Information, Control, and Organizational Structure

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 1992, Pages 237-275

  Baron, David P ^a   Besanko, David ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84988084563     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00237.x     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Regulation and Legislative Choice
2. Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
3. Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent
4. On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts
5. Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents
6. Hierarchial Regulatory Control
7. Managing Supplier Switching
8. An Approach to Communications Equilibrium
9. Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
10. Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three Level Hierarchy
11. Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
12. Stopping Agents from ‘Cheating’
13. The Principal‐Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, I: Private Values
14. The Principal‐Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
15. A Theory of Responsibility Centers
16. Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
17. Multistage Games with Communication
18. Information, Incentives, and Organizational Mode
19. The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies
20. Limited Liability Contracts between Principal and Agent
21. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations