‘That dangerous and difficult enterprise’: British military thinking and the Russo-Japanese War

War and Society

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 1991, Pages 17-37

  Neilson, Keith ^a  

^a ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA   (Canada)

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EID: 84976733627     PISSN: 07292473     EISSN: 20424345     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1179/072924791791202323     Document Type: Article

References (132)

1. Tim Travers ‘Technology, Tactics and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900-1914’, Journal of Modern History, 51 (1979): 264-86.
2. ‘The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought 1870-1915’, Journal of Contemporary History, 13 (1978): 531-53.
3. Michael Howard, ‘Men Against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914’ in Stephen L. Miller (ed.), Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, 1985), 41-57.
4. ‘Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914’ in Peter Paret (ed.), The Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, 1986), 510-25.
5. Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, 1984).
6. Captain A.H.C. Kearsey, ‘The Manner in which the Infantry Attack can best be supported by Artillery Fire, Having regard to the present system of artillery training and to recent improvements in materiel’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 54 (1910): 772.
7. Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1985).
8. J.M. Westwood, Russia Against Japan 1904-05 A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1986).
9. Raymond A. Esthus, Double Eagle and Rising Sun The Russians and the Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905 (Durham, 1988).
10. Richard Connaughton, The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear (London, 1989). However, in purely military terms, the Russo-Japanese War remains little examined.
11. Peter Towle, ‘The Russo-Japanese War and British Military Thought’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 116 (1971): 64-8.
12. ‘The Effect of the Russo-Japanese War on British Naval Policy’, Mariner’s Mirror, 60: 4 (1974), 383-94.
13. ‘The Evaluation of the Experience of the Russo-Japanese War’ in Brian Ranft, (ed.), Technical Change and British Naval Policy 1860-1939 (London, 1977), 65-79.
14. ‘The Russo-Japanese War and the Defence of India’, Military Affairs, 44: 3 (1980), 111-17.
15. More typical is Tim Travers’ work, which considers the Russo-Japanese War only briefly. Travers’ work culminates in his The Killing Ground. The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918 (London, 1987). Of particular interest here are pages 37-62.
16. In addition to the literature discussed below, there were a number of official and semi-official publications issued: Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, 3 vols (London, 1908-09).
17. War Office, The Russo-Japanese War: Reports from British Officers (London, 1908).
18. Admiralty War Staff, Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 4 vols (London, 1914). This latter was written by Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir E.J.S. Slade and never published, but it was widely read.
19. Viscount French of Ypres, 1914 (London, 1919), 11.
20. Captain C.E.P. Sankey, ‘The Campaign of the Future. A Possible Development’, Royal Engineers Journal, 5 (1907): 4-6.
21. L.L. Farrar, Jr, The Short-War Illusion (Santa Barbara, 1974).
22. Captain E. Rogers, ‘Siege Warfare’, Royal Engineers Journal, 17 (1913); 283.
23. Captain J.C. Matheson, ‘Some Lessons from Port Arthur’, Royal Engineers Journal 4 (1906): 252.
24. Rogers, ‘Siege Warfare’, 284.
25. Captain E.D. Swinton, ‘The Defence of a position upon Open Ground’, Royal Engineers Journal, 4 (1906): 128.
26. Matheson, ‘Some Lessons from Port Arthur’, 252.
27. Swinton, ‘The Defence of a position’, 132.
28. Major R.O. Martin, ‘Siege Artillery-Methods and Requirements from R.E.’, Royal Engineers Journal 17 (1913): 363.
29. Captain J.E.E. Craster, ‘The Attack of Entrenched Positions’, Royal Engineers Journal 3 (1906): 342.
30. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (London, 1982), 7-38.
31. Dominick Graham, ‘Observations on the Dialectics of British Tactics’ in R. Haycock and K. Neilson (eds), Men, Machines and War (Waterloo, Canada, 1988), 54-7.
32. Swinton, ‘The Defence of a position’, 134.
33. Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 51 (1907): 797-823.
34. Colonel F.D.V. Wing, ‘The Distribution and Supply of Ammunition on the Battle-Field’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 52 (1908): 895-902.
