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1
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0030336337
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The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control
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(Winter
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Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society 23, 2 (Winter 1996): 149-178.
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(1996)
Armed Forces & Society
, vol.23
, Issue.2
, pp. 149-178
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Feaver, P.D.1
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2
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0003285415
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Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force
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Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (eds.) (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 114 and fn. 4.
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Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force,” in U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or Transition, Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (eds.) (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 114 and fn. 4.
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U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or Transition
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Feaver, P.D.1
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3
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0002782814
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Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction?
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(Autumn/Winter 1994-95): He reiterates this theme in A. J. Bacevich, “Clinton's Military Problem-And Ours,” National Review 45, 24 (13 December 1993): 36-40; A. J. Bacevich, “Tradition Abandoned,” The National Interest 48 (Summer 1997): 16-26; and A. J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, “The Grand Old Army of the Republicans,” The New Republic 8 December 1997, 22-25.
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A. J. Bacevich, “Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction?” Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 11. He reiterates this theme in A. J. Bacevich, “Clinton's Military Problem-And Ours,” National Review 45, 24 (13 December 1993): 36-40; A. J. Bacevich, “Tradition Abandoned,” The National Interest 48 (Summer 1997): 16-26; and A. J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, “The Grand Old Army of the Republicans,” The New Republic 8 December 1997, 22-25.
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Joint Forces Quarterly
, vol.11
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Bacevich, A.J.1
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4
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0010354978
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See the “History and Theory” symposium in (Summer
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See the “History and Theory” symposium in International Security 22, 1 (Summer 1997): 5-85.
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(1997)
International Security
, vol.22
, Issue.1
, pp. 5-85
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5
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84904396319
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Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War
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I use “linear” in the imprecise sense that has become standard in the literature, to mean the opposite of “erratic” or “unpredictable.” This is not the correct definition of linear; y=x2 is a nonlinear expression but it is entirely predictable. When historians accuse political scientists of making the crude assumption of linearity, they really mean that political scientists pay inadequate attention to the contingent and inherently unpredictable nature of human events. (Winter 1992/93): I am indebted to Stephen Biddle for instructing me on this point.
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I use “linear” in the imprecise sense that has become standard in the literature, to mean the opposite of “erratic” or “unpredictable.” This is not the correct definition of linear; y=x2 is a nonlinear expression but it is entirely predictable. When historians accuse political scientists of making the crude assumption of linearity, they really mean that political scientists pay inadequate attention to the contingent and inherently unpredictable nature of human events. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security 17, 3 (Winter 1992/93): 61-66. I am indebted to Stephen Biddle for instructing me on this point.
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International Security
, vol.17
, Issue.3
, pp. 61-66
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Beyerchen, A.1
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