The Predatory Theory of Rule

Politics & Society

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 1981, Pages 431-465

  Levi, Margaret ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84977229977     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: 15527514     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/003232928101000403     Document Type: Article

References (138)

1. In this paper I am concerned both with identifying as the object of study a dependent variable that does indeed vary and with developing a theory that is capable of being translated into refutable hypotheses and that specifies the direction and strength of causality among important factors. My approach is not to be confused with the kind of empiricism, derived from Locke, that Marx criticized. Marx objected, as do I, to a theory based only on sensory experience. (See Geoffrey Pilling, Marx's “Capital”: Philosophy and Political Economy [Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980], pp. 26-35, for a discussion of Marx's critique.) Moreover, I intend to use deductive reasoning. I shall begin with stated assumptions and first principles in order to derive refutable hypotheses; the tests of these hypotheses can then be used to modify and improve the theory itself. This is how Marx's method in
2. Capital is described by Oskar Lange, Political Economy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), vol. 1, pp. 92-147.
3. For a discussion of the varieties of Marxism, see Perry Anderson, Consideration on Western Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1976).
4. Alvin Gouldner, The Two Marxisms (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), chap. 3, offers an interesting discussion of scientific Marxism that emphasizes the tension between voluntarism and determinism in Marx's work. Recently, several works have appeared that attempt to extract from Marx's work theory that is scientific by the criteria of logic and consistency. In particular, see
5. G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)
6. and Jon Elster, Logic and Society (New York: John Wiley, 1978).
7. and Karel Williams, “Facing Reality: A Critique of Karl Popper's Empiri cism,” Economy and Society 4, no. 3 (1975): 309-58.
8. Several other authors are also currently seeking the microfoundations of macro questions. See especially Michael Hechter, “Karl Polanyi's Social Theory: A Critique,” Politics & Society 10, no. 4 (1981): 399-429
9. William Brustein, “A Regional Mode of Production Analysis of Political Behavior. The Cases of Western and Mediterranean France,” Politics & Society 10, no. 4 (1981): 355-98;
10. Adam Przeworski, “Material Interests, Class Compromise, and the Transition to Socialism,” Politics & Society 10, no. 2 (1980); 125-53
11. Bruce Cumings, “Interest and Ideology in the Study of Agrarian Politics,” Politics & Society, forthcoming; John E. Roemer, “New Directions in the Marxian Theory of Exploitation and Class,” Politics & Society, forthcoming;
12. Joe A. Oppenheimer, “Small Steps Forward for Political Economy,” World Politics 33, no. 1 (1980): 121-51;
13. Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens. Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979
14. and Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: W. W. Norton and Company) 1981
15. The discussion in Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1978, pp. 180-83 of the compatability of economic and sociological ap proaches is also relevant
16. Among the finest pieces of work that borrow from the Marxist tradition in this way are: Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, Strikes in France (New York; Cambridge University, 1974) Eric Hobshawm, Primitive Rebels (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1965)
17. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism : The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)
18. Jeffrey Paige, Agrarian Revolutions: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World (New York- The Free Press, 1975):
19. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979)
20. and Elizabeth Perry, From Rebellion to Revolution: Peasant Protestin Huai-bei (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980).
21. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1978), p. 179, argue that “the separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a battle against another class; otherwise, they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors. On the other hand, the class in turn achieves an independent existence over against the individuals, so that the latter find their conditions of existence predestined, and hence have their personal development assigned to them by their class, become subsumed under it” Also, see
22. Michael Hechter, “A Theory of Group Solidarity,” in Choice Theoretic Models in Social Science with Marketing Applications, ed. Leigh McAllister (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1981), for an interesting reformulation of this problem.
23. For example, see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: Aca demic Press, 1974)
24. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974): Maurice Dobb et aL, Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1978).
25. Examples include: Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966)
26. Anderson, Lineages, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London: New Left Books, 1974)
27. and Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship, trans. Judith White (London: New Left Books, 1974).
