Determinants of Foreign Trade Mission Participation: An Analysis of Corporate Political and Trade Activities

Business & Society

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 6-35

  Schuler, Douglas A ^a   Schnietz, Karen E ^a   Baggett, L Scott ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84992880108     PISSN: 00076503     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0007650302041001003     Document Type: Article

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