Strategizing, economizing, and economic organization

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 12, Issue 2 S, 1991, Pages 75-94

  Williamson, Oliver E ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

economic organization; economizing; Strategizing

Indexed keywords

EID: 84989040635     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.4250121007     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. The antimerger act, 1950–1960
2. Specificity, specialization, and coalitions
3. Reflections on the theory of the firm
4. Toward an economic model of the Japanese firm
5. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources of invention
6. The organization of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of market versus nonmarket allocation
7. Manufacturer‐supplier relationships in Japan and the concept of relation specific skills
8. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage
9. Measurement cost and the organization of markets
10. Socialist economies
11. Pricing policy in relation to financial control
12. The Nature of the Firm
13. The regulated industries: Discussion
14. The new institutional economics
15. The nature of the firm: Influence
16. Law and economics
17. Technological paradigms and technological trajectories
18. Agency problems and the theory of the firm
19. Sharing among the human capitalists: An economic inquiry into the corporate law firm and how partners split profits
20. Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives
21. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration
22. Monopoly and resource allocation
23. Vertical integration and market foreclosure
24. The use of knowledge in society
25. The role of dependence balancing in safeguarding transaction‐specific assets in conventional channels
26. Agency costs and innovation
27. Regulating trade among agents
28. The economics of block booking
29. Transaction cost determinants of ‘unfair’ contractual arrangements
30. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process
31. Review of Melville J. Herskovits’, ‘Economic Anthology
32. Modelling the role of history in industrial organization and competition
33. On the theory of economic socialism
34. The cost of organization
35. The role of institutions in the revival of trade
36. Diversification, Picardian rents, and Tobin's q
37. Evolution, economic competence, and the market for corporate control
38. The core competence of the corporation
39. Asset specificity and economic organization
40. Towards a strategic theory of the firm
41. Theory, strategy, and entrepreneurship
42. Raising rival's costs
43. The creative response in economic history
44. The theory of business strategy
45. The Main Bank System and corporate monitoring in Japan
46. Breach of trust in hostile takeovers
47. The architecture of complexity
48. Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm
49. Profiting from technological innovation
50. A resource‐based view of the firm
51. The vertical integration of production: Market failure considerations
52. Transaction‐cost economics: The governance of contractual relations
53. Credible commitments: Using hostages to support exchange
54. The economics and sociology of organization: Promoting a dialogue
55. Breach of trust in hostile takeovers: Comment
56. Transaction cost economics
57. Chester Barnard and the incipient science of organization
58. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives
59. Knowledge and competence as strategic assets