28. The Marxist literature on the capitalist state is too extensive to cite completely. Among the major books and articles that attempt to lay out the theory are: Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, trans. Timothy Hagen (London: New Left Books, 1973)
29. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969) and Marxism and Politics (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1977)
30. Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1978)
31. James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York. St. Martin's Press, 1973)
32. Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: Free Press, 1977)
33. John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, eds., State and Capital: A Marxist Debate (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978)
34. Gosta Esping-Anderson, Roger Friedland, and Erik Olin Wright, “Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State,” Kapitalstate 4-5 (1976): 186-220; Bob Jessop, “Recent Theories of the Capitalist State,” Cambridge Journal of Eco nomics 1 (1977): 353-77; Clause Offe, “The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation,” in Stress and Contradictions in Modern Capitalism, ed. Leon Lindberg et al. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975)
35. and Fred Block, ''The Ruling Class Does Not Rule,” Socialist Review 33 (1977): 6-28. Recent applications of particular Marxist notions of the capitalist state to actual policies include: Ian Gough, “State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism,” New Left Review 92 (1975): 53-92; Goran Therbom, “The Rule of Capital and The Rise of Democracy,” New Left Review 103 (1977): 3-41; Francis G. Castles, The Social Democratic Image of Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978)
36. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, 1976)
37. Ira Katznelson, City Trenches (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981)
38. Manuel Castells, The Economic Crisis and American Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1980)
39. Pierre Birnbaum et al., La Classe dirigeante française (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978)
40. Theda Skocpol, “Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal,” Politics & Society 10, no. 2 (1980): 155-201
41. Sidney Plotkin, “Policy Frag mentation and Capitalist Reform: The Defeat of National Land-Use Policy,” Politics & Society 9, no. 4 (1980): 409-45
42. Gosta Esping-Andersen, “The Political Limits of Social Democracy: State Policy and Party Decomposition in Denmark and Sweden,” in Classes, Conflict, and the State, ed. Maurice Zeitlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1980), pp. 257-75.
43. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, “The Crisis of Liberal Democratic Capitalism: The Case of the United States,” Politics & Society, forthcoming.
44. For a discussion of this concept, see: Miliband, Marxism and Politics, pp. 66-74
45. Ernesto Laclau, “The Spec ificity of the Political,” in Political and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: New Left Books, 1977), pp. 51-79 Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband, “The Problem of the Capitalist State,” in Ideology in Social Science, ed. Robin Blackburn (New York: Vintage Books, 1973)
46. Barry Hindess, “Class and Politics in Marxist Theory,” in Power and the State, ed. Gary Littlejohn et al. (London: Croom Helm, 1978) William G. Domhoff, The Powers That Be (New York. Vintage Books, 1979)
47. Albert Szymanski, The Capitalist State and The Politics of Class (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishas, 1978)
48. Holloway and Picciotto, State and Capital, esp. the introduction; and Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power and Socialism, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: New Left Books, 1978), esp. pp. 25-27.
49. Fred Block, “Beyond Relative Autonomy, State Managers as Historical Subjects,” in Socialist Register 1980, ed. Ralph Miliband and John Saville, pp. 227-42;
50. John M. Maguire, Marx's “Theory of Politics” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 16-27 and passim
51. and Paul Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 56-122, find Marx himself occasionally guilty of this reduction.
52. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens, chap. 2, tries to extend the notion of rationality beyond the more narrow identification of homo economicus with rational action. He continues to address this problem in his current work; see his “Rationality,” mimeographed (Oslo Department of History, University of Oslo, 1981).
53. Steven N. S. Cheung, The Myth of Social Cost (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978), p. 53.
54. One of the most interesting formulations of the Hobbesian dilemma is found in Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: Free Press, 1949), pp. 89-94.
55. Gordon Tullock, The Social Dilemma (Blacksburg, Va.: University Publications, 1974), p. 17. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (London: Methuen, 1950), p. 203, also discussed the importance of the state for protecting private property rights and promoting economic growth. Other economists have attempted to use neoclassical economic assumptions to develop a theory of the state. For example, see Richard D. Auster and Morris Silver, The State as a Firm (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1979). However, they treat the state as an actor rather than as an institution composed of actors, and they focus mostly on modem polities.
56. The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
57. This was pointed out by Steven N. S. Cheung and Douglass C. North in their graduate seminar on economic organization at the University of Washington in 1979. They argued that the firm, too, has remained a black box for neoclassical economists. See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975) for a seminal, if unsuccessful, attempt to rectify this lacuna.
58. Also, see M. C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Struc ture,” Journal of Finance Economics 3 (1976): 305-60.
59. See, especially, Randall Bartlett, Economic Foundations of Political Neoclassical and Marxist Theories of Government Behavior (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1976). Such implications can also be drawn from: Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957)
60. Albert Breton, The Economic Theory of Repsesentative Government (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1974)
61. and William Niskanan, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971).
