Inclusion and mobilization in european leninist regimes

World Politics

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1975, Pages 69-96

  Jowitt, Kenneth ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84976193327     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: 10863338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2010030     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. For one Leninist regime's attempts to move in this direction see Jowitt, "Political Innovation in Romania," Survey, Vol. 93 (Autumn 1074), 132-52.
2. See Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," in The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: Norton 1969), 172-215; and Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1970), 33-117.
3. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books 1970), 3-48.
4. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" in Brzezinski, ed., Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics (New York: Columbia University Press 1969), 1-35; for a restatement of this thesis, see Zvi Gitelman, "Beyond Leninism, Political Development in Eastern Europe," Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism, v (May 1972), 18-44.
5. During the consolidation period, Leninist regimes typically attempt to invidiously distinguish regime supporters from nonsupporters and to socially isolate the former. In short, at the social level as well as in the relations between society and polity, insulation is the major characteristic at this stage of development. Social "elites" are forced to forsake their social-occupational identities in order to share in political status and responsibilities. Inclusion regimes are characterized by attempts to integrate social and political roles. On the "insulative" tendencies of consolidation regimes, see Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (New York: John Wiley & Sons 1956), 400-434.
6. On this central point, see Peter C. Ludz, The Changing Party Elite in East Germany (Cambridge: MIT Press 1972), 40-42, 126, 185; Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York: Random House 1965).
7. Obshchestvennikj are party members who, while active as consultants and even as officeholders in the party organization, are not full-time party apparatus workers. I have attempted to analyze their significance in terms of national development in my paper, "State and National Development in Contemporary Eastern Europe" (un-pub.).
8. See Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," American Political Science Review, Vol. 68 (September 1974), 1171-91.
9. On the extent of rights of dissent in the Romanian party, see Statutul Partidului Communist Roman (Bucharest 1959), 40.
10. See, for example, the interesting article by Thomas Baylis, "East Germany: In Quest of Legitimacy," Problems of Communism, xxi (March-April 1072), 46-56.
11. Baylis (fn. 15), and Peter C. Ludz, "Continuity and Change Since Ulbricht," Problems of Communism, xxi (March-April 1972), 56-57. Ludz has provided an excellent and succinct analysis of development in the D.D.R. in The German Democratic Republic jrom the Sixties to the Seventies (Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1970); see also Ross Johnson, "Poland: End of an Era," Problems of Communism, xix (January-February 1970), 28-40.
12. See, for example, Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite," World Politics, xxiv (April 1972), 382-409.
13. David Halberstam, "The Programming of Robert McNamara," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 242 (February 1971), 7-21. The term "model" should not suggest that "managerial" cadres in Leninist regimes consciously have McNamara in mind.
14. For Weber's comparison, see The Protestant Ethic (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1958), 69-78.
15. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, "The Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," in Robin Alison Remington, ed., Winter in Prague (Cambridge: MIT Press 1969), 88-137.
16. For the East German reform, see Baylis (fn. 15), and "Economic Reform as Ideology: East Germany's New Economic System," Comparative Politics, m (January; 1971), 211-31. See also the fine article by Bennet Kovrig, "Decompression in Hungary:: Phase Two," in Peter A. Toma, ed., The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern) Europe (Tucson: University of Arizona Press 1970), 196-202, for an analysis of the upgrading of economic-managerial personnel that attended the Hungarian reforms.
17. On recruitment patterns during the sixties, see Frank Parkin, "Class Stratification in Socialist Societies," British Journal of Sociology, xx (December 1969), W-vs.
18. Aryeh L. Unger, "Politinformator or Agitator: A Decision Blocked," Problems of Communism, xix (September-October 1970), 31.
19. See Kovrig (fn. 22); also Barnabas Racz, "Political Changes in Hungary after the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," Slavic Review, xxix (December 1970), 633-51; and in particular William F. Robinson, The Pattern of Reform in Hungary (New York: Praeeer 1973), 238-45 and 326-42.
20. See the very perceptive piece by Jerry Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" in Problems of Communism, xxi (March-April 1972), 25-46.
21. For a report of the meeting of economic managers, see Scinteia, February 18, 1972.
22. The rapid and visible rise of sociological studies in Leninist political systems is easily documented. For an interesting analysis of this rise, see Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books 1970), 447-78.
23. For the Romanian position, see "Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers Party Concerning the Problems of the International Communist and Working Class Movement (April 1964)" in Wm. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 11)64-1, 965 (Cambridge: MIT Press 1967), 269-97.
24. See Remington (fn. 21), 133-34. On Bulgaria, see J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule (New York: Praeger 1970), 173-301; Michael Costello, "Bulgaria," in Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, eds., The Communist States in Disarray 1965-1981 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1972), 135-58; Marin V. Pundeff, "Bulgaria under Zhivkov," in Toma (fn. 22), 89-121.
25. Costello (fn. 31), 155.
26. For an analysis of a development of this order, see Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971). 221-24, 280-82.
27. Galia Golan, "The Road to Reform," Problems of Communism, xx (May-June 1971), 11-22.
28. See Miron Constantinescu, "Valorificarea critica a mostenirii culturale," in Luceafarul, May 6, 1972, and Remington (fn. 21), 131-32.
29. As Neil Smelser has pointed out in "Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., Industrialization and Society (Paris: UNESCO, Mouton 1968), 32-57, the process of differentiation places a premium on effective integrative processes. Social disturbances are often the result of discontinuities between differentiation and integration. One may view the reassertion of a mobilization posture in many Leninist regimes as the party's attempt at an integrative response.
30. On this point, see the discussion in Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (London: MacGibbon & Kee 1971), 137-86; on the conflict between workers and managers in Hungary and on the increasing status of managers under the N. E.M., see Kovrig (fn. 22), and Racz (fn. 26). The place of China in all of this is complex. I would suggest that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was both an attack on the "new class" (i. e., against a Stalinist consolidation structure) and an attack on a Soviet-type inclusion structure with its emphasis on "political" integration with a new professional class and exclusion of the mass of the population. China offers the student of Leninist regimes conceptions and definitions of both consolidation and inclusion that differ from those of the Soviets.
31. Kovrig has characterized the contemporary social ethos in Hungary as "collective and intergenerational alienation… obsessive materialism and a partial breakdown of traditional morality…" (fn. 22), 208. He notes that young people in Hungary "are reluctant to be transformed into obedient factors of production" (p. 21). There is evidence that young people in Bulgaria, Poland (under Gomulka), Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union are estranged in many respects from the structure and ethos of party rule.
32. For example, see the Romanian party's statement on November 4, 1971 (Scinteia); the emphasis on ideological preparation in Hungary manifested in county-level "educational directorates" (Racz, fn. 26, p. 638); the thrust of the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; the emphasis in North Korea on the ideological revolution; the emphasis on consciencia in Cuba, and recent developments in Yugoslavia.
33. Gitelman (fn. 8), is a case in point.
34. Jeremy Azrael, "Varieties of De-Stalinization," in Johnson (fn. 6), 135-53.
35. Though important, the changes in these regimes, particularly the North Korean, were quite limited. On Bulgaria, see Brown (fn. 31); on North Korea, see Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, "North Korea's Seven Year Plan (1961-1968): Economic Performance and Reforms," Asian Survey, xn (June 1972).
36. Thus, at the point of their initial encounter, tradition and modernity are antithetical. They can and do form amalgams but their viability depends on one or the other establishing a de jure or de facto superordinate position. As Halpern has argued, "the two things that cannot be combined at all are the best in traditional society and the best in modern society. Indeed before anything significantly traditional can be combined with anything significantly modern, a revolution must first have torn apart the closed system of tradition so that it may not merely add or substitute the new, but become capable of assimilating it." See Manfred Halpern, "The Revolution of Modernization in National and International Society," in Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, eds., Issues in Comparative Politics (New York: St. Martins Press 1971), 52; also Jowitt (fn. 35), Part 1, esp. n. 5, pp. 63-64.
37. See Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books 1062), 383-416.
38. See Mark Field, "Soviet Society and Communist Party Controls: A Case of 'Constricted' Development," in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1967), for an analysis that confuses liberal modernity with modernity. In spite of that, Field's analysis of regime-society relationships and developments is very acute. For a more complex appreciation of the character of Soviet development, see J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, "Industrialization, Development, or Modernization," British journal of Sociology, xvn (September 1066), 274-01.
39. For an excellent and insightful analysis of the conflicting emphases in the American tradition and the character of its resolution, see Norman Jacobson, "Political Science and Political Education," American Political Science Review, lvii (September 1963), 561-69; for the Mao-Liu conflict, see the revised edition of Franz Schurmann's
40. Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press 1968), 501-93, as well as Benjamin Schwartz's "The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution," in John Wilson Lewis, ed., Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge [England] University Press 1970), 149-70.