Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game: The Walrasian Fixed-Supply Conjecture Model, Contest-Nash Equilibrium, and the Invariance Principle

Journal of Sports Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 234-239

  Eckard, E Woodrow ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

player allocation; sports labor supply; theory of sports leagues

Indexed keywords

EID: 84990359298     PISSN: 15270025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1527002504272947     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. Fort, R., & Quirk, J. (1995). Cross-subsidization, incentives, and outcomes in professional team sports leagues. Journal of Economic Literature, 33(3), 1265-1299.
2. Money matters: A-Rod earns Rays; average salary tops ․2.5M. (2003). Retrieved July 27, 2004, from http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/news/2003/04/03/salaries_ap/
3. Neale, W. C. (1964). The peculiar economics of professional sports: A contribution to the theory of the firm in sporting competition and in market competition. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78(1), 1-14.
4. Quirk, J., & Fort, R. (1992). Pay dirt: The business of professional team sports. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
5. Szymanski, S. (2004). Professional team sports are only a game: The Walrasian fixed-supply conjecture model, contest-Nash equilibrium, and the invariance principle. Journal of Sports Economics, 5(2), 111-126.