메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 43, Issue 3, 1988, Pages 593-616

Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 84977726267     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04593.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (1078)

References (45)
  • 2
    • 84977716405 scopus 로고
    • “Incentives in Hierarchies: Promotions, Bonuses and Monitoring.” Harvard Business School Working Paper
    • (1987)
    • Baker1
  • 10
    • 84977708049 scopus 로고
    • “Employee Crime, Monitoring, and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis.” NBER Working Paper
    • (1987)
    • Dickens1    Katz2    Lang3    Summers4
  • 11
    • 84977730933 scopus 로고
    • “Compensation and Firm Performance.” NBER Working Paper No. 2145
    • (1987)
    • Ehrenberg1    Milkovich2
  • 19
    • 84977701251 scopus 로고
    • “The Theory of the Firm.” Forthcoming in, R. Schmalensee, R. Willig, (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization
    • (1987)
    • Holmström1    Tirole2
  • 23
    • 84977734688 scopus 로고
    • “Are Executive Compensation Contracts Structured Properly?” Harvard Business School and University of Rochester Working Paper
    • (1988)
    • Jensen1    Murphy2
  • 36
  • 42
    • 0001449103 scopus 로고
    • “Theories of Wage Rigidity.”
    • James L. Butkiewicz, Kenneth J. Koford, Jeffrey B. Miller, Praeger
    • (1986) Keynes' Economic Legacy , pp. 153-221
    • Stiglitz1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.