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Volumn 4, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 7-15

Understanding the corporate governance quadrilateral

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Shareholders; Stakeholders

Indexed keywords


EID: 84986038328     PISSN: 14720701     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/14720700410558844     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (16)

References (10)
  • 1
    • 0000589044 scopus 로고
    • Production, information costs and economic organization
    • Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H. (1972), “Production, information costs and economic organization”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, p. 777.
    • (1972) The American Economic Review , vol.62 , pp. 777
    • Alchian, A.1    Demsetz, H.2
  • 2
    • 84909194839 scopus 로고
    • The politics of corporate governance: Roe's strong managers, weak owners
    • Research Paper No. 01-10, UCLA School of Law, Los Angeles, CA.
    • Bainbridge, M.S. (1995), “The politics of corporate governance: Roe's strong managers, weak owners”, Research Paper No. 01-10, UCLA School of Law, Los Angeles, CA.
    • (1995)
    • Bainbridge, M.S.1
  • 3
    • 0009954736 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The changing corporate governance paradigm: implications for transition and developing countries
    • Conference paper, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC.
    • Berglof, E. and von Thadden, E. (1999), “The changing corporate governance paradigm: implications for transition and developing countries”, Conference paper, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC.
    • (1999)
    • Berglof, E.1    von Thadden, E.2
  • 7
    • 0000328264 scopus 로고
    • The market mechanism as an incentive scheme
    • Hart, O. (1983), “The market mechanism as an incentive scheme”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.14, pp. 366-82.
    • (1983) Bell Journal of Economics , vol.14 , pp. 366-382
    • Hart, O.1
  • 8
    • 44649197264 scopus 로고
    • Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
    • Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976), “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 305-60.
    • (1976) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.4 , pp. 305-360
    • Jensen, M.C.1    Meckling, W.H.2
  • 9
    • 0013028968 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Does the governed corporation perform better? Governance structures and corporate performance in Germany
    • Lehmann, E. and Weigand, J. (2000), “Does the governed corporation perform better? Governance structures and corporate performance in Germany”, European Economic Review, Vol. 4, pp. 157-95.
    • (2000) European Economic Review , vol.4 , pp. 157-195
    • Lehmann, E.1    Weigand, J.2
  • 10
    • 84986071363 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Contractual constraints on firm performance in developing countries
    • Institute for Economic Development, Boston University.
    • Mookherjee, D. (1999), “Contractual constraints on firm performance in developing countries”, Discussion paper No. 98, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University.
    • (1999) Discussion paper No. 98
    • Mookherjee, D.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.