1983, pp. 508-16.
11. Selden, R., “The chain store paradox”. Theory and Decision, Vol. 9, 1978, pp. 127-59.
12. Kreps, D.M. and Wilson, R., “Reputation and imperfect information”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, August 1982, pp. 253-79.
13. Scherer, F., Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Rand McNally College Publishing, Chicago, IL, 1980, p. 338.
14. Heil, O., “Explaining and predicting competitive reaction: a marketing signalling approach”, doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, PA, 1988.
15. Harmon, R.R. and Corey, K., “The persuasive effects of source credibility in buy lease situations”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 19, May 1982, pp. 255-60.
16. Krapfel, R.E. Jr, “An advocacy behavior model of organization buyers' vendor choice”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 49, Autumn 1985, pp. 51-59.
17. Sternthal, B., Dholakia, R. and Leavitt, C., “The persuasive effect of source credibility: tests of cognitive response”, Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 4, March 1978, pp. 252-60.
18. Bell, C., “Building a reputation for training effectiveness”, Training and Development Journal, Vol. 38, May 1984, pp. 50-54.
19. Fitzgerald, T.J., “Understanding the differences and similarities between services and products to exploit your competitive advantage”, Journal of Services Marketing, Vol. 2, Winter 1988, pp. 25-30.
20. Kreps, D.M. and Wilson, R., “Sequential equilibria”, Econometrica, Vol. 50, 1982, pp. 863-94.
21. Camerer, C. and Weigeit, K., “Experimental tests of a sequential equilibrium reputation model”, Econometrica, Vol. 56, January 1986, pp. 1-36.
22. Aaker, D.A., Managing Brand Equity, Free Press, New York, NY, 1991.
23. Dholokia, R.R. and Sternthal, B., “Highly credible sources: persuasive facilitators persuasive liabilities”, Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 3, March 1977, pp. 223-32.
24. Heil, O., “A basic marketing signaling framework to explain and predict the magnitude of competitive reactions”, working paper, Indiana University, IN, 1988.
25. Heil, O. and Robertson, T.S., “Toward a theory of competitive market signaling: a research agenda”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, 1991, pp. 403-18.
26. Levitt, T., “Communications and industrial selling”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 31, April 1967, pp. 15-21.
27. Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., “Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information: an equilibrium analysis”, Econometrica, Vol. 50,1982, pp. 443-59.
28. Spence, A.M., Market Signaling: The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1974.