The Sandelian Republic and the Encumbered Self

Review of Politics

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 181-208

  Dagger, Richard ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84991963137     PISSN: 00346705     EISSN: 17486858     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0034670500051950     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982;
2. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). Further references to Liberalism and the Limits of Justice appear in the text, in parentheses, as LLJ.
3. Michael Sandel, ed., Liberalism and Its Critics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984);
4. Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” Political Theory 12 (1984): 81-96, and
5. reprinted in Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 12–28, from which I shall quote. Further references to “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self” appear in the text, in parentheses, as “PR.”
6. Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. ix. Further references to this book appear in the text, in parentheses, as DD.
7. Cp. “Procedural Republic”: “But I suspect we would find in the practice of the procedural republic two broad tendencies foreshadowed by its philosophy: first, a tendency to crowd out democratic possibilities; second, a tendency to undercut the kind of community on which it none the less depends” (p. 27).
8. Michael Sandei, “Political Liberalism,” Harvard Law Review 107, no. 7 (1994): 1767.
9. Amy Gutmann, “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 308-322, as reprinted in Avineri and de-Shalit, Communitarianism and Individualism, p. 133. In this regard, note Sandel's admission (Democracy's Discontent, p. 321) that “bad communities may form bad characters.”
10. The internal quotation is from John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 560.
11. See also Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, pp. 147–154, where Sandel develops this argument.
12. Cp. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 179.
13. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 52–53.
14. See also John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 27 and n. 29, where Rawls endorses Kymlicka's response to Sandel.
15. Daniel A. Bell, “Liberal Neutrality and Its Role in American Political Life,” The Responsive Community 7 (1997): 61-68, esp. p. 62. Nor does Sandel respond to Kymlicka or other critics in the second edition of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (cited, n. 1), which adds an introduction consisting largely of his review of Rawls's Political Liberalism to the original edition.
16. But note that Rawls also stresses the importance of self-reflection: “each person must decide by rational reflection what constitutes his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for him to pursue” (A Theory of Justice, p. 11).
17. Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 208.
18. I develop this conception in “Politics and the Pursuit of Autonomy” NOMOS XXVIII: Justification in Politics, ed. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1986)
19. and in Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), esp. chap. 3.
20. Cp. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 179, and “Procedural Republic,” p. 23.
21. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 186–216;
22. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), chaps. 5 and 6.
23. See also: Margaret Gilbert, “Group Membership and Political Obligation,” The Monist 76 (1993): 119-131;
24. Michael Hardimon, “Role Obligations,” The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 333-363;
25. John Horton, Political Obligation (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1992), chap. 6;
26. and Bhikhu Parekh, “Citizenship and Political Obligation,” in Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays, ed. Preston King (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 259–289.
27. For criticism, see A. John Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations,” Ethics 106 (1996): 247-273
28. and Christopher Heath Wellman, “Associative Allegiances and Political Obligations,” Social Theory and Practice 23 (1997): 181-204.
29. Sandel, “Political Liberalism,” p. 1767.
30. As quoted in Democracy's Discontent, p. 15.
31. See the reviews of Democracy's Discontent by Susan Okin (American Political Science Review 91 [1997]: 440-442) and Mark Hulliung (The Responsive Community 7 [1997]: 68-72).
32. Lance Banning, “Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic,” William and Mary Quarterly 43 (1986): 12. Sandel cites this article in note 33, p. 372.
33. The following discussion is adapted from my Civic Virtues, pp. 13–18.
34. For a valuable account of and argument for the republican conception of liberty as “nondomination,” see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), esp. part 1.
35. Note also Pettit's “Reworking Sandel's Republicanism,” The Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998): 73-96.
36. Shelley Burtt, “The Good Citizen's Psyche: On the Psychology of Civic Virtue,” Polity 23 (1990): 23-38.
37. Rousseau, Émile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 85.
38. Rousseau, Social Contract, ed. Roger D. Masters and trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 53.
39. Robert Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Positive and Negative Liberty (London: Croom and Helm, 1986), p. 9.
40. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986);
41. William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Thomas Spragens, “The