Choice Character, and Excuse

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 1990, Pages 29-58

  Moore, Michael S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84976114120     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: 14716437     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0265052500000753     Document Type: Article

References (81)

1. Michael S. Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, 1984), pp. 233–243.
2. Michael S. Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribution,”, Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, 1987), pp. 179–219
3. Michael S. Moore, “Causation and the Excuses,” California Law Review, vol. 73, no. 4 (July 1985), pp. 1091–1149.
4. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 1986), p. 179.
5. R.B. Brandt, “A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law,”, Nomos XXVII: Criminal Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1985), pp. 165–98
6. Nicola Lacey, State Punishment, 1988, p. 62
7. Hyman Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice, 1979, p. 137
8. Sandord H. Kadish, “Excusing Crime,” Blame and Punishment, 1987, pp. 81–106
9. Michael D. Bayles, “Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility,” Law and Philosophy, vol 1, 1982, pp. 5–20, at p. 6;
10. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Chitty ed., voL IV (London, 1826), p. 20.
11. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 1968).
12. H.L.A. Hart, “Legal Responsibility and Excuses,”, Determinism and Freedom, 1958, pp. 28–53.
13. J.L. Austin, “Ifs and Cans,”, Freedom and Responsibility, 1961.
14. H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honors, Causation in the Law, 1985
15. Benjamin Libet, “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action,” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 8, no. 4 (Fall 1985), pp. 529–66.
16. Herbert Fingarette, Heavy Drinking: The Myth of Alcoholism as a Disease, 1989 vol. 99, pp. 660–61.
17. Stephen Morse, “Psychology, Determinism, and Legal Responsibility,”, Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1985: Volume 33, pp. 35–85.
18. Richard McKeon, Introduction to Aristotle, 1973, pp. 387–88.
19. Sigmund Freud, “Moral Responsibility for the Content of Dreams,”, Standard Edition of the Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 19, pp. 131–34.
20. Michael Moore, “Mind, Brain, and Unconscious,”, Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science, 1988, pp. 141–166.
21. Moore, Law and Psychiatry, pp. 67–77.
22. John Sabini and Maury Silver, “Emotions, Responsibility, and Character,” Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, 1987, pp. 164–75
23. David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (LaSalle: Open Court, 1949), p. 108
24. Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory, 1959, pp. 465–74;
25. Brandt, “Blameworthiness and Obligation,”Essays in Moral Philosophy, 1958), pp. Iff
26. Brandt, “The Ultilitarian Theory of Excuse,” Philosophical Review, vol. 78, 1969, pp. 337–61;
27. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuse.
28. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, pp. 799–802
29. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 1981, pp. 384–387
30. Bayles, “Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility”
31. George Vuoso, “Background, Responsibility, and Excuse,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 96, 1987, pp. 1661–86;
32. P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” ed. G. Watson, Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 59–80.
33. Gary Watson“Responsibility and the Limits of Evil,”, Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, 1987, pp. 256–86
34. Brandt, “Traits of Character: A Conceptual Analysis,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 7, 1970, pp. 23–37
35. Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 14–16.
36. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1949.
37. Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), pp. 222–25
38. David Papineau, Theory and Meaning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 182
39. Michael S. Moore, “Mind, Brain, and the Unconscious.”
40. Morris Eagle, “Anatomy of the Self in Psychoanalytic Theory,”, Nature Animated, 1983, pp. 133–61
41. Michael S. Moore, “The Unity of Self,” pp. 163–202 of the same volume
42. Herbert Fingarette, Self-Deception, 1969
43. Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” Journalof Philosophy, vol. 72, no. 8 (April 1975), pp. 205–20
44. Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self, 1973, pp. 15–18
45. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, pp. 395–99
46. Charles Taylor, “Responsibility for Self,”The Identities of Persons, 1976, pp. 281–99
47. Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, 1971, pp. 5–20;
48. Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,”, Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, 1987, pp. 27–45.
49. Susan Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” ed. F. Schoeman, Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, pp. 46–62
50. Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil,” p. 281
51. See, e.g., Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p. 396.
52. Dan Dennett, “Mechanism and Responsibility,”Essays on Freedom of Action, 1973, pp. 175–80.
53. Moore, Law and Psychiatry, pp. 343–347.
54. Bernard Williams, “Morality and the Emotions,” in his Problems of the Self, pp. 207–229
55. All such expressions may be found in Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p. 383
56. Bayles, “Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility,” p. 7;
57. Brandt, “A Motivational Theory of Excuse,” pp. 165, 171
58. Lacey State Punishment, p. 66
59. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, pp. 799, 801
60. Vuoso, “Background, Responsibility, and Excuse,” pp. 1672–73
61. John Martin Fischer, “Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility,”, Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, pp. 81–100, at 103–
62. Brandt, “A Motivational Theory of Excuses,” pp. 184–94
63. Lacey, State Punishment, pp. 65–72
64. Bayles, “Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility.”
65. Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil
66. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, pp. 801–2;
67. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, pp. 393–96.
68. Brandt, “A Motivational Theory of Excuse,” p. 172;
69. Arenella, “Character, Choice, and Moral Agency,” social Philosophy, vol. 7, 1990
70. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, pp. 395.
71. John Hospers, “Meaning and Free Will,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 10 (1950), pp. 307–30.
72. Ferdinand Schoeman, “Introduction,” Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, p. 5
73. Moore, “The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?,” Stanford Law Review, vol. 41, 1989, pp. 871–957
74. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, p. 800
75. Lacey, State Punishment, p. 68.
76. William Gaylin, The Killing of Bonnie Garland (New York: Penguin Books, 1983)
77. Michael Moore, “The Unity of the Self,”, Nature Animated, 1982)
78. Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribution,” pp. 212–16.
79. Jay Katz, Joseph Goldstein, and Alan Dershowitz, Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry, and Law (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 526–35
80. Fletcher, Rethinking, pp. 800–801
81. H.L.A. Hart, “Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility,” in Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 136–57