62. No rules governing democratic elections or decision making yet exist that are capable of promoting optimum conditions for alL Someone always loses. The rules always exclude certain groups from having an effective influence on the policy-making process. The rules can also promote log-rolling, vote trading, or coalition formation in which one or another party is excluded from the pie. The most important statement of this problem is Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
63. Also, see John M. Orbell and L. A. Wilson, “Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners' Di lemma,” American Political Science Review 72, no. 2 (1979): 411-21;
64. and Douglas Rae, “The Limits of Constitutional Design,” American Political Science Review 69, no. 4 (1975): 127-94. A related finding is that the setting of the agenda, particularly through the pairing of choices, can predetermine the outcome. See, for example, Charles R. Plott and Michael E. Levine, “On Using the Agenda to Influence Group Decisions: Theory, Experiments, and Applications,” American Economic Review, forthcoming; and Joe A. Oppenheimer, “Problems with Applying Collective Good Theories to Alliances,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming. For a good review of this literature, see Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, Modern Political Economy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), esp. chap. 2;
65. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 9-13;
66. and Robert Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), chaps. 2-3. In other words, such mundane factors as electoral arrangements, parliamentary procedures, and constitutional design can significantly influence whose preferences are taken into account when policies are being made.
67. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, has become the classic statement of this di lemma. However, Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, raised a similar issue with regard to voting.
68. Also, see Terry M. Moe, The Organization of Interests (Chicago: University of Chi cago Press, 1980).
69. William C. Mitchell, “The Democratic State: A Public Choice Perspective” (Paper presented to the Public Choice Society, Charleston, S.C., 1979)
70. and Douglass C. North, “Struc ture and Performance: The Task of Economic History,” Journal of Economic Literature 16 (1978): 963-78.
71. Logic of Collective Action, p. 132.
72. North, “Structure and Performance.”
73. This definition is derived from Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (New York: International Publishers, 1973), pp. 229-30. To some extent it is also derived from
74. Max Weber, Economy and Society, trans. Guenther Roth and Carl Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 56. However, Weber says quite clearly that it is the modem state that monopolizes legitimate force; presumably premodern states did not always possess a monopoly.
75. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values.
76. Anthropological accounts include: Elman R. Service, Origins of the State and Civilization (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1975)
77. Ronald Cohen and Elman R. Service, eds., Origins of the State (Philadelphia. Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1978)
78. and H. T. Wrigbt, “Recent Research on the State,” Annual Review of Anthropology 6 (1977): 379-97. One of the underlying arguments is that the state arises when society reaches such a size that a specialized agency of justice and protection is required, however, there is consider able debate about what this size is and what determines it. For another view of these issues, see Auster and Silver, The State as a Firm, chap. 2. Sociologists and historians have also ex plored the question of state formation and transformation. For example, see Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978)
79. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Wallerstein, The Modern World System; Anderson, Lineages; Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State (Stan ford: Stanford University Press, 1978)
80. and Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). While the anthropol ogists tend to focus on the emergence of an institution that can be labeled a state, these ana lysts tend to investigate the emergence of the modem state. One theorist who addresses the question across many time periods and countries is, of course, Weber, in Economy and Society. Political philosophers have addressed the question of state emergence in yet another way. The great works in this literature abound, but among the most important older texts are: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakshott (London: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1962)
81. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960)
82. and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1950). Recent contributions to the tradition of constitutional design include: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)
83. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974)
84. James M. Buch anan and Gordon Tulluck, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor. The University of Michigan Press, 1962).
85. John Umbeck, A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation into the Formation of Property Rights (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, forthcoming).
86. “Regional Modes of Production and Patterns of State Formation in Western Europe,” American Journal of Sociology 85, no. 5 (1980): 1061-94. Support for their argument from a different continent and century is found in Allen Kommesser, “Regional Modes of Production and the Emergence of the State in Ancient India,” mimeographed (Seattle: Department of Political Science, University of Washington, 1981).
87. Perry Anderson, Lineages, pp. 17-19.
88. In Origins of Private Property, Engels, p. 231, argues that the state “arose from the need to keep class antagonisms in check,” but that “… it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful economically dominant class.”
89. Also, see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in Marx-Engels Reader, p. 48 1.
90. and Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy, pp. 37-40.
91. Also, see Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer and Oran Young Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). Several of the writers in the “resource mobilization” perspective also discuss the role and preconditions of leadership, especially John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Re source Mobilization and Social Movements A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1212-41;
92. and Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 116-18, 157-84.
93. This story is summarized from Gustav Schwab, Gods and Heroes (New York: Pantheon Books, 1946), pp. 307-14. The various epithets for Odysseus come from Homer, The Illiad, trans. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 63, 70, 469.
94. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1968).
95. For concise histories of this period, see The Cambridge Ancient History VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), esp. the essays by
96. A. W. Pickard-Cambridge (“The Rise of Macedonia,” pp. 200-43
97. and W. W. Tarn (“Alexander: The Conquest of Persia,” pp. 352-86 and “Macedonian Supremacy in Greece,” pp. 244-71)
98. “Alexander. The Conquest of the Far East,” pp. 387-437).
