Association, Federation and “Genuine” Autonomy: The Dalai Lama's Proposals and Tibet Independence

China Information

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 31-91

  Sautman, Barry ^a  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

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EID: 84992829398     PISSN: 0920203X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0920203X0001400202     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. The corresponding Tibetan terms are genuine autonomy: tonthamgi ranggyong, literally “pure meaning autonomy”; federation: natun gyegab, literally “harmonious vow couny”; and association: nyamne, literally “cooperating place/area.” My thanks to Melvyn Goldstein for this information. The Dalai Lama speaks of these concepts in English and there is no indication that the Tibetan terms convey a meaning at odds with the English terms.
2. A German newsweekly quoted his secretary Kelsang Gyaltsen as stating that “The 1t4h Dalai Lama is said to be ready to declare that Tibet and Taiwan are part of China” (“der 14. Dalai-Lama sei bereit zu erklären, dass ‘Tibet und Taiwan ein Teil Chinas sind”; Die Woche 1998). The statement was soon repudiated (LHP 1998), but the Dalai Lama's minister T.C. Tethong told a UK paper that “His Holiness the Dalai Lama is prepared to give the statement, but the time and the place has not been settled” (Poole 1998).
3. As late as May, 1999, the UK Foreign Office stated that Britain “has always regarded Tibet as autonomous, but we do recognize the special position that the Chinese authorities have there. We did not recognize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, but neither did we recognize Tibet as being independent” (Reuters 8 May 1999). A suzerainty is not sovereign, but under a guardianship at least as to international representation (Oppenheim 1955:189). It may be established by force, in contrast to a protectorate, which is consensual (Crawford 1979:187). A protectorate remains a sovereign state (Shaw 1997:155), while a suzerainty loses its international personality. Chinese sources attribute the term “suzerainity” with regard to Tibet to Lord Curzon, the early 2t 0h century governorgeneral of India and reject it (and protection) as epitomizing past Sino-Tibetan relations. (Xinhua 9 March 1999b, 5 March 1992). Article 2 of the Simla Convention (1914), in which the 1t 3h Dalai Lama purported to contract with Britain (over Chinese objections), stated that Britain recognizes that Tibet is autonomous but under Chinese suzerainity and engages to respect China's territorial integrity. Britain reaffirmed this position in a 1943 message to China (Shakya 1999:465). For all that legal scholars do not view suzerainty as a legal term of art, but as only a gloss on a political arrangement (Dowd 1993).
4. While hoping that the spread of capitalism in China will undermine the CCP, the Dalai Lama from time to time describes himself as a socialist. In 1998, for example, he stated “I am a socialist in so far as economic principles are concerned” (Hindu 1998).
5. A TYC leader has in turn stated “we are very committed to [the Dalai Lama] and whatever we do, we do under his guidance” (AFP 6 November 1998). The PRC has argued that “the 1t 4h Dalai Lama and the [TYC] have worked hand in glove with each other on many programs” (CT 1999). The TYC head in the early 1990s, Tashi Namgyal, stated that “[W]e hate the Chinese. They invaded our country. Why should we let them sleep in peace?… If we kill Chinese, no one should accuse us of being terrorists; no Chinese who comes to Tibet is innocent.” Donnet (1994), p. 186.
6. India is sometimes thought an exception is this regard. Following the UK policy inherited at India's independence, it officially continues to recognize China's “suzerainity” in Tibet and Tibet's autonomy (Statesman 1998). It has been noted, however, that during Nehru's time, India's Ministry of External Affairs acknowledged China's “sovereignty” over Tibet (Datta-Ray 2000). In 1954, India informed the Guomindang delegation to the UN that India recognizes Tibet as “autonomous within the framework of Chinese sovereignty” (Li 1956:404). A 1954 border trade agreement between India and China referred to the “Tibet region of China” (Sahay 2000). In Sino-Indian communiqués of 1988 and 1991, the Indian side employed identical wording and stated that “Tibet is an autonomous region of China.” (Xinhua 23 December 1988, 16 December 1991). Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi held that the matter of Tibet's autonomy was an internal affair of China (Partsch 1993:109).
7. Hannum and Lillich (1980) discuss other areas as associated with the US (Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands) that most scholars view as having less autonomy than associated states (Rodriguez-Orellana 1987). These three US territories, plus the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands (CNMI), are like New Zealand's associated states: their inhabitants have principal state citizenship and the principal state conducts foreign and military affairs for them (Clark 1986). US dependencies enjoy varied degrees of autonomy. The CMNI has a high degree: it controls immigration and customs and is a member of international organizations; the US cannot alter its political structure without the CNMI's consent (Covenant 1976: Art. V, Sect. 503; Art. VI, Sec. 603; Art. IX, Sec 904(c). American Samoa is an “outlying possession”; its inhabitants are US nationals who owe primary allegiance to the US, but not US citizens (Torruella 1998:1504 fn. 11). Wake Island and Midway Islands inhabitants are neither citizens nor nationals, but aliens (Curran 1998:65). The other seven US dependencies are small uninhabited islands and are, like Wake and the Midways, administered from Washington (OGGI 2000).
8. Association has also been proposed as an option in the case of Taiwan. Rosenblatt (1998).
9. A Xinjiang official told the author in a November 1999 interview that the region's leaders were not so much concerned with the degree of autonomy as with the ability of the central government to provide them with adequate funds for development. Top PRC minority officials have put it that “Today, the ethnic question in China is mainly expressed in the pressing demand of nationality areas for economic and cultural development” (Dawamat 1998) and “The solution to all problems in ethnic regions cannot be separated from economic development” (Buhe 1997).
10. Chinese analysts clearly distinguish between a federation and a unitary state: A federation has inherent power. Each constituent unit has its own constitution and power to determine its government structure. Constituent units participate in the federal system, for example by sending representatives to the national parliament and the distribution of power between the federal government and constituent units is set by a federal constitution. In a unitary state, subdivisions have no power apart from what they are authorized by the central government, no constitutions and no right to determine their own government structures. The constituent units of a unitary state do not participate in the national system and local authorities may not contest national laws (Xiao Weiyun 1990:125-126).
11. On the weakness of the American Confederation, see James Madison, “Vices of the political system of the U. States” [1787], in Paul H. Smith (ed.), Twenty-four Letters of The Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789 (New York, 1996).
12. The five autonomous areas are Eritrea under Ethiopia, Catalonia and other autonomous regions under the Second Spanish Republic, the Basque country under Spain, Greenland under Denmark, Belgian linguistic communities under Belgium. The three unit governments are the proposed Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates and Switzerland.
13. Ironically, the émigré leaders and their supporters disavow the 17-Point Agreement as “coerced” or “imposed under duress” and thus void under international law (Moynihan 1997; van Walt 1989:ix). Armed conflicts between and within states, however, are typically settled by agreements that reflect an imbalance of power among the parties, but that are legally valid. Shakya (1999:87-88) shows that there was general support for the 17- Point Agreement in the Tibetan National Assembly and monastic community. The Dalai Lama's positive references in the late 1990s to the Sino-Tibetan relationship from 1951-1959 are politically driven; he formerly characterized the relationship in negative terms, stating that “he lost his freedom and liberty at the age of 16 and his country at 24” (WTN 1993).
14. Interestingly, leading Tatarstani policy-makers also “often point to Scotland as a perfect example of gradual and civilised secession from the United Kingdom… ” (Yemelianov 2000:42).