Dworkin and His Critics: The Relevance of Ethical Theory in Philosophy of Law

Ratio Juris

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 1990, Pages 340-384

  BALL, STEPHEN W ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84983952583     PISSN: 09521917     EISSN: 14679337     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.1990.tb00067.x     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. Legal Positivism, Natural Law, and the Hart/Dworkin Debate
2. Economic Equality: Rawls Versus Utilitarianism
3. Choosing Between Choice Models of Ethics: Rawlsian Equality, Utilitarianism, and the Concept of Persons
4. Review of A. D'Amato, Jurisprudence: A Descriptive arid Normafive Analysis of Law
5. Reductionism in Ethics and Science: A Contemporary Look at G. E. Moore's Open‐Question Argument
6. Evolution, Explanation, and the Fact/Value Distinction
7. Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism
8. Some Merits of One Form of Rule Utilitarianism
9. Problems of Contemporary Utilitarianism: Real and Alleged
10. “Negative and Positive Positivism.”
11. Philosophy, Morality, and Law — Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller's Novel Claim
12. No Right Answer
13. A Reply
14. Justice, Fairness, and Ratnality
15. Natural and Inalienable Rights
16. On Defining and Defending Natural Law
17. Moral‐Point‐of‐View Theories
18. Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision
19. Review of Fuller's The Morality of Law
20. Between Utility and Rights
21. Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments
22. Moral Aspects of Legal Theory
23. Dworkin as Pre‐Benthamite
24. The Third Theory of Law
25. Dworkin's Critique of Wealth Maximization
26. Reply to Alexander and Musgrave
27. Legal Principles and the Limits of Law
28. Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies
29. Liberalism and the Claims of Community: The Case Against Affirmative Action
30. Dworkin on Rights and Utilitarianism
31. An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics
32. Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute
33. No Right Answer