Merger activity: solutions to Japan's economic downturn?

Management Decision

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 263-272

  Morrison, Janet ^a   Floyd, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUNDERLAND   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Financial restructuring; Japan; Mergers and acquisitions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84986065030     PISSN: 00251747     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/00251740010326324     Document Type: Review

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