35. Barrett, ‘Lessons to be Learned’, 811. Interestingly, and of major significance for the First World War, Barrett inadvertently contradicted himself by noting, on page 810, that the fixed Russian defences at Mukden had proved invulnerable to direct attack and had fallen only when the Japanese had managed to outflank them. The rest of the direct quotations from Barrett are from page 811, unless otherwise noted.
36. Barrett himself noted (804-5) that only seven per cent of the casualties resulted from shrapnel.
37. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, 57-106 and especially 77-81 for the reasons why the French ignored the lessons of Manchuria.
38. Howard, ‘Men against Fire’, 52-7.
39. Colin Holmes and A.H. Ion, ‘Bushidō and Samurai: Images in British Public Opinion, 1894-1914’, Modern Asian Studies, 14: 2 (1980), 309-29.
40. ‘The Nation and the Military Spirit’, Royal Engineers Journal 4 (1906): 89-91, chose the nom de plume ‘Bushido’ under which to air his call for a heightened military spirit in Britain.
41. ‘Remarks by General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command, on the Training of Troops during 1907’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 52 (1908), 89, from which the following quotations are also taken.
42. Captain B. Vincent, “Artillery in the Manchurian Campaign,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 52 (1908): 28-52.
43. Dennis Showalter, ‘Prussia, Technology and War: Artillery from 1815 to 1914’, in Haycock and Neilson (eds), Men, Machines and War, especially 139-51.
44. Martin, ‘Siege Artillery-Methods and Requirements from R.E.’, 357. This view was shared by Hamilton.
45. ‘Remarks … on the Training of Troops during 1907’, 85.
46. Vincent, ‘Artillery in the Manchurian Campaign’, 31.
47. Rogers, ‘Siege Warfare’, 283, that a lack of artillery to provide oblique or enfilading fire ‘has incontestably magnified the difficulties of the close attack’.
48. Vincent, ‘Artillery in the Manchurian Campaign’, 31.
49. Edward M. Spiers, ‘Rearming the Edwardian Artillery’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 57 (1979): 167-76.
50. Matheson, ‘Some Lessons from Port Arthur’, 255, where he deprecates those who argue that new technology necessitates new theories and practices.
51. But many suggested that QF would be significant in future conflicts.
52. Vincent, ‘Artillery in the Manchurian Campaign’, 29.
53. Swinton, ‘The Defence of a Position’, 132.
54. Major K.K. Knapp, ‘The Tactical Employment of Pack-Artillery-The Influence of Armament on the Question’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 51 (1907): 722.
55. The quotation is from Vincent, ‘Artillery in the Manchurian Campaign’, 40.
56. Kearsey, ‘The Manner in which the Infantry Attack can best be supported by Artillery Fire’, 777-8.
57. Knapp, ‘Tactical Employment’, 720-4.
58. ‘Pack Artillery and the Close Support of the Infantry Attack’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 52 (1908): 962-7.
59. Major R.O. Marton, ‘The Role of Heavy Artillery on the Modern Battlefield’, Royal Engineers Journal, 18 (1913): 23-32.
60. Knapp, Tactical Employment’, 720.
61. This was interesting, for many argued-and the French were foremost in this regard in discussions about the use of their famous 75 mm gun-that the field gun was the natural offensive weapon, while the howitzer was the natural weapon of siege warfare. Such an argument had as its basic assumption a war of movement without entrenchment. Knapp’s arguments posited that the offensive would be of a different sort, and that trenches would have to be assaulted.
62. Knapp, ‘Pack Artillery’, 964-5.
63. Knapp, ‘Tactical Employment’, 772.
64. Colonel F.D.V. Wing, ‘Cavalry and Horse Artillery’, The Cavalry Journal, 3 (1908): 33.
65. Captain R.S. Hamilton-Grace, ‘Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War’, The Cavalry Journal, 4 (1910): 213-19.
66. Captain C.W. Battine, ‘The Use of the Horse Soldier in the Twentieth Century’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 52 (1908): 309-30.
67. Edward M. Spiers, ‘The British Cavalry, 1902-1914’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 57 (1979): 71-9.
68. Marquess of Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry 1816 to 1919, IV 1899 to 1913 (London, 1986), 376-423.
69. Brian Bond (ed.), The Theory and Practice of War (London, 1965), 97-125. The rest of this paragraph, except where otherwise noted, is derived from these three sources.
70. G.J. de Groot, Douglas Haig 1861-1928 (London, 1988), 84-112, 128-9.
71. R. Holmes, The Little Field Marshal: Sir John French (London, 1981), 151-65.
72. These are Haig’s views as outlined in Kitchener (the British commander-in-chief, India) to Roberts, private letter, 5 November 1903, Kitchener Papers, 30/57/27, Public Record Office, Kew.
73. Erskine Childers, War and the Arme Blanche (London, 1910).
74. The Cavalry Journal, 5 (1910): 406-13.
75. ‘War and the “Arme Blanche”’, (London, 1910), 286.
76. Barrett, ‘Lessons to be Learned’, 808.
77. Captain R.V.K. Applin, ‘Machine Gun Tactics in our Own and Other Armies’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 52 (1908): 34-65.
78. ‘Machine Guns with Cavalry’, The Cavalry Journal, 2 (1907): 320-5.
79. Battine, ‘The Use of the Horse Soldier’, 314-15.
80. Brigadier-General Sir H.S. Rawlinson, ‘Night Operations’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 52 (1908), 805.
81. Major J.M. Home, ‘Reflections on the Tactics of the Attack’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 52 (1908), 1630-1.
82. Barrett, ‘Lessons to be Learned’, 799, 801. His comments are typical.
83. Vincent, ‘Artillery in the Machurian Campaign’, 30.
84. Home, ‘Reflections on the Tactics’, 1652.
85. Wing, ‘Distribution and Supply’, 903.
86. Kearsey, ‘The Manner in which the Infantry Attack can best be supported by Artillery Fire’, 766.
87. Rawlinson, ‘Night Operations’, 805.
88. Matheson, ‘Some Lessons from Port Arthur’, 255.
89. General Staff, War Office, Field Service Regulations (London, reprinted with amendments, 1914).
90. Sir E. Spears, Liaison 1914 (London, 2nd edn, 1968).
91. Great Britain, History of the Ministry of Munitions, 12 vols (London, 1920-24), I, part 1, 16-20.
92. A. Forbes, A History of the Army Ordnance Services, III, The Great War (London, 1929), 3-4.
93. Field Service Regulations, 146, original emphasis.
94. History of the Ministry of Munitions, I, part 1, 22.
95. Forbes, History of Army Ordnance, III, 118-19.
96. General Staff, War Office, Notes From the Front (London, 1914).
97. Notes from the Front. Part II (London, 1914).
98. Notes from the Front, Part III. And Further Notes on Field Defences (London, February 1915).
99. Notes from the Front. Part IV (London, May 1915).
100. Notes from the Front, 8.
101. Notes from the Front II, 17-19.
102. Notes from the Front III, 43-59.
103. Notes from the Front, 7.
104. Notes from the Front II, 13.
105. Notes from the Front III, 10.
106. Notes from the Front II, 5-7.
107. Notes from the Front IV, 28-9.
108. Guy Hartcup, The War of Invention Scientific Developments, 1914-18 (London, 1988).
109. Spiers, ‘British Cavalry’, 75-9.
110. de Groot, Haig, 128-9, 135-7.
111. Holmes, French, 151-65.
112. Anglesey, British Cavalry, IV, 386-423.
113. Travers, Killing Ground, 3-84.
114. Tim Travers in his revealing article, ‘The Hidden Army: Structural Problems in the British Officer Corps, 1900-1918’, Journal of Contemporary History, 17 (1982): 523-44. Of particular interest are pages 524-5.
115. Such a clash was not limited to the British army. The Russian army had very similar problems involving the conflict between rising professionalism and the roles occupied by the traditional elites in the Tsarist army.
116. William C. Fuller, Jr, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914 (Princeton, 1985).
117. Dominic Lieven, Russia’s Rulers Under the Old Regime (New Haven, 1989).
118. H.V. Emy, Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics 1892-1914 (Cambridge, 1973).
119. H.S. Weinroth, ‘The British radicals and the balance of power, 1902-14’, Historical Journal, 13 (1970): 653-82.
120. David French, British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905-1915 (London, 1982), 24.
121. E.W. Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer (Edinburgh, 1980).
122. W.H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago, 1982), 262-306.
123. Clive Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise, 1854-1914 (London, 1977).
124. Showalter, ‘Prussia, Technology and War’.
125. Keith Neilson, ‘Watching the “Steamroller”: British Observers and the Russian Army before 1914’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 8: 2 (1985), 207-14.
126. The dual nature of the BEF was intended from its creation.
127. E.W. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (London, 1980), 268-84.
128. E.W. Spiers, Haldane, 192-3.
129. Howard Bailes, ‘Technology and Tactics in the British Army’, in Haycock and Neilson (eds), Men, Machines and War, 26-36.
130. Hamilton to Kitchener (British commander-in-chief, India), letter, 25 December, 1904, Kitchener Papers, 30/57/37 PRO.
131. Major J.M. Home, ‘The Russo-Japanese War up to 15th August, 1904. A Report’, 15 February 1905, WO 33/337 PRO.
132. Graham and Bid well, Fir e-Power, 17-21, 49-58.