Sentences, belief and logical omniscience, or what does deduction tell us?

Review of Symbolic Logic

Volumn 1, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 459-476

  Parikh, Rohit ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84989168201     PISSN: 17550203     EISSN: 17550211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1755020308090059     Document Type: Article

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