99. Anderson, Lineages, pp. 103-4.
100. For a fairly complete review of the Marxist literature on dependency, see Anthony Brewer, Marxirt Theories of Imperialism (London: Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1980).
101. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York. International Publishers, 1939).
102. See esp. Shorter and Tilly, Strikes in France. For a discussion of the unionization of public employees in the United States, see Margaret Levi, Bureaucratic Insurgency: The Case of Police Unions (Lexington: Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books, 1977).
103. Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), chap. 3;
104. and Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (New York: Dodd & Mead, 1970), provide particularly useful analyses.
105. These are from Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. For their elaboration and application to a wider range of organizations and movements, see Oberschall, Social Conflict; Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978)
106. and McCarthy and Zald, “Resource Mobilization.”
107. Margaret Levi, “Poor People against the State,” The Review of Radical Political Economics 6 (Spring 1974): 76-98; Michael Lipsky and Margaret Levi, “Community Organization as a Political Resource,” in People and Politics in Urban Society, ed. Harlan Hahn (Beverly Hills Sage, 1972), pp. 175-99;
108. and Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), chap. 10.
109. Marx and Engels, “Manifesto,” pp. 480-81.
110. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, esp. p. 43;
111. and Margaret Levi and Michael Hechter, “The Rise and Decline of Ethnoregional Political Parties: Scotland, Wales, and Brittany,” in Ethnicity and Economic Development, ed. William Lockwood, forthcoming.
112. “Moments of Madness,“ Politics & Society 2, no. 2 (1972): 183-207.
113. This seems to have been the view propounded by Marx and Engels in both “Mani festo,” p. 481, and The German Ideology, pp. 172-75. These ideas were developed further by Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: New Left Books, 1971). For an interesting and clear discussion of Gramsci's con cepts, see Jerome Karabel, “Revolutionary Contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the Problem of Intellectuals,” Politics & Society 6, no. 2 (1976): 123-72.
114. Also, see Perry Anderson, ''The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,” New Left Review 100 (1977): 5-79;
115. and Chantal Mouffe, “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci,” in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, ed. Chantal Mouffe (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 168-204.
116. For example, see Shorter and Tilly, Strikes in France; and Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).
117. “Manifesto,” p. 481.
118. Also, see Engels, Origin of the Family, p. 232.
119. Piven and Coward, Regulating the Poor, chap. 9.
120. Levi and Hechter, “The Rise and Decline of Ethnoregional Political Parties.”
121. Bendix, Kings or People, pp. 321-62
122. Allan Silver, “The Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some of the Themes in the History of Urban Crime, Police, and Riot,” in The Police, ed. David Bordua (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), pp. 1-24.
123. North, Structure and Change and “Institutional Change.”
124. See, for example, Cheung, The Myth of Social Cost; Yoram Barzel, “Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets,” mimeographed (Seattle: Department of Economics, University of Washington, 1980).
125. North, Structure and Change: and Hechter, “A Theory of Group Solidarity,” also address the problems of monitoring. For another discussion of the problem, see Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
126. Hechter, “A Theory of Group Solidarity.”
127. Perry, From Rebellion to Revolution, esp. pp. 10-16, 38-40.
128. Bendix, Kings or People, p. 207.
129. Poor Peoples Movements: How They Succeed and Why They Fail (New York: Pan theon Books, 1977).
130. Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 963
131. Also, see North, Structure and Change. 67. Economy and Society, esp. pp. 956-63.
132. There is a considerable literature on how differences in bargaining power, based in part on essential services and in part on the right to engage in collective bargaining, result in differ ences in pay. See, for example, A. H. Raskin, “Politics Up-Ends the Bargaining Table,” in Public Workers and Public Unions, ed. Sam Zagoria (New York: American Assembly, 1972)
133. Ray mond D. Horton, Municipal Labor Relations in New York City: Lessons of the Lindsay-Wagner Years (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), chap. 6;
134. Walter Fogel and David Lewin, “Wage Determination in the Public Sector,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 27 (1974): 410- 31;
135. and Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Gerald S. Goldstein, “A Model of Public Sector Wage Deter mination,” in Public Sector Labor Relations, ed. David Lewin et aL (Glen Ridge, N.J.: Thomas Horton & Daughters, 1977), pp. 362-72.
136. John Dickinson, Death of a Republic: Politics and Political Thought at Rome, 59-44
137. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses (New York Modern Library, 1950), esp. pp. 127-28:
138. Lenin, Imperialism; Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1975), pp. 84-85 and chap. 11.