The Implications of Long-Term Performance Plans and Institutional Ownership for Firms’ Research and Development (R&D) Investments

Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 117-139

  Eng, Li Li ^a   Shackell, Margaret ^b  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84990374533     PISSN: 0148558X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0148558X0101600204     Document Type: Review

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