THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS

Economics & Politics

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1990, Pages 1-23

  Milgrom, Paul R ^a   North, Douglass C ^b   Weingast, Barry R ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84984499607     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: 14680343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00020.x     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
2. Repeated Games
3. An Evolutionary Approach to Social Norms
4. The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law
5. Reciprocity Among Self‐interested Actors
6. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
7. The Organization of Trade
8. Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade
9. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
10. Institutions, Transactions Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires
11. General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant
12. Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
13. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device
14. Models of Money with Spatially Separated Agents
15. Markets and Fairs
16. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislatures, like Firms, are not Organized as Markets