Congruence between citizens and policymakers in two visions of liberal democracy

World Politics

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 1994, Pages 291-326

  Huber, John D ^a   Powell, G Bingham ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84976128062     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: 10863338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2950684     Document Type: